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“In energy policy, big ideas may be needed, but the devil is often in the 
details.  This book combines assessments of broad policy decisions with 
a closer look at some of the issues raised as those major policies come 
into effect.  It starts with the EU’s main targets for energy – the 20% 
reductions in carbon emissions and energy intensity, and the 20% share 
of renewable energy – and its flagship Emissions Trading System.  Later 
chapters consider the current (in)efficiency of European energy use, the 
potential of the smart grid, how regulation can affect productivity in 
electricity distribution and how to pay for the flexible generators that 
will be needed alongside less flexible low-carbon plants.  The book will be 
useful for policymakers, those working in the electricity industry and those 
studying it.”
Richard Green, Alan and Sabine Howard Professor of Sustainable Energy 
Business, Imperial College London
“This is a much-needed book for policymakers, scholars and any 
serious student of energy policy in today’s complex environment. The 
contributions unravel the current European energy framework and point 
out shortcomings, incoherences, gaps and mismanaged uncertainties 
that lead to suboptimal outcomes. They also show the way forward for 
an effective European energy policy including the always complicated 
mix of national and supranational jurisdictions. The mixture of normative 
and empirical analysis offered by the book will prove useful to those 
implementing policy reform in European energy.”
Jose Luis Guasch, Professor Emeritus, University of California San Diego; 
Former Senior Adviser on Regulation and Competitiveness, and Head of 
the World Bank Global Expert Team on PPPs
“Energy economics is dead … long live energy economics. This book 
provides the most up-to-date analysis of current challenges to energy 
economics and energy policy in Europe, covering environmental, planning, 
distributional issues as well as traditional issues such as generation 
adequacy. A must-read for those interested in ‘the next generation’ of 
energy economics.”
Christian von Hirschhausen, Professor of Economic and Infrastructure 
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Foreword
This book is one of the research products made possible during 2013 thanks to 
the support of the Chaire Bernard Van Ommeslaghe established at ECARES 
(the European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics) at the 
Université libre de Bruxelles. One of the goals of the Chair is to get academic 
researchers to stimulate policy debates and anticipate issues likely to emerge as 
a result of, first, policy mistakes or omissions, and second, changing economic 
or societal contexts. This is exactly what the various chapters deliver. They 
assess the multiple facets of the energy policy challenges the various European 
countries and Europe as a whole are likely to have to face in the foreseeable 
future. In doing so, they suggest that the scope for improvements in quantitative 
policy assessments is still large, notwithstanding the significant improvements 
achieved in recent years. They highlight a number of inconsistencies and 
coordination failures within and across countries. They also point to a number of 
possible options not yet explored in policy debates.
To those of us associated with the Chair, it is our hope that the chapters of this 
book will help in refining the research agenda for the sector and also the heated 
policy debates on energy policy that will no doubt continue as governments try 
to balance concerns for cheap energy (to support competitiveness and minimise 
fuel poverty) with the acceleration of the transformation of the sector (to boost 
energy independence and reduce environmental hazards).
Mathias Dewatripont







The main purpose of this book is to share the results of a series of policy-oriented 
think pieces on energy policy sponsored during 2013 by the Chaire Bernard 
Van Ommeslaghe of European Center for Advanced Research in Economics 
and Statistics (ECARES) of the Université Libre de Bruxelles in Brussels, and 
the Centre for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) in London. The chapters 
deal with various facets of the energy policy challenges Europe as a region and 
European countries are likely to face in the foreseeable future. 
Overall, the book confirms increasingly well-known concerns over the 
difficulties encountered by Europe in getting its energy policies right, but it 
also provides new insights on specific key difficulties encountered in defining 
both regional and national policies. While a number of these insights are known 
at least conceptually to many of the experts following the European energy 
debates, some more specific dimensions of their relevance are less familiar. It 
is clear from recurrent omissions and imprecisions in political speeches across 
Europe that many policymakers responsible for some of the central decisions in 
the sector tend to ignore or underestimate many of the subtle, essential drivers of 
success and failure for their political and policy commitments. It also seems clear 
that the scope for improvements in the quantification of choices is significant, as 
illustrated by some of the diagnostics illustrated in this book. Quantification is 
essential to be able to distinguish between cynicism and incompetence in policy, 
and this book contributes to the efforts to improve accountability for decisions 
in the sector by reducing the scope for decision-makers (and many users) to hide 
behind the veil of ignorance in the energy sector. 
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To ensure the broadest possible audience without underestimating some of the 
complex dimensions of the challenge, the book is written in such a way that the 
key messages come through as directly as possible without shying away from 
the technical dimensions. Indeed, these more technical dimensions are often part 
of the challenges or the reasons why some issues are underestimated and lessons 
from past mistakes ignored. 
thE broAd contExt
A superficial reading of the evidence would blame many of the current energy 
policy challenges on politics, or at least on the inability or unwillingness of 
politicians to take decisions or to make the right ones. Not all energy problems 
are purely political, however. Politics matter of course, as illustrated in various 
chapters of this book, but they are not alone in explaining the slow rate at which 
energy policy is changing and adapting to tomorrow’s needs. One of the lessons 
of the many books and articles that have been produced over the last 10 or 15 
years is that energy policy is also becoming increasingly complex from an 
economics perspective. Poor internalisation of the analytical requirements of 
this increased complexity has now become part of the policy problem. 
About 30 years ago, energy policy was relatively simple among the many policy 
areas government had to deal with. It was about ensuring that energy would be 
delivered smoothly regardless of provider, source, cost and competition. It then 
became somewhat more complex with the desire to reduce the role of the state as 
a provider and to increase competition to cut costs to users and taxpayers. With 
the growing concern for the greening of energy, the need to consider the choice 
of energy source more carefully became increasingly important as well. In the 
European context, the desire to ensure a minimum level of coordination across 
countries in the vision for the energy sector also further increased the complexity 
of its management, operation, financing and supervision. 
Energy policy is clearly no longer simple, but its complexity seems to be 
increasing and this raises uncertainty in the sector. It also reduces the ability of 
key actors to decide upon and to deliver on increasingly reversible commitments 
that are made too early, too poorly informed and too incompletely analysed. 
There is a plethora of anecdotes across countries with striking similarities 
that point to recurrent themes and trade-offs. These reveal the high degree of 
complexity and the difficulty for policymakers to make the right decisions. The 
main themes can be categorised as follows: 
i. the lasting unhappiness with the increasing gap in average industrial 
tariffs between the EU and its competitors, which is blamed (not totally 
adequately) for a reduction in the industrial competitiveness of Europe;
ii. the growing unhappiness with the increase in real residential tariffs 
across Europe in difficult economic times with growing shares of the 
population facing increasingly binding budget constraints;
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iii. the exploding unhappiness of some producers and consumers with the 
reversal of national commitments to subsidise renewable energy and 
their inability to recover investments; and
iv. the underestimated unhappiness with the indecisiveness with respect to 
various technological options for the future of the sector (and which may 
explain changes of heart over nuclear power plants or carbon capture, 
for instance). Each has political costs, but each also has some significant 
costs for today’s and tomorrow’s users and taxpayers. 
The different ways in which different countries and political parties tackle 
these challenges increases the uncertainty over the costs and benefits of various 
organisational structures for the sector at the national level. They also increase 
the difficulty of developing coordination mechanisms that deliver cost-effective 
integration of the European markets and, in particular, an honest vision of the 
investment requirements in transmission and in the added flexibility requirements 
imposed by the collective, dominating desire to rely more on renewable sources 
of energy.
This uncertainty is far from simply an intellectual curiosity for academics. 
It matters in an industry expecting to rely on private investors and operators 
taking a lead role in the delivery of an essential service with obvious social 
intergenerational impacts. Investors in this sector care as much about risks as 
in any other sector, and high uncertainty means higher risks. Higher risks mean 
higher expected return. Higher expected returns mean higher average tariffs. 
High expected average tariffs mean higher social damage from the national and 
supranational mismanagement of the sector. 
This represents a change in the sector. Energy companies used to be so 
predictable that they were often seen as a safe haven for investors. The high 
proportion of pension funds willing to invest in energy over the last 15 years is a 
good indicator of this perception. This is changing rapidly. In Europe, investing 
in energy firms is no longer for the faint of heart and this can largely be blamed 
on the fact that policy has become unpredictable (one of the implicit lessons 
of Johan’s Aldrecht chapter, for example). And the risk aversion with respect 
to investment in the sector is not expected to improve in the foreseeable future 
unless national and supranational policymakers sort out a growing number of 
concerns which are fuelling complexity, incoherence and uncertainty. 
Policymakers are not insensitive to these concerns and many significant 
changes have taken place in energy policy in 2013 to try to improve the 
investment climate in the sector. However, many have also contributed to 
the confusion in the signals sent to operators and consumers rather than to a 
clarification of the institutional and financial mechanisms that will be adopted 
to deliver the promised convergence towards a greener common energy policy. 
Short-term national and supranational political pragmatism is indeed coming at 
the cost of increases in short- and long-term uncertainty. Some of this may be 
related to an underestimation of the scope of action available to governments to 
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reduce residential and non-residential energy consumption, as illustrated in the 
chapter by Laurens Cherchye, Bram De Rock and Barnabé Walheer on the level 
of sectoral energy consumption inefficiency tolerated thanks to the misguided 
belief that it is needed to save jobs. It is also related to the occasional misreading 
of the scope for regulatory effectiveness, as illustrated by the Spanish case 
study presented in this book. When things go well, everyone takes the credit for 
success, including regulators. It is only when things don’t work as well as they 
should that the various stakeholders try to identify who should have been doing 
what and failed to do so.   
Ultimately, excessive short-term political and operational pragmatism rather 
than incompetence is probably to blame for many of the incoherencies and gaps 
in the current European design of energy policy. Central to these are the failure 
to create institutions with a clear mandate and well-established incentives to 
minimise incoherencies, and gaps in efforts to reconcile national sovereign 
concerns with the supranational concerns. 
The most obvious institutional failure is that the assignment of responsibilities 
between the supranational and the national authorities in Europe is still incomplete 
(and probably confusing). This has left significant gaps in the accountability 
built into the current governance structures. Regulators across Europe have been 
(and continue to be) slow to react to evolving market conditions, but also to 
abuses allowed by cracks in the governance wall intended to protect users and 
taxpayers. This slow reaction time built into the institutional inadequacies of 
the system has allowed insidious, unjustifiable increases in market power. This 
then leads to incoherencies such as the failure to recognise that there is no need 
to define the social and environmental goals of the sector in terms of trade-off 
(i.e. cutting prices to protect today’s users versus increasing today’s prices to 
protect tomorrow’s users and taxpayers), as too many recent political decisions 
imply. Reconciling regulatory, social and industrial policy objectives is possible, 
but the process seems to be turning a bit schizophrenic instead, as implied by 
Claude Crampes’ discussion of the implementation challenges of the EU’s 20-
20-20 Vision. 
A second obvious gap is the failure to reconstruct the planning ability for 
investments that was eliminated as a result of the desire to increase the role of 
the private sector and shrink the role of the public sector in energy over 15 years 
ago. It has been replaced by a planning process which generates bureaucratic 
red tape, easy politicising of technical and economic decisions, and uncertainty, 
rather than a process that sends a clear signal to investors from all boards. There 
is very little strategising possible for the implementation of politically defined 
visions without the discipline offered by simpler and clearer sector planning. 
Europe is seeing now what early reformers in Latin America discovered 15 years 
ago when they began to face the increased risks of rationing due to insufficient 
or uncoordinated investments in the sector resulting from the tabla rasa strategy 
adopted in the redesign of the governance structure of the sector. Operational 
planning is back in Latin America, it never disappeared in the key emerging 
economies of Asia (following Korea’s lead), and it will have to return in Europe 
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and many other OECD countries if investment has to adjust to the interests of 
both users and taxpayers.  
A third gap is in the clarification of the definition of the real scope for 
coordination in Europe in view of the great variation in market and production 
structures across countries. In spite of these differences, the concerns across 
countries are largely similar but today’s failures show that changes are needed and 
that in this context, pragmatism rather than idealism may be needed to ensure the 
political support at the national level of supranational commitments. The payoffs 
to improved coordination can be categorised into two broad groups: (i) more 
investment to implement the changes in production and market structures; and 
(ii) different regulations and regulatory frameworks to ensure the sustainability 
and the adaptability of the changes.  
The changes observed in the production structures are largely driven by the 
need to increase the share of renewable energies among the various sources 
of energy relied upon (and in some countries, by the desire to cut the share 
of nuclear energy as well). The changes in the market structure emphasise 
improvements in the management of demand (i.e. improved energy efficiency) 
as well as continued improvements in competition in the industry, including 
more international competition. Changes on both the production and the demand 
side will require significant investments, as seen in the British and Belgian case 
studies covered in this book. Investments are indeed needed to integrate the new 
renewable sources as well as to improve the international mobility of energy. 
They are also needed to implement the technological changes that are needed to 
improve the efficiency of the sector. Systems to make energy require investments 
as well. 
To ensure that the key actors in the sector have the right financial incentives to 
deliver the investment needed and to use these investments efficiently, changes 
in regulation are also needed. This will also require changes in the economic 
incentives faced by these actors. Social issues are serious, of course, and will 
have to be addressed, but this has to be done in an environment in which prices 
will have to reflect more accurately externalities. In many countries, this has 
been dealt with through short-term politically motivated decisions disregarding 
the longer-term consequences on investment and consumption incentives. 
Taxpayers’ money has often been wasted supporting short-term solutions without 
regard to the longer-term consequences of these decisions. And yet our ability 
to design price structures that will protect those who need it without sending the 
wrong signals in terms of demand management is something relatively easy to 
do with the design of tariffs structures and/or through the targeting of subsidies, 
with relatively low administrative costs.
The European Commission is making notable efforts to reduce these 
uncertainties and incoherencies and to push for the search for more desirable 
policy interventions (European Commission, 2013a,b,c). It is doing this 
by attempting to clarify messages and commitments but, in the process, it 
sometimes also adds to the confusion. Consider the evolution of its views on the 
management of the sector in 2013. In May 2013, it issued a review of the energy 
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challenges Europe will have to address over the short to medium run. To the 
recurring discussions of (i) the interactions between energy policies and concerns 
for climate change, and (ii) energy supply security, it added the need to work on 
the economic competitiveness and social impacts of the energy challenges.1 This 
made sense and it then included a positive assessment of the role played by 
subsidies in stimulating the development of renewable sources of energy and an 
explicit discussion of the need to increase the use of prices to improve demand 
management. In early November 2013, less than 6 months later, it issued new 
guidelines to eventually end costly and controversial subsidies for renewable 
energy, but possibly opening the way for state-aid backing of gas or coal-fired 
electricity generation projects.2 It also hinted that state aid to invest in nuclear 
energy was not desirable, less than a month after the British government decided 
to invest in a new nuclear price with a guaranteed price that will be hard to meet 
without some form of subsidy. It is indeed hard not to be confused.
In sum, the broad context in which energy policy is currently being designed is 
dominated by uncertainty with respect to the key drivers of optimal choices for 
the sector. And as we are all collectively learning, politicians and bureaucrats are 
all showing an impressive degree of (often well intended) political pragmatism. 
However, it turns out that this pragmatism is reaching the stage at which it may be 
hindering more than helping the transformation of the sector. It is thus essential 
to increase the transparency of the damage done by not figuring out the costs and 
benefits of the various options and by not recognising the costs of indecision or 
of reversing decisions based on intuition and political responsiveness rather than 
on facts. Increasing this transparency is one of the clearest roles of the following 
chapters. 
thE broAd mEssAgE of thE book
Overall, the book is likely to leave the reader somewhat concerned. The main 
impression to emerge from the evidence reported by the various chapters is that 
the road to a sustainable and credible European policy is a long and increasingly 
winding one, which builds on national feeder roads that are not all in good 
shape.  Some will actually lead nowhere unless key policy and implementation 
decisions are finally taken in credible ways. Many need significant rehabilitation 
if the energy vision for 2020 is to become a reality. 
The book also provides some clear broad suggestions, in addition to the issue-
specific recommendations that are made in each chapter. Collectively, the various 
authors have managed to accumulate convincing evidence that learning from the 
recent failures in energy policy is essential. This is because the recognition of 
the sources of, and the quantification of, their costs should make all actors in the 
1 The most popular description of the targets to be achieved is the "20 20 20 by 2020", reflecting the 
idea that, by 2020, Europe wants to reduce CO2 emissions by 20% compared to 1990 levels, to raise 
the share of renewable sources as part of the overall EU energy mix to 20% and to increase energy 
efficiency by 20%. 
2  http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/doc/com_2013_public_intervention_en.pdf
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sector more humble in self-assessments of the policy achievements in the recent 
past. Most of the chapters show clearly that improving clarity and reducing 
both innocence and excessive pragmatism in the design of policies could go 
a long way towards cutting increasingly unbearable costs in the sectors. An 
implementation strategy that would be physically, economically and politically 
viable is possible; it simply requires investing more in details at the institutional, 
policy and political level. 
In this context, learning from the data is just as important as learning the 
conceptualisations of issues. Energy policy is no different from any other policy, 
and data and their analysis teaches lessons on the willingness to change, the 
willingness to pay for change and the ability to pay for change. It also allows 
for increasing transparency of the quantified revealed preferences of producers, 
consumers and politicians. This should be used to cut short many of the 
unsubstantiated debates on what works and what does not. It also provides key 
insights on where communication with users and voters on the costs and benefits 
of the various possible roads by the experts and the politicians is failing.
This may seem obvious to some, but the fact that key decisions are not taken 
or are often reversed in the context of energy policy is not without long-term 
consequences. The most obvious of these are environmental, but there are also 
many social and fiscal consequences. Many would argue that the failure to deliver 
on such a central policy is also likely to have brutal political consequences, as 
it redefines what is possible in terms of coordination of sectoral policies across 
Europe. Several other evaluations have made similar points with respect to the 
integration of energy markets since the European Commission issued its revised 
energy guidelines in May 2013.3 However, few get into many of the details of 
specific trade-offs and specific national policy implementation efforts, as the 
contributors to this volume have been willing and able to do. And yet a broad 
range of more specific messages are possible, as seen in the individual chapters. 
thE spEcific contributions of EAch chAptEr
Claude Crampes reviews the economics of the 20-20-20 vision aiming at 
cleaning, greening and saving energy by 2020. He focuses on the competition 
and regulation dimensions of the implementation of the vision and the overall 
coherence of these policies with the sector’s objectives. He points out that the 
European authorities are progressively abandoning the simple objective of 
enhancing competition. Indeed, he shows that with a combination of quantitative 
targets and penalties for non-compliance, member states are gradually moving 
towards somewhat ad hoc ex-post adjustment planning mechanisms where new 
corrections try to fix the negative consequences of former corrections without 
3  To name just a few that are well worth reading in that they provide a large number of important 
insights on the current debates: Booz & Company (2013), Buchan (2013) Glachant and Reuster 
(2013), Vasconcelos (2013), Von Hirshhausen (2013), Waddams et al. (2013) and Zachman (2013).
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much concern for the big picture. The final outcome of this process is the 
addition of layers of industrial policy to competition policy, combined with the 
uncoordinated addition of environmental policy to energy policy. 
This chapter makes a large number of quite specific suggestions on various 
key dimensions of the sector at the European level. At a more general level, it 
emphasises the important role R&D should be playing, but cannot play, in the 
context of fiscal support to these activities shrinking as a result of the crisis. 
He also points to the need to turn the cheap talk on the political commitment 
to demand management into concrete actions, including the restoration of the 
economic signalling power of pricing across most activities in the sector. At 
a more subtle level, he points to the need to establish a clearer hierarchy of 
policies to ensure their coherence. At the institutional level, he points to the 
need to get the essence of the problem, which is simply the management of a 
common resource and the allocation of rights over this resource. In this context, 
he suggests the creation of an independent “Intergenerational Regulation Fund” 
with a clear mandate to define and enforce rules of the game in the best interests 
of both present and future generations.
Johan Aldrecht focuses on the investment needs associated with the new 
visions of the energy sector and on their financing requirements. He shows 
that in most European countries, electricity prices are currently too low to 
trigger new investments in efficient generation and network assets. Yet, these 
investments are essential to prepare the energy transition. The economic crisis 
resulted in a significant conventional overcapacity on European electricity 
markets while the low CO
2
 emission price provides no incentive for ambitious 
mitigation investments. He argues that the current stalemate risks becoming 
structural. European climate policies combined technology-neutral instruments, 
like ETS, with supplementary technology-imposing targets, such as the RES, 
and energy efficiency targets by 2020. But the rigid supplementary measures 
to flank carbon pricing contributed to generation overcapacity and low CO
2
 
prices. The policies designed to achieve the long-term vision underestimated 
the short-run reactions of the market. Strategic banking of benefits (i.e. transfers 
of unused permits from one phase to the next) between ETS Phases, including 
in the later ones, will influence short-term market behaviour and CO
2
 prices 
(i.e. between 2015 and 2020). It is rational to expect a significant increase in 
the demand for permits during that period and, hence, an increase in prices. But 
it is just as rational to expect that changes in goals (e.g. 30/30/30 rather than 
20/20/20) would also impact demand and prices and distort the commitments 
to investment in renewables again. In a nutshell, the supplementary policies and 
the scope for their recurring changes increase the scope for strategic behaviour 
with respect to investment decisions and hence increase the level of uncertainty 
to be internalised by all actors in the sector, delaying the expected changes in 
the composition of generation in the sector in a very unpredictable way. And 
to a large extent, this is why there is a serious risk of underfinancing of the 
investment requirements of the clean sources.
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Aldrecht points to many key structural reform needs in the sector to minimise 
the risks of its underfinancing and of mistargeting support. These include the 
need to reconsider the specific climate policy goals and the management of their 
evolution, the need to consider a reduction in the dependence on technology-
imposing measures, changes in the definition and management of the ETS caps 
as of 2015, and changes in the organisational structure of specific markets such 
as the gas market to recognise the growing role shale gas has in determining the 
comparative advantage of gas producers. One of the main specific contributions 
to the reform agenda he argues for may be the identification of a mechanism that 
could reduce the risk of the crowding-out of energy transition investments by 
energy system expansion investments driven by economic fluctuations. In the 
last years, this has indeed been a key source of distortion in investment incentives 
in the sector. To minimise this risk, he argues that policy frameworks must 
commit to ensuring the continuous funding of high-energy R&D expenditures, 
irrespective of fluctuations; future recessions will always impact the CO
2
 price 
in ETS. One way to do so would be to commit the allocation of carbon taxation 
revenues to energy R&D budgets.  
Laurens Cherchye, Bram De Rock and Barnabé Walheer try to step back 
from the many debates on negative impact that the greening of energy is likely 
to have on the competitiveness of European economies and on jobs. To do so, 
they develop an efficiency assessment method specially tailored to address this 
issue. The method is used to conduct an efficiency analysis at the sector level 
(unbundled as Agriculture, Transport and Other industry). It allows a detailed 
assessment of the scope for improvements in efficiency available from using 
current assets. It allows them to measure the scope for reductions in input use 
and the scope for pollution reduction without having to cut employment, for 
instance, if that is the political preference supported by the voters. The chapter 
thus considers jobs as an output target just as the level of output (and hence 
growth). The results allow a fair degree of optimism, since they show that in 
many countries for many key economic activities, the scope for improvement is 
significant. As expected, there are large differences across countries but in their 
quantitative assessment, they manage to identify the specific activities in which 
the scope for improvement is largest. Unbundling their sectoral categories would 
allow for even more precise targeting of the activities with easy environmental 
payoffs at no political costs, because of no employment and output cost. 
The implicit message from this chapter is thus that, in the short to medium 
run, energy efficiency should be a lot more central to the debate than is revealed 
by the current policy preferences observed in new laws and regulations for the 
sector. This is not a minor message in a European context in which a still popular 
view among politicians and key lobbies is that industrial policies should support 
the status quo or a very slow progression towards efficiency improvements.  The 
evidence provided here suggests instead that this view underestimates the scope 
for improvements in the use of current technologies during the transition.  
Sarah Deasley and her co-authors provide the first of three country case 
studies to show how countries deal with the challenges quite differently.  They 
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show that in the UK context, meeting the carbon budgets will require radical 
changes to the supply and demand of electricity in the next decades. Low-
carbon generation is likely to be more intermittent and inflexible than today’s 
mix, and the electrification of heat and transport will add significant new loads 
to the demand side.  Accommodating the changes is likely to require major 
investment in networks.  Smart grid investments may be able to reduce the 
costs of the transition to a low-carbon economy by facilitating more efficient 
use of existing infrastructure, thereby allowing the postponement of investment 
in new network capacity. But before investments are made, it is necessary to 
assess the costs and benefits of smart grid technologies compared with those of 
conventional alternatives. Smart grid technologies are less capital-intense, less 
‘lumpy’ (i.e. they can come in smaller increments) and have shorter asset lives 
than conventional network technologies.  These features may be an advantage 
in a world characterised by much uncertainty, as they allow greater flexibility to 
change strategy as new information emerges. 
In addition to the specific messages applicable to the UK case and to the useful 
insights of the subtle dimensions of smart grid management and operation, the 
chapter offers a number of more general messages. The main one may be that 
the quantification of the challenges and options to address any policy can be real 
eye-opener as to what is possible and what it costs to change the design of an 
energy system. However, the chapter also shows that the methodology adopted 
to assess the options may have limits. They show, for instance, that the choice 
of network investments using a standard cost-benefit analysis technique will not 
take the option value associated with smart technologies into account, and may 
therefore underestimate their true net benefits. In other words, in this case, one 
of the most popular options has a built-in bias against a specific technology. 
Political decision-makers should not be expected to pick this up on their own, but 
experts and the policy advisors certainly should. But they often don’t however. 
Leticia Blázquez, Humberto Brea-Solís and Emili Griffel focus on Spain 
in analysing the extent to which the sector has been responsive to changes in 
policy in the past. They base their evaluation on an empirical analysis on the 
performance of the Spanish electricity distribution companies for the period from 
1988 to 2010. During this period, two main different regulatory regimes were in 
force, and the changes resulted in a significant increase in the concentration of 
the sector, prompted by numerous mergers and acquisitions. 
Their main message is that the ability to unbundle the sources of the changes 
observed in a sector can be a very pragmatic way of learning what works and what 
does not in reform. It can also be a way of replacing cheap talk with substantive 
talk in the assessment of the relative effectiveness of reform. For instance, they 
validate the idea that the package of changes in the organisation of the sector was 
associated with positive responses from the operators, since average productivity 
increased in the sector at an annual rate of 3.3% for a period that lasted 22 
years. Most of the payoffs only came from technical improvements, however. 
The institutional changes did not manage to stimulate significant improvement 
in any of the other dimensions of efficiency change. In sum, what the chapter 
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shows is that regulation can afford to be lax and nobody will complain as long 
at something improves. This somewhat cynical management of perceptions is 
unfortunately not only an issue but also certainly an essential dimension of any 
efforts to improve the accountability of operators, regulators and policymakers 
as Europe and European countries are pursuing their efforts to transform the 
sector. Cheap talk is easy and, as the Spanish example and the current debates on 
the future of the sector are showing, it is also quite costly in the long run.
Estelle Cantillon offers a case study of one of the emerging challenges for 
Belgium: dealing with electricity overcapacity in base load and tight capacity in 
peak load. Base load overcapacity is driven by the country’s historical reliance 
on must-run technologies, such as nuclear power, and generous subsidies for 
electricity production from renewables. The increasing reliance on intermittent 
sources of energies (wind and solar) raises the need for flexible capacity, 
especially during peak times, but markets do not provide sufficient incentives for 
such flexible capacity provision. Belgium needs to fix this if it wants to guarantee 
security of supply. To do so at the lowest cost and to help the transition of the 
country’s electricity system towards a world with more renewables, Cantillon 
suggests that Belgium, as any other country, would have to meet four general 
principles: neutrality between electricity demand and supply, technological 
neutrality, accountability, and price transparency. The solution she suggests 
meets these principles – she makes a preliminary proposal for a specific support 
mechanism for flexible capacity that Belgium could put in place to restore 
incentives for its provision and to ensure the country’s supply security while 
supporting the presence of renewables.  
In addition to the Belgium-specific cases, the more general contributions 
made by Estelle Cantillon are of two types. The first is a useful reminder that 
policy decisions need to be anchored in fairly general principles. Relying on a 
specific assessment of the effectiveness of a policy with respect to each of these 
principles may be the most effective way of identifying trade-offs and ensuring 
their transparency. It also has the advantage of serving as a revelation mechanism 
for any bias built into solutions championed by some stakeholders when they 
neglect to discuss key dimensions to avoid having to highlight a trade-off. This 
has happened in the energy debates a lot lately, as illustrated in the discussions 
of almost all the key dimensions reviewed in this book (the nuclear debates and 
the design of subsidies to users of renewable sources of energy are two obvious 
examples). Second is a more general discussion of the potential to expand the 
use of transmission system operators’ (TSOs) tertiary reserves, including a 
discussion of a new mechanism for allocating and activating these reserves, and 
new cost-sharing rules. Her proposal ensures that security of supply is met at the 
lowest cost today and tomorrow by making the most of flexibility on both the 
supply and the demand side of the market. By the design of its cost-allocation 
rules, the proposal also restores the incentives to all participants to make the 
investments needed to cut the size of required reserves. While her proposal still 
requires some operational (including political) fine-tuning, it has the effect of 
12 The Next Generation of Economic Issues in Energy Policy in Europe
getting the discussion rolling in Belgium. It also provides a potentially replicable 
idea for similar contexts in other countries. 
concluding commEnts
While the book touches upon many ideas, the sum of these ideas is only a 
small part of the set of issues that should be addressed by any encompassing 
assessment of the challenges ahead for the sector at the national and supranational 
levels. In the current social context, the most obvious gap that deserves further 
attention may be the discussion of the equity (i.e. distributional) effects of any 
changes in the sector. 
While various chapters touch upon the social concerns that changes in average 
tariff levels may generate for some consumers, none really goes through a full 
assessment of their quantitative size, and even less so of the possible specific 
solutions considered in the various countries to minimise the social burden of the 
transformation of the energy sector. The social implications of the effects on the 
labour market induced by efforts to improve efficiency on the production side 
are touched upon in Chapter 4 – on pollution versus growth versus jobs trade-
offs – but this is done at an aggregate level and does not allow for a complete 
assessment of the differences in impact across skills, for instance, which is 
important to track down any bias in the labour-market effects against low-
income workers.  
The answers to this dimension of the challenge, however, are central to the 
political viability of any further transformation of the sector. As mentioned 
earlier, politicians in Belgium, France or the UK, for instance, are de facto 
adopting price control decisions, in the interest of the protection of residential 
users, that are incompatible with their commitment to rely more effectively on 
demand management. Since demand management is so central to improvements 
in efficiency, and improvements in efficiency are so central to the sustainability 
of the transformation of the sector, these policy reversals are a major threat to 
the credibility of the changes committed to and, hence, to the incentives to invest 
further in the transformation of the sector. Because they are so fundamentally 
important for the future of the sector, these issues will be dealt with in a 
forthcoming collection of policy insights on the sector to be conducted by the 
Chaire Bernard Van Ommeslaghe.
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The EU’s “Three 20s”:  
Environmental or Industrial Policy?
clAudE crAmpEs
2
With Directive 96/92/EC – “concerning common rules for the internal market 
in electricity”4 – the EU launched in 1996 the unbundling of the electricity 
industry, thereby partially separating, on one hand, production and supply, 
where competition is allegedly sustainable, and on the other, transport and 
distribution, which are viewed as natural monopolies. It was expected that 
economic discipline would be guaranteed by industry-specific regulators for the 
latter and by competition authorities for the former. In this framework, state aid 
could be granted only in specific and infrequent circumstances, because such aid 
usually has the purpose or the effect of distorting competition.
The regulatory paradigm in which state aid was discouraged began to change 
in the spring of 2007, when the European Council called on member states and 
EU institutions to pursue actions to develop a sustainable, integrated European 
climate and energy policy. Energy Policy for Europe (EPE) was expected to 
pursue three objectives:
•	 increasing the security of supply,
•	 ensuring the competitiveness of European economies and the availability 
of affordable energy, and
•	 promoting environmental sustainability and combating climate change.
The new orientation necessitates the massive use of state aid, which is becoming 
the rule rather than the exception in the energy policy of member states. This 
4 Repealed by Directive 2003/54/EC, later repealed in turn by Directive 2009/72/EC.
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chapter is dedicated to one facet of the EPE, namely, the three-target commitment 
by the EU to: 
•	 achieve at least a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 
compared with 1990;
•	 increase energy efficiency so as to achieve the objective of saving 20% 
of the EU’s energy consumption compared with projections for 2020; 
and 
•	 achieve a binding target of a 20% share of renewable energies in overall 
EU energy consumption by 2020. 
We discuss the tools used to reach these three quantitative targets and show that 
most are intrinsically bureaucratic. They create both a financial burden that cannot 
be sustained within the current institutional framework and a public commitment 
to constrain the future structure of the energy industry. Because of these effects, 
the role of competition in EPE will wither, and the rationale for managing the 
energy industry independently from environmental policy will disappear. The 
current combination of independent regulations intended to solve, separately, 
the problems of energy scarcity, environment protection, imperfect competition, 
and industry development is no longer sustainable. It is time to admit that if the 
central problem is global warming, all answers must turn on a pivotal institution 
endowed with the responsibility of managing common resources in a way that 
maximises the welfare of present and future generations. 
In the first section below, we briefly present the conflicting objectives pursued 
by the European authorities as regards competition and environment protection. 
The three following sections are dedicated successively to the three pillars of 
the EPE: lower greenhouse gas emissions, more renewable energy sources, 
and lower energy consumption. The last section offers some brief concluding 
remarks.
intErgEnErAtionAl rEgulAtion
Static efficiency versus environmental protection
Economic regulation, whether industry-specific (such as the regulation performed 
by national entities responsible for energy, telecoms, and water) or applicable to 
all industries (such as the regulation applied by competition authorities), has 
the objective of preventing individual firms and groups of firms from abusing 
their dominant position. Such regulation focuses on short-run structure and 
conduct and as such, it mainly results in actual or virtual price cuts or price caps 
imposed on or negotiated with producers. But lower prices entail higher levels 
of consumption. Consequently, in many industries (particularly in transport and 
energy), economic regulation has two negative side effects in the long run: 
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•	 Because production burns non-renewable resources (coal, gas, oil), 
more consumption means accelerating the depletion of fossil fuel stocks 
and increasing imports of primary fuel in some countries.
•	 Because production disseminates pollutants, more consumption means 
increasing damage to the environment.
Clearly, current practices designed to promote competition are at odds with 
stopping global warming and protecting the environment. In some places, they 
are at odds with the goal of assuring security of supply.
The source of the problem is that economic regulators are not formally 
responsible for environmental protection, which remains under the direct control 
of governments or is assigned to distinct independent entities. In the US, for 
example, concerns about abuse of dominant position and restrictions on access 
to essential facilities are managed by economic regulation authorities such as 
the FCC, FERC, DOJ, FTC and PUCs.5 Independently, agencies like EPA, Cal/
EPA, and TCEQ6 are in charge of the risks of toxic emissions and damage to the 
environment caused by industrial plants. Similar institutional arrangements are 
in place in most developing countries.
The separation of tasks among several public entities can be motivated by the 
need for heterogeneous expertise, as well as by worries about the possibility 
of abuse of discretionary power. Whatever the reason, separation results in 
multiple agencies, each with a limited scope of responsibilities and each unable 
5 The Federal Communications Commission is charged with regulating interstate and international 
communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable (www.fcc.gov). The Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission is an independent agency that regulates the interstate transmission of 
natural gas, oil, and electricity (www.ferc.gov). The Department of Justice has an antitrust division 
(www.usdoj.gov/atr) as well as a separate environment and natural resources division (www.usdoj.
gov/enrd). The Federal Trade Commission has a Bureau of Competition to prevent monopolistic 
practices, attempts to monopolise, conspiracies to restrain trade, and anticompetitive mergers 
and acquisitions (www.ftc.gov). Public Utility Commissions are local or regional entities that are 
generally responsible for regulating electricity, gas, telephone, and water industries (see for example 
www.cpuc.ca.gov for California or www.puc.state.tx.us for Texas).
6 The Environmental Protection Agency is a federal body (www.epa.gov). Cal/EPA, the Californian 
Environmental Protection Agency (www.calepa.ca.gov) and TCEQ, the Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality (www.tceq.state.tx.us), are state bodies. 
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to incorporate certain concerns that logically should be taken into account in the 
rules the agency promulgates.7 
To tackle the problem of designing an overall regulation aimed at protecting 
both present and future generations is a matter of ‘intergenerational regulation’, 
which is best understood as a set of issues such as:
•	 Standard setting: What are the general features of constrained optimal 
intergenerational regulation? How should it balance instantaneous and 
dynamic efficiency, immediate and intergenerational rent-sharing?
•	 Implementation: Which part of the second-best intergenerational 
regulation can be implemented through market mechanisms and which 
part should be maintained under the supervision of a specific entity 
(or sector-specific entities)? How can one make ‘cap-and-trade’ and 
‘feed-in’ mechanisms efficient components of the implementation of 
intergenerational regulation? 
•	 Regulation design: Should regulators be responsible for both static 
and dynamic objectives? Under what circumstances can independent 
regulators tackling economic efficiency and environmental efficiency 
separately perform better than a single universal entity? 
•	 Regulation tools: Except for the control of mergers, current regulation 
is mainly behavioural. Its toolbox basically contains controls and limits 
on prices, contractual provisions, and advertising content. Should 
discount rates and investment levels and types be added to the list? 
Should regulatory entities have structural prerogatives (divestment, 
number and size of firms)? What is the best way to tackle the problems 
of renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency? 
7 OECD (2006) identifies five key points concerning the potential conflicts and complementarities 
between competition and environmental regulations:
(1) Competition and environmental policies are complementary. They seek to correct market failures 
and enhance social welfare.
(2) Environmental regulations can, however, reduce competition in markets through various channels, 
raising prices for consumers. They may create barriers to entry into particular markets and increase 
concentration.
(3) Environmental regulation can also give rise to anticompetitive practices. They can be misused 
in predatory schemes to exclude or disadvantage rivals and also facilitate price-fixing and other 
collusive schemes.
(4) Competition authorities take environmental regulations into account in their everyday work but do 
not provide special consideration for environmental impacts or “environmental overrides.”
(5) Environmental policies should be designed to achieve their aims without unnecessarily restraining 
competition. Competition authorities should help environmental agencies and legislatures find ways 
to achieve environmental objectives that are the least restrictive of competition.
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•	 Capture: Regulatory bodies consist of individuals who pursue personal 
agendas. Is the risk of capture increased in the intergenerational 
framework? Are the risks higher in less-developed countries? 
•	 International coordination: Given the globalisation process and the 
worldwide diffusion of some pollutants, would it be more efficient to 
organise intergenerational regulation on an international basis?
Setting up such institutions requires an economic analysis based on theoretical 
models of public economics and contract theory (Estache and Martimort, 1999; 
Laffont and Martimort, 1999; Laffont and Tirole, 1991; Martimort, 1999). That 
analysis must go beyond the standard conflict between prices and quantities as 
regulation devices (Hepburn, 2006; Weitzman, 1974) to explain how economic 
and environmental regulations interact (Fullerton et al., 1997; Gersbach and 
Requate, 2004; Haq et al., 2001). In particular, the imperfect competition features 
of most industries concerned by environmental regulation must be emphasised 
as well as the consequences of dynamic regulation in terms of industrial policy 
(OECD, 1996; Requate, 2006).
We address some of these questions by examining how the pro-competitive 
policy launched by the European authorities in the electricity industry at the 
end of the 1990s is now being distorted by the new environmental priorities 
resulting from the alarm over global warming. Before going through the details 
of EU environmental policy, we briefly comment on the role of state aid in 
environmental protection within the Union. 
Are green electrons marketable?
In any microeconomics textbook, the first chapter tells us that perfect competition 
and perfect central planning are equivalent, so that pure market mechanisms lead 
to optimality. The second chapter details the hurdles that prevent competitive 
markets from implementing this ‘first best’ state of affairs. Among the usual 
suspects, one finds non-convex technologies and preferences, transaction costs, 
imperfect information, and externalities. The third chapter suggests how to mix 
market mechanisms and public intrusion to mitigate the nuisances caused by 
the aforementioned culprits. The discussion centres on the right mix of tight 
regulation (e.g., quotas and standards) and light regulation (e.g., taxes and 
regulated markets). In Brussels, no one has made it past the first chapter. They 
want competition everywhere all the time. France, by contrast, only read the 
second chapter. French politicians consider that since competition cannot bring 
about good outcomes, then central planning is certainly better than any form of 
market, never mind all the flaws of authoritarianism. The pragmatic English are 
perfectly indifferent to the first two chapters. They are concerned solely with the 
third.8
8 This paragraph is an adapted translation of Boiteux (2007). 
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This sketch of the views on market pros and cons is changing, at least with 
respect to EU policy. The Directorate-General for Competition (DG Comp) is 
gradually losing its preeminence in favour of other Directorates-General, in 
particular that for climate action and environment.9 Also of note is the fact that 
energy is now an independent DG.10 Because the present director general for 
energy (Philip Lowe) was formerly director general for competition, one may 
suspect that the energy industry remains highly constrained by the EU Treaty’s 
Articles 101 on agreements, 102 on abuse, and 107 on state aid, plus the 2004 
Regulation on mergers. Nevertheless, starting with the important publication of 
20-20-20 by 2020 in the 2007 climate and energy package (ec.europa.eu/clima/
policies/package/index_en.htm), the energy policy of the EU is drifting toward 
central planning and away from the free market.11 Indeed, when the public 
authority is fixing quantitative targets (20% cleaning, 20% greening and 20% 
saving by 2020) combined with penalties for non-compliance, we are far from 
perfect competition, even though some ex post trade is still allowed like in the 
Emissions Trading System discussed later.
In the EU competition policy toolbox, the control of state aid plays an 
important role in limiting the potential distortions that governments can create 
when they support domestic actors by financial and nonfinancial means. The 
principle settled by Article 107 is simple: state aid is forbidden, except if….12 
Actually, environmental protection is one of the exceptions in Article 107. Now, 
when it comes to the ‘20-20-20’ objective, the principle changes to: state aid is 
permitted, except if….13
Indeed, distortions of competition are necessary to reduce the negative 
externalities of industrial production and consumption;14 absent public 
obligation, decision-makers do not internalise the environmental damages they 
9 However, it remains true that the commissioner responsible for competition in 2013 (Joaquín 
Almunia) is a vice-president of the Commission, a title denied to the commissioners for climate, 
energy, and environment (ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/index_en.htm). 
10 The energy DG has been in operation since February 17, 2010. Formerly, Energy and Transport were 
one. On the same date, Climate Action was split from Environment.
11 Even so, the EC recurrently remembers its attachment to market mechanisms. See, for example, 
“Green Paper on market-based instruments for environment and related policy purposes,” COM(2007) 
140 final.
12 “Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through State 
resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring 
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between 
Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.”
13 “The primary objective of State aid control in the field of environmental protection is to ensure that 
State aid measures will result in a higher level of environmental protection than would occur without 
the aid and to ensure that the positive effects of the aid outweigh its negative effects in terms of 
distortions of competition …” (clause 8 in “Community guidelines on State aid for environmental 
protection,” 2008/C 82/01). 
14 “State aid measures can sometimes be effective tools for achieving objectives of common interest. 
Under some conditions, State aid can correct market failures, thereby improving the functioning 
of markets and enhancing competitiveness. It can also help to promote sustainable development, 
irrespective of the correction of market failures.” (State Aid Action Plan — Less and better targeted 
State aid: A roadmap for State aid reform 2005-2009 COM(2005) 107 final).
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create, contrary to the ‘polluter pays principle’ established by Article 191 of 
the Treaty. Yet, in a non-regulated market system, decision-makers will never 
internalise environmental damage. In that case, the corrective scheme designed 
to implement polluter-pays must be installed for the long run.
Because of both their cost and intermittency, renewable energy sources (RES) 
cannot be developed without public intervention. The new frontier for electricity 
from RES is the so-called ‘grid parity’, which is the possibility for these sources 
to compete against fossil-fuel sources on a level field. It may be true that in 
the future, RES-electricity will have a MWh cost comparable to the cost of 
power generated in fossil-fuel powered plants. This will solve the cost problem, 
but not the intermittency feature. The guarantee to supply a given quantity 
of electrical power at a given date for a given duration will always be out of 
reach for intermittent sources such as wind and solar energy. Consequently, the 
development of RES-electricity creates a public commitment to constrain the 
future structure of the industry. The EU Green 20  actually authorises member 
states to set industrial policy in the energy sector.
Concerning energy saving, it is not the natural outcome of a competition policy 
that promotes price cuts. Increasing consumers’ surplus while decreasing energy 
consumption requires huge investments in insulating buildings and high levels 
of R&D in the industries that manufacture electrical appliances. Again, a matter 
of industrial policy. 
To satisfy the competition proclivities of the EU authorities, some tools 
for environmental regulation include pieces of market mechanisms. This 
is clearly the case for the trade half of the ‘cap-and-trade’ mechanism at the 
core of the Emission Trading System targeted at decreasing CO
2
 emissions. 
Some possibilities of trade also exist for the promotion of renewables (green 
certificates) and for energy saving (white certificates). Basically, they all rely on 
the following structure:
•	 Obligated agents are designated, their duties defined and ‘materialised’ 
by certificates.
•	 A quantitative link is forged between the obligation and some technology 
that produces certificates.
•	 A commercial forum is created within which the obligated agents and 
the producers of certificates can trade.
•	 Performance is monitored; violators are sanctioned. 
This mechanism is mainly working for the reduction of CO
2
 emissions in the 
EU. It is not the main tool used for the two other environmental targets.
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The target of decreasing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 20% from the 
1990 level is a sequel of the Kyoto Protocol of 1997. To meet the objective, EU 
member states in 2005 launched the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, a cap-and-
trade system.15 A mandatory target is imposed on almost 12,000 industrial plants 
all around Europe, plus airlines since 2012. They are the obligated parties. Every 
year, each obligated firm receives for free or buys an initial endowment. Along 
the year, the adjustment between the individual target and the initial endowment 
is reached, partly through technical investment to abate polluting emissions, 
and partly through spot and forward market exchanges. The market part of the 
mechanism generates a carbon price. Up to now, the price has apparently been 
driven by macroeconomic trends (e.g., the worldwide economic crisis) rather 
than by the microeconomic balancing of the benefits from pollution abatement 





has remained well below the penalty for noncompliance; the latter being €40/t 
CO
2
 during the first round (2005–07), and €100/t CO
2
 during the second (2008–
12) and third (2013–20). 
There is a structural explanation for the discrepancy between the spot price 
of CO
2
 (never above €30/t, around €3/t during spring 2013) and the estimate of 
what it could (or should?) be, say between €40/t and €100/t.16 The explanation 
can be found in the basics of microeconomics. We know that: 
•	 competition leads to optimality, as long as all competing agents neither 
emit nor are subjected to externalities (the first welfare theorem); and
•	 when externalities are present, a Pigouvian tax or a Coasian system 
of property rights restores optimality as long as the tax is fixed at the 
damage level and the rights can be sold and bought by all the concerned 
agents.
The problem is that, as regards global warming, the main concerned party is not 
present at the negotiating table because it hasn’t yet been born. Governments, 
international organisations, and NGOs are in charge of speaking on behalf of our 
great-children. It could help to solve the problem if these representatives did not 
depend on the votes and financial resources of today’s myopic citizens. Here is 
the source of the failure: entities mandated for five or ten years by egoistic and 
short-sighted agents, and intensively lobbied by industrial groups, are supposed 
to take conflicting decisions in favour of agents with unknown preferences 
and technologies living a century from now. Because of structural myopia, 
15 The system is now backed by Directive 2009/29/EC of 23 April 2009 of the European Parliament 
and Council, amending Directive 2003/87/EC, to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission 
allowance trading scheme of the Community. For the analysis of the comparative advantages of 
alternative tools, see Fischer and Newell (2008).
16 This is the interval commonly accepted for the cost of carbon capture and storage.
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the quantity of permits given for free or auctioned (since January 2013 for all 
electricity producers) is too large. And excess supply means low carbon prices 
with almost no effect on industrial production and consumption. This in turn has 
weak effects on emission reduction, energy saving, and the encouragement of 
renewables. How can the dilemma be solved?
Because it is impossible to imagine what preferences and technologies will be 
in the long run, no solution can be perfect. As a second-best solution, however, 
we should require that the institutional arrangement takes the future into account. 
The probably less inefficient solution draws on the case of so-called orphan 
diseases, where one entity is specifically in charge of replacing the missing side 
of the market. Pharmaceutical firms invest in the development of new therapies 
only if they face a solvent demand, i.e., enough potential buyers with enough 
money to spend. A disease that does not meet these conditions is one of the 6,000 
to 8,000 rare diseases listed by the World Health Organization as having little 
chance of being considered by the industry, except if a public or private entity 
enters the arena as a surrogate for the missing solvent demand. An example is 
the Global Fund, created in 2002, as a public-private partnership that raises and 
spends resources to prevent and treat HIV and AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. 
Similarly, as regards CO
2
 emissions, a fully independent entity (let us call 
it the Intergenerational Regulation Fund, or IRF) without national political 
interference could be installed as the representative of both present and future 
generations. It would be responsible for allocating the rights to use common 
resources, such as the atmosphere and the oceans. Again, this would not solve 
the difficulty of evaluating future needs and technical possibilities. However, the 
fund could at least make quota and pricing decisions without being focused on 
short-term worries. As the seller of permits to emit pollutants, it would collect 
large amounts of money that could be invested in less-polluting technologies 
and used to compensate poor people and poor countries for the regressive 
effects of expected increases in energy prices. According to the Coase principle, 
whoever the rights holder is, the volume of the externality will be efficient on 
the condition that the rights are well defined. Creating an IRF with the power 
to regulate access to common natural resources would make it possible to meet 
environmental targets and to apply the polluter-pays principle as well.
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This solution has all the qualities and defaults of natural monopolies, alleviated 
by ex post trade possibilities. As shown in Figure 2.1, the supply of allowances 
in the EU Emission Trading System is currently made up mostly of quotas, 
supplemented by permits from the Joint Implementation scheme17 and the Clean 
Development Mechanism.18 
The way these allowances are calculated and allocated to obligated parties 
can create distortions of competition that do not exist in the case of a single 
supplier. By contrast, there is a risk that the monopolistic institution could abuse 
its position by restricting the supply of quotas. That risk can be reduced if the 
IRF is a non-profit private-public partnership with transparency obligations.
























Another problem with the EU’s Emission Trading System is carbon leakage.19 
Because the abatement mechanism is limited to Europe, the potential increase 
in electricity prices that could result from high carbon prices could put certain 
EU energy-intensive sectors at an economic disadvantage compared with firms 
located in countries where carbon constraints do not apply. Additionally, it could 
result in larger emissions worldwide. Because of this risk, Article 10a(6) of 
17 The Joint Implementation scheme promotes emissions reduction projects in the developed countries 
listed in Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol, financed by another developed country of Annex I. The 
project developer obtains an emissions reduction unit (ERU) credit for each ton of carbon dioxide 
equivalent. Russia and Ukraine have hosted the majority of Joint Implementation projects to date.
18 Annex I countries finance emission reduction projects in developing countries and earn certified 
emission reduction (CER) credits that are priced on the EU ETS. The projects are mainly aimed at 
developing renewable energies (36% of expected credits) and improving energy efficiency (11% of 
expected credits). More than three quarters (81%) are in Asia, 13% in South America, and 4% in 
Africa.
19 “Carbon leakage is the term used to refer to the observation that emission reductions in one country 
or region may be offset by increasing emissions in other countries or regions.” OECD (2011: 10).
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Directive 2009/29/EC provides that member states may adopt financial measures 
in favour of 164 energy-intensive sectors determined by the Commission.20 This 
means that we are back to state aid and its potentially distortionary effects on 
competition within the European market. Again, administrative rules are required 
to limit the distortions,21 and again, we glide farther and farther from pure market 
mechanisms, closer and closer to industrial policy at the level of each member 
state. A global mechanism applied by a single institution would be preferable.
Overall, we see that the core of the EU policy against global warming is an 
administrative planning process biased by a set of subsidiarity issues. It requires 
bureaucracy, monitoring, and registers for ex ante evaluation and ex post control. 
It creates a lot of red tape and transaction costs still to be estimated, as well as 
some opportunities for fraud.
Given the complexity of the installed mechanism, one could have expected 
better results. If the EU Emission Trading System had been correctly set up, it 
would have produced a much higher price for carbon emissions, thus a much 
higher cost for electricity production burning fossil fuel, and thus the following:
•	 an incentive to invest in R&D to develop technologies to reduce the 
level of polluting emissions in the atmosphere (e.g., carbon capture and 
storage);
•	 an incentive to invest in R&D to develop technologies with low emissions 
(RES, hydro, nuclear); and
•	 an incentive to reduce the consumption of energy.
So, the need for custom-made policies to sustain renewables and energy saving 
can be viewed at best as an acknowledgment of the failure of the current 
mechanism, and at worst as the inability of the authorities to understand that 
curbing polluting emissions is the paramount objective, next to which the two 
other policy tools should be subordinated. The EU Emission Trading System is 
a tool to correct an externality. There is no such externality for renewables and 
energy efficiency. 
20 Commission decision of 24 December 2009 determining, pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, a list of sectors and subsectors which are deemed to be 
exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage.
21 “Those measures shall be based on ex-ante benchmarks of the indirect emissions of CO
2
 per unit of 
production. The ex-ante benchmarks shall be calculated for a given sector or subsector as the product 
of the electricity consumption per unit of production corresponding to the most efficient available 
technologies and of the CO
2
 emissions of the relevant European electricity production mix.” (Article 
10a(6) of Directive 2009/29/EC.)
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To achieve the binding target of a 20% share of renewable energies in overall EU 
energy consumption by 2020, member states have implemented various policies 
in favour of the production of energy from wind, solar, aerothermal, geothermal, 
hydrothermal and ocean energy, hydropower, biomass, landfill gas, sewage 
treatment plant gas, and biogases.22 Some member states use direct investment 
subsidies; others prefer quota obligations, sometimes combined with tradable 
green certificates.23 However the most widely used financial tool around the 
world is a non-market system: fixed feed-in tariffs (FITs) paid to green producers 
to compensate high investment costs and low reliability.24
In the next section, we sketch the analysis of the effects of FITs on the structure 
of the market for green technologies used in the production of electricity, 
such as windmills and photovoltaic panels. We show that FITs set above the 
consumption tariff automatically increase the demand for RES equipment, 
transforming all consumers into would-be electricity producers with dramatic 
effects on the financial equilibrium of the aid system. On the supply side of 
the equipment industry, as R&D and investment are sustained by subsidised 
demand, an asymmetrical learning-by-doing effect drives the less efficient 
European manufacturers out of the market.
The following section is devoted to the problem of intermittency. We observe 
that the promotion of electricity from renewable sources is not accompanied 
by a comparable increase in flexibility on the demand side. This means that 
the European authorities are encouraging the development of random and 
cyclical sources of production, whereas the demand by final consumers cannot 
be made contingent on the state of nature that prevails at the production nodes. 
For that reason, plants operating on RES should not be viewed as substitutes to 
fossil-fuelled plants. The latter are necessary complements to satisfy demand 
by nonresponsive consumers, i.e., consumers not equipped with smart meters 
and appliances to respond to scarcity signals. This underestimated effect creates 
structural and financial constraints for the future of the energy industry.
22 The list is fixed by Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 
2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources.
23 "By early 2009, policy targets existed in at least 73 countries, and at least 64 countries had policies 
to promote renewable power generation, including 45 countries and 18 states/provinces/territories 
with feed-in tariffs (many of these recently updated). The number of countries/states/provinces with 
renewable portfolio standards increased to 49. Policy targets for renewable energy were added, 
supplemented, revised, or clarified in a large number of countries in 2008." REN21 (2009). See also 
European Wind Energy Association (2005: 29-31).
24 This has been encouraged by the EC: ”[W]ell-adapted feed-in tariff regimes are generally the most 
efficient and effective support schemes for promoting renewable electricity,” European Commission 
(2008). See also Energy Economics Group (2010). For a comparison of alternative support tools, see 
Butler and Neuhoff (2008).
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The structural effects of FITs
Most EU member states – in particular France, Germany, Italy, and Spain – have 
hugely subsidised the solar and wind energies by guaranteeing generous selling 
prices (FITs) to electricity producers operating windmills and photovoltaic 
panels. These programmes have been so successful that they have endangered 
the financial equilibrium of the funding system in the four countries listed above, 
forcing their governments to decrease tariff levels and redefine the conditions of 
eligibility for these promotion programmes.
The point is that the programmes for subsidising the generation of electricity 
from RES through demand were launched without any analysis of the strategic 
behaviour that could be expected from the agents affected by such a public 
bonanza, in particular: 
•	 the consumers/producers who benefit from the feed-in tariff; and
•	 the firms that manufacture the production assets, in particular PV panels. 
Other important players are the firms that install and maintain the physical 
assets that produce green electricity and the operators of the distribution and 
transmission networks. The integration of RES into the grid requires huge 
investment in transformers, lines, and two-way meters (European Wind Energy 
Association 2005). 
Public authorities often emphasise several side benefits from the promotion of 
RES. For example, clause 4 of Directive 2009/28/EC states: 
When favouring the development of the market for renewable energy 
sources, it is necessary to take into account the positive impact on regional 
and local development opportunities, export prospects, social cohesion and 
employment opportunities, in particular as concerns SMEs and independent 
energy producers.
Clause 6 of the same document states: 
The move towards decentralized energy production has many benefits, 
including the utilization of local energy sources, increased local security of 
energy supply, shorter transport distances and reduced energy transmission 
losses. Such decentralization also fosters community development and 
cohesion by providing income sources and creating jobs locally.
Similarly, according to the European Commission (2011):
Renewable energy is crucial to any move toward a low-carbon economy. It 
is also a key component of the EU energy strategy. The European industry 
leads global renewable energy technology development employs 1.5 million 
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people and by 2020 could employ a further 3 million. The promotion of 
renewable energy also develops a diverse range of mostly indigenous energy 
resources. 
Clearly, all these appealing outcomes cannot surge without public intervention: 
The State Aid Action Plan also stressed that environmental protection 
can provide opportunities for innovation, create new markets and 
increase competitiveness through resource efficiency and new investment 
opportunities. Under some conditions, State aid can be conducive to these 
objectives, thus contributing to the core Lisbon strategy objectives of more 
sustainable growth and jobs.25
On top of all these positive expectations, electricity production from RES also has 
an exciting feature for green supporters. RES-electricity plants can be installed 
on a small scale in a decentralised way. Therefore, RES electricity would make 
consumers more responsible in energy use, as they would balance the relative 
advantages of selling rather than consuming electricity produced locally. 
This is true in a framework where the FIT is below the retail tariff or price, as 
argued below.26 
Under circumstances where local energy is abundant (say, a large surface of 
PV panels and bright sun), keeping the entire local production for consumption is 
not efficient since the consumer’s marginal valuation is smaller than the market 
valuation represented by the FIT. The consumer equipped with PV panels is 
better off selling any extra production to the grid. The production, consumption, 
and sale decisions are all governed by the FIT. The retail price plays no role, 
because the local production is so abundant that it is not necessary to buy extra 
energy from the grid.
In contrast, when electricity from RES is scarce (small PV panels or cloudy 
skies), it would be inefficient to limit consumption to the local production 
because the consumers’ valuation is above the price at which they can obtain 
extra energy – that is, the retail price. Consumers are better off buying a part of 
their consumption from the grid. The production, consumption, and purchase 
decisions are all governed by the retail price. The FIT plays no role because 
the local production is so scarce that there is no energy left to be sold after 
consumption. 
In this framework, the agent does not simultaneously buy from and sell to 
the grid.27 He is a ‘green citizen’ in the sense that he must make a set of related 
decisions concerning consumption and local production backed by the grid where 
he can sell or buy extra power. This is not the case in the EU member states that 
have set the FIT so high that all consumers and producers of electricity from 
25 Introductory clause 5 of “Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection” (2008/C 
82/01). 
26 For a formal proof of the following statements, see Crampes and Lefouili (2011).
27 At some exceptional times, he can even live in autarky.
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RES actually behave strategically by totally separating their two roles: on the 
one hand, consumption and purchase decisions depend solely on preferences and 
the purchase price; on the other, production and sale decisions depend solely on 
the local generation cost and the FIT. The system has transformed all consumers 
with local possibilities of production into producers, driven only by the promise 
of profit. This is good for the development of green technologies, but it has three 
serious drawbacks:
•	 It is financially unsustainable because subsidised green investment 
has gone too far and too fast; all member states using FITs have been 
obliged to decrease them drastically.28
•	 It increases the randomness of production.
•	 It has created a violent shock of demand in the market that produces 
green equipment, and that shock has forced out European manufacturers.
Let us comment briefly on this third negative outcome. The mechanism behind 
the expected development of RES through demand subsidies is based on 
decreases in production cost from learning-by-doing.29 Contrary to the logic of 
R&D subsidies, where an increase in demand is due to lower prices resulting 
from lower costs, in the FIT system demand is the driver of the cost decrease. 
Therefore, with FITs, an increase in demand comes sooner than under the 
regime of R&D subsidies. Nevertheless, this system can have adverse effects for 
competition. According to Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988): 
Learning-by-doing involves a form of sunk cost. Production leading to a 
gain in experience, is the cost which is sunk. Learning therefore manifests 
itself as an irreversibility in production possibilities.
28 This start-and-stop policy obviously creates uncertainty for the investors. Italy, after the other big EU 
countries, decided in March 2011 to decrease the advantages given to green investors. As a result, 
the EU energy commissioner said in a letter to Italy's industry minister that he was concerned about 
the consequences of such changes for investment in the RES sector after receiving complaints from 
sector operators: "It is fundamental that the Italian government creates as soon as possible a clear, 
stable and predictable internal framework for incentives to guarantee the development of renewable 
energy. The changes which alter financial returns on existing projects risk violating general principles 
of national and EU rights and, moreover, compromising the stability of the investments in the sector." 
The European Commission’s energy spokesperson said the Commission could open an infringement 
procedure against countries that cannot provide certainty about the incentives to renewable energy 
investors. (Euractive, www.euractiv.com/en/climate-environment)
29 “Productivity increases are realised not only as a result of the explicit allocation of resources to 
capital accumulation and research and development, but also often as a by-product of the process 
of production; that is, learning-by-doing. Learning gives rise to a special kind of intertemporal 
externality in production. It was used as an argument for the protection of infant industries, the idea 
being that in the absence of public intervention a domestic infant industry capable of learning would 
be stifled by foreign competition.” Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1988). See also Arrow (1962), Cabral and 
Riordan (1994), Fudenberg and Tirole (1983).
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This implies that under FIT schemes, there is a potential for creating a natural 
monopoly instead of promoting competition. One benefit expected from green 
policies was the promotion of a European high-tech industry innovating in new 
technologies with an accompanying increase in local employment. However, 
the European authorities have apparently not considered the consequences of 
learning in a worldwide competition framework. Actually, the FIT-based EU 
policy has excluded European champions from the equipment market instead of 
giving them a boost. Thus, the industrial policy slice of the promotion plan is a 
total failure. 
To conclude this section, note that FITs are not the only tool used to promote 
renewable energy sources. Some countries rely instead on premiums or on 
tradable green certificates. In both cases, the green producer sells its energy to 
market and, on top of the spot price, receives a fixed premium or a green certificate 
for each kWh of electricity produced. Certificates are then sold to obligated 
parties (suppliers in Belgium and the UK, producers in Italy, grid companies 
in Germany). The premium system is a light form of FIT. The tradable green 
certificate system looks like the EU Emission Trading System, except that it is 
organised on a national basis.30 Therefore it has the same qualities and defects 
as the ETS, in particular the administrative cost of registration and monitoring.
Backup technologies for green electricity
The substitution of renewable sources of energy for fossil fuel in electricity 
production is one of the key technological solutions to mitigate global warming. 
It is currently being pushed by many scientists and policymakers within the 
context of the debate on reducing emissions of greenhouse gases. We have seen 
that environmental policies support less carbon-intensive renewable sources of 
energy by means of subsidies, FITs, and mandatory minimal installed capacity. 
In all developed countries, the generation of electricity from geothermal, wind, 
solar, and other renewable sources is increasing by more than 20% a year. 
An essential feature of most renewable sources of energy is intermittency. 
Electricity can be produced from wind turbines only on windy days, from 
photovoltaic cells on sunny days and certainly not at night, and from waves and 
swell when the sea is rough. All these intermittent sources of energy rely on an 
input (wind, sun, waves, tide) the supply of which is under no-one’s control. 
Some of these conditions are perfectly predictable, for example, the seasonal 
duration of daylight or the tide level. Others, such as the strength of the wind 
and the intensity of the sunshine, can be forecast only a few days in advance, and 
even then with some degree of uncertainty.
30 Comparing with Figure 2.1, demand for certificates is vertical because the obligated firms have no 
way to decrease their obligation, whereas supply is an increasing curve because a higher price of 
certificates is an incentive to produce more green energy. However, note that the exact location of the 
supply curve depends on the energy spot price, since green plants produce two outputs: energy and 
certificates.
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Yet a contractual characteristic of the electricity industry is the commitment of 
retailers to supply electricity to consumers at a given price at any time and at any 
level of demand. This business model reflects the consumers’ taste for a reliable 
source of energy, which is viewed as essential for lighting, cooling, or heating, 
for example. In developed countries where power outages and blackouts are very 
costly both economically and politically, electricity production and supply are 
designed to match the demand of consumers any time and at any location on the 
grid. Thus, the variability and unpredictability of intermittent sources of energy 
clearly conflict with a reliable supply of electricity.
One way to reconcile intermittent supply with permanent demand consists in 
storing the input, the output, or both. In that respect, hydropower production 
is an attractive source of energy. Although it relies on uncertain rain and snow, 
water can be stored in dams to supply electricity during periods of peak load. In 
northern countries, water is stored during the autumn and spring to be used in 
winter for heating and lighting. 
In contrast, input storage is not possible for two growing renewable sources of 
energy: wind and solar power. Output storage is also very limited. The current 
storage technologies using batteries are still very costly and inefficient at large 
scale. An intermediary solution in combination with hydropower is pumped 
storage.31
The introduction of a large share of intermittent and non-storable sources 
of energy is a new challenge for the operators and regulators of the electricity 
industry. In addition to difficulties in transportation and distribution (NERC, 
2009), intermittent sources raise problems at the generation stage, in particular:
•	 the efficient mixing of intermittent sources (wind, solar) with reliable 
sources such as fossil fuel (coal, oil, natural gas) or nuclear power;
•	 the compatibility of intermittent sources of energy with market 
mechanisms (can competitive markets decentralise an efficient mix of 
capacity?); and
•	 the design of an environmental policy aimed at promoting low-
carbon technologies by relying on intermittent sources of energy and 
simultaneously guaranteeing security of supply.
These issues can be analysed in a formal model of energy investment and 
production using two sources of energy: a low-cost intermittent source (wind), 
and a costly non-intermittent source (fossil fuel) (Ambec and Crampes, 2012). 
The two sources differ in cost and availability. Both require installed capacities 
at a cost. Electricity generation in plants using non-intermittent energy costs the 
price of the fossil fuel plus a possible emission tax or carbon price. In contrast, 
31 Cheap electricity is consumed in periods of low demand to restore water resources that can be used 
to generate electricity in periods of peak demand. See Crampes and Moreaux (2010).
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producing electricity from wind is (almost) free once capacity is installed. 
Nevertheless, it is possible only when and where the input (wind) is available. 
One can characterise the efficient energy mix in terms of installed capacity and 
production for all possible values of their costs. Wind power is used either as a 
substitute for or a complement to fuel power on windy days. 
Decentralising the efficient energy mix requires that prices be based on the 
availability of the intermittent source of energy, that is, on weather conditions 
at the production node. Unfortunately, this requirement is not implementable 
because of the lack of price responsiveness on the consumer side; consumers are 
not informed about the availability of the RES or they receive a signal but cannot 
adapt because the electrical appliances are not flexible enough. So prices have 
to be the same in all states of nature, independent of whether wind turbines are 
spinning or not. 
This results in a second-best solution characterised by underinvestment in wind 
power and overinvestment in plants burning fossil fuel compared with a first-best 
solution. The reason is that a uniform price cannot reflect energy scarcity in each 
state of nature. The price is too high on windy days when energy is abundant, 
and too low on windless days when energy is scarce, with the consequence that 
production (or consumption) is too small (large) when the wind is (not) blowing. 
The result is that wind power production is more profitable than fossil power. A 
regulated electricity monopoly that operates the two technologies under a zero-
profit condition experiences a deficit on fossil power that is compensated by 
the profit from its wind power division. If, however, electricity is supplied by 
competing firms each owning only one of the two technologies, and if there is 
free entry, the zero-profit condition of the fossil power producers implies strictly 
positive profits for wind power producers. 
Let us consider some consequences of this result in terms of energy policy. In 
the near future, intermittent technologies will be able to compete against fossil 
fuel technologies after a technological breakthrough or some drastic learning 
effect, or because of more stringent climate change mitigation policies (higher 
carbon taxes or fewer emission permits) that lead to a higher marginal cost for 
fossil combustion.32 Meanwhile, intermittent technologies will be sustained 
by public aid or purchase requirements that are a financial burden for society. 
These costs are well known. In contrast, the other costs identified in Ambec 
and Crampes (2012) have received less emphasis and still have important policy 
implications for the future of the energy industry, in particular:
•	 the cost of altering the electrical appliances used by consumers and 
adapting the network to enable responsive consumers to participate in 
achieving the optimal energy mix;
32 According to a report of the French Senate (summer 2012), the cost of 1 MWh is €54 from nuclear 
plants (including the post-Fukushima costs), €82 from on-shore windmills, €220 from off-shore 
windmills, and between €229 and €371 from photovoltaic panels.
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•	 the structural or institutional arrangements required to decentralise the 
optimal energy mix with non-responsive consumers; and
•	 the conflict between the environmental regulation of fossil sources and 
the financial regulation of intermittent sources.
Smart consumers
First-best analysis suggests that intermittent technologies should be promoted 
in parallel with smart meters and/or smart boxes. These intelligent devices can 
make electricity consumption dependent on the state of nature that prevails 
at the location of production plants. By controlling in real time programmed 
electrical equipment such as boilers and heaters (disconnecting them when the 
intermittent source of energy is not available), smart meters and smart boxes can 
make electricity demand sensitive to energy scarcity across time and space (a 
topic dealt with in the section on ‘the white 20’). Such devices (and therefore the 
consumers who use them) are likely to be more receptive and responsive than 
consumers exposed to messages such as ‘the wind turbines you are connected to 
are currently running; therefore the price of electricity is low’. The smart meters 
and boxes that dispatch consumption automatically over time need to paired with 
information technologies (ICTs) installed all along the energy network. More 
generally, the growth of intermittent energy calls for further investment in the 
network to intensify both connections and information processing. Compared 
with thermal power plants, wind and solar plants are more likely to be scattered 
across a given territory. This has two consequences. First, connection requires 
large investment in small-scale lines, transformers, and two-way meters. This 
obviously makes coordination necessary between producers, transmitters, and 
system and market operators. Second, random local injections radically modify 
the business model of distributors, since the latter now have to balance flows on 
sections of the grid under their responsibility and, in some cases, must install 
new lines and transformers or reinforce old ones to guarantee the reliability of 
the local system under the constraint of accepting injections from authorised 
generators. In most developed countries, making the grid smart is now a priority, 
a goal that entails huge investments to embed information and communication 
technologies into the grid.
Structural arrangements
The huge cost of installing smart appliances at consumption nodes and 
information technologies all along the grid is still too high when compared with 
the welfare increase derived from introducing prices contingent on the state of 
nature. Consequently, consumers continue to be offered only one price, whether 
wind turbines are producing or not. Compared with the optimal energy mix 
under state-contingent prices, today’s consumers demand too little energy when 
the intermittent source is available and too much when it is not. If the resulting 
equilibrium price were an average value of the marginal costs of production in 
the different types of generation plants, generators using fossil energy would 
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lose money and eventually would prefer to leave the industry. We therefore 
must consider structural and legal solutions to implement the optimal energy 
mix under the constraint of non-contingent prices. Assuming free entry and exit, 
in order to keep generators using fossil fuel in the market, the price should be 
equal to the long-run marginal cost of their MWh. This can be construed as a 
requirement that consumers must pay a premium for guaranteed service. The 
drawback of this solution is that the owners of plants using intermittent energy 
pocket a profit equal to the difference between the long-run marginal cost of 
electricity from fossil fuel and the long-run marginal cost of electricity from 
intermittent energy. Consumers pay for being insured against random supply, 
and the money they pay accrues to those who create randomness. 
Two basic public policies can restore the second-best energy mix. The first 
consists of taxing RES and subsidising thermal plants in order to balance the 
budget for each type of technology, the reverse of current policy. The second 
consists of a mandatory technological mix in order to produce a non-random 
energy outflow. Each producer should either control the two technologies or 
buy an insurance contract that secures energy supply at all times. These legal 
arrangements would force both the incumbents and new entrants to guarantee 
energy provision whatever the state of nature at the production plant locations. 
Both policies have drawbacks. The first, which is the more market-oriented, 
comes at the cost of levying and redistributing public funds. The second, which 
is more in line with command-and-control regulation, restricts firms’ flexibility 
in their choice of technology. 
An intermediate solution is to reinforce the role of suppliers in providing final 
consumers with both energy and insurance through a menu of contracts. Yet 
this is for a more distant future, because providing some consumers with cheap 
intermittent electricity and others with expensive reliable electricity within the 
same distribution network will necessitate more than smart meters. Consumption 
appliances will have to be equipped with microprocessors and connected through 
the ‘internet of things’ to suppliers. At periods of scarce energy, suppliers will 
then be able to (partly) disconnect Mr. A, who did not sign a ‘non-random 
contract’, while still fully supplying Ms. B, his nearest neighbour, who did.
Environmental policy
The cost of energy production must include the environmental costs of air 
pollution, resources used, and waste generated for present and future generations. 
When consumers are non-responsive, the regulator must mitigate two market 
failures. The first is the pollution externality created by plants that generate 
electricity from fossil fuels. The mitigation of that externality requires favouring 
less dirty sources of energy such as wind and solar power.
When consumers do not react to pricing that is contingent on the state of nature, 
the demand for electricity is independent of the availability of energy. This is the 
second market failure. Producers must supply the same quantity of electricity at 
the same price in all states of nature. Under perfect competition with free entry, 
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the regulator should set the average profit of the electricity industry to zero in the 
long run by taxing windmills to subsidise thermal power. 
The two market failures call for opposite policies. The net tax or subsidy on 
each source of energy would depend on the magnitude of each market failure. If 
pollution damages are more important than consumers’ loss of surplus (owing 
to their non-responsiveness), fossil fuel power should be taxed and wind power 
subsidised. Money should move the other way in the opposite case.
thE WhitE 20
Energy services
“Doing more with less” was the teaser of the Green Paper on energy efficiency 
published by the European Commission in 2005.33 The idea was that electricity 
is just an input used at consumption nodes to produce energy services, such 
as heating and lighting, in combination with some piece of equipment. By 
promoting the insulation of buildings and the use of low-consumption electrical 
devices, the logic went, one could increase energy services while reducing the 
amount of electricity consumed.
In 2007, the EU set the objective of achieving 20% primary energy savings in 
2020,34 again forgetting that a high price for or tax on carbon emissions would 
induce decision-makers to instinctively favour energy-saving decisions. The EU 
was also apparently forgetting that as competition policy pushes retail prices 
toward marginal production costs, it is not abnormal to observe a limited decrease 
in demand, even possibly an increase. Despite this behavioural evidence, in 2011 
the Commission estimated that taking into account the national energy efficiency 
targets set by member states in the context of the 2020 strategy, the EU would 
achieve only half of the 20% target in 2020. It then decided to prepare a new 
directive35 transforming certain aspects of its energy efficiency plan into binding 
measures. 
To comply with the 20% energy-saving objective, member states have adopted 
a variety of measures, some purely administrative (such as standards for the 
consumption of primary energy in new buildings), others in line with the cap-
and-trade mechanism. 
The consumption cap raises an interesting case of contradiction between public 
policies. In France, it has been fixed at 50 kWh/m²/year. Obeying the rule makes 
it impossible to equip new apartments with electricity-fuelled water boilers 
33 (COM(2005) 265 final; ec.europa.eu/energy/efficiency/doc/2005_06_green_paper_book_en.pdf
34 The 20% improvement in energy efficiency by 2020 was set out in the Commission communication 
of 19 October 2006 entitled “Action Plan for Energy Efficiency: Realising the Potential.” It was 
endorsed by the European Council of March 2007 and by the European Parliament in a Resolution of 
31 January 2008.
35 Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on energy 
efficiency, amending Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU and repealing Directives 2004/8/EC 
and 2006/32/EC.
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because, with a conversion factor of 2.6 for electricity (an old administrative 
coefficient), the quantity of primary energy required would be above the 50 
kWh cap. Therefore, in most cases, boilers burning natural gas will be installed. 
Because most of the electricity consumed in France comes from nuclear plants, 
and because nuclear generation emits much less CO
2
 than gas generation, the 
mandatory 50kWh cap results in an increase of CO
2
 emissions.
An example of a (mildly) market-based incentive is the white certificates 
mechanism. Energy companies are the obligated parties.36 To acquire the 
certificates that they will have to surrender to the regulator, they must promote 
or fund energy efficiency improvements. The certificates can also be traded 
(though very few are), but only at a national level. Like the green certificates and 
unlike the Emission Trading System, the energy-saving certificates have no EU-
wide value. The administrative costs of the scheme are high, as the mandatory 
savings to be evaluated are those above business-as-usual consumption and must 
be discounted for a duration that varies with the type of investment. It has been 
necessary to define standardised operations (such as the replacement of an old 
refrigerator with an A-rated refrigerator/freezer). For non-standard operations 
(such as wall insulation producing an energy saving that varies with the type of 
dwelling and the location), the public officials in charge of the implementation 
have some discretionary power. These measures resemble those found in any 
centrally planned economy. 
The system can be coupled with operations to combat fuel poverty. For 
example, France and the UK have identified some customers (low-income and 
elderly people) as a priority group for investments in energy efficiency. 
The countries using the white certificates system seem so happy with it that 
they have decided to tighten the constraint by increasing the objective that energy 
firms must meet.37 
In the next section, we switch to a more promising market-based system: 
the development of demand responsiveness – more precisely, distributed load-
shedding. The case illustrates how good economic initiatives can be compromised 
by erroneous legal decisions. 
Load-shedding
The need to balance the electric power system in real time to account for the 
non-storability of electricity is the main explanation for vertical integration in 
the sector, either structurally or contractually. Non-storability also explains the 
secondary role traditionally given to demand in the physical balancing of the 
36 Electricity distributors in Flanders, retailers of non-transport energy in France, electricity and gas 
distributors in Italy, electricity and gas retailers in the UK.
37 “There is now around €2 billion per year being spent by energy companies in the EU to deliver energy 
efficiency under Energy Efficiency Obligations. This figure still only represents between 1 and 5 
percent of the energy bill to customers depending on the Member States. The success of this policy 
tool prompted two more EU Member States—Poland and Ireland—to develop similar schemes.” 
(European Council for an Energy Efficient Economy, 2012).
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power system. However, the advances in smart networks based on information 
and communication technologies suggest drastic changes in the near term, 
changes that will provide consumers with a more active role make the whole 
system more efficient.
Balancing the electric power system has long been a centralised matter, usually 
achieved through:
•	 outages or rolling and selective blackouts, methods still experienced 
daily in many developing countries; and
•	 the installation of operational reserves to ensure a given level of security 
of supply.
Nevertheless, large consumers, in particular, wish to achieve finer control of 
their energy bills. Since their electricity use has a significant impact on total 
demand, producers have progressively proposed contracts that include negotiated 
curtailment clauses under which the value of electricity signals the time and 
duration of selective curtailments. When negotiating a contract to supply low-
price electricity, the electricity producer buys an option on the production of 
negawatt-hours (NWh) that are cheaper than the production of the additional 
megawatt-hours (MWh) necessary to balance the system without consumers’ 
participation.38 For its part, a client that can decrease its consumption pays a 
lower bill on the condition that it will either stop consuming energy or switch to 
alternative sources upon request. 
The total load-shedding potential is much larger than the capacity offered 
by a handful of large consumers. Every consumer can be disconnected at 
low damage for dates, durations, and quantities varying with his equipment 
and preferences. The barrier is the cost of implementation. The installation 
of information technology allowing specialised service providers to control 
consumption equipment overcomes this obstacle. It is now technically possible 
to aggregate distributed load-shedding nodes on a large scale. Additionally, to 
meet environmental constraints and requirements in energy saving, the active 
participation of consumers is increasingly seen as politically desirable, especially 
voluntary load-shedding. But successful participation of consumers in system 
balancing requires more than technology; it also takes economic rules that make 
it possible to decentralise efficient dispatch. 
The possibility of exercising an option to discontinue consumption can 
approximate the optimal peak production, provided that this option is acquired 
at the wholesale price and rewarded at the adjustment price. If that is the 
case, interruptible consumers supply NWh to compete against the suppliers 
of additional MWh on a level field. The efficient rule for financial balancing 
requires that the firms responsible for the need to re-dispatch acquire, at the 
38 On negawatts, see Joskow and Marron (1992).
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price of the real-time market, the electricity they had committed to sell at the 
wholesale price. 
To be more explicit,39 consider a competitive day-ahead market in equilibrium 
at price p. The market operator (MO) informs all bidders about their rights and 
duties at this price: 
•	 consumers who have bid below p and producers who have bid above p 
will not be served or called;
•	 the others will have to withdraw or inject the amounts of power to which 
they have committed. 
Let u be the use value of one MWh of electricity and c the production cost. 
Denoting by n the last demand bid served and by m the last supply bid called at 
equilibrium (given that the efficient ranking of bids by the MO follows the merit 
order) we have:
un ≥ p ≥ cm where un > un-1 and cm < cm+1.
Optimal adjustment
One of the m producers supposed to be active at equilibrium informs the MO 
that it will fail to deliver 1 MWh. The MO faces two elementary rebalancing 
solutions: 
•	 either the MO calls the last nonplanned producer to supply the missing 
MWh (which will cost cm+1); or
•	 the MO asks the planned consumer with the lowest electricity valuation 
to reduce its demand by 1 MWh (in which case the cost is the lost gross 
surplus un). 
The least costly adjustment rule is:
•	 call producer m + 1 if cm+1 < un
•	 curtail consumer n if cm+1 > un
Decentralised adjustment
Assume that there is no organised market for rebalancing. The defaulting 
producer is obliged by law to find a solution. If it organises an auction between 
available producers to buy the missing quantity, competition will drive the 
adjustment price to pa = cm+1. With this solution, the defaulting producer is 
like a supplier without generation assets buying from an adjustment market at 
39 For the details of the model, see Crampes and Léautier (2012).
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price pa and selling at the wholesale price p to which it had committed. Because 
the reserve assets are more costly than the assets planned to be dispatched, the 
producer’s net loss is pa	�	p = cm+1	�	p. 
The second possibility is to propose a compensation r to one of its customers 
because that customer will not be served. The producer prefers to buy the missing 
production if r > cm+1	�	p and to propose a deal to the consumer otherwise. This 
decision is in line with the optimal adjustment portrayed above only if r = un	�	
p. Therefore, to implement the first-best solution, the power-cut deal must be 
concluded with customer n, the one with the lowest willingness to pay that also 
holds the right to consume. Moreover, n must be compensated only for its net 
surplus. Consequently, if customer n has already paid the market price p to the 
defaulting producer and if that customer is called to rebalance the system, the 
producer must pay the customer un so that it receives the net reward un �	p for not 
consuming. If the customer had not yet paid for the option to withdraw energy 
but receives compensation un, it must pay back p to the defaulting producer. 
This process is increasingly common in day-ahead and real-time markets, 
rather than on a bilateral basis. In real-time markets, candidates for load-
shedding compete against reserve producers to solve market imbalances either 
directly (big consumers) or indirectly (small consumers delegating decisions to 
aggregators). If we want this pure market adjustment process to decentralise 
the optimum, candidates for rebalancing must satisfy the following necessary 
conditions:
a. producers must have the capacity to produce on hand; and
b. consumers must own rights to the quantity of power they intend to 
renounce, which means they must pay the options to consume or not to 
consume at wholesale price p. 
In such a market, competition between consumers that can reduce their energy 
demands and producers that can increase injections gives the equilibrium price 
pa = min (un, cm+1).
The apparently innocuous rule (b) above is denied by aggregators of 
decentralised load-shedding who consider that they should be allowed to keep 
the whole price pa when they participate in the balancing mechanism. Actually, 
allowing consumers to exert an option without paying to acquire it violates 
the merit order that is at the core of electricity wholesale markets. In contrast, 
the economists’ conclusion is clear: voluntary curtailed consumers should be 
paid pa �	p, not pa. In France, the highest administrative authority (the Conseil 
d’Etat) invalidated the efficient reward scheme (‘pay pa �	p’) designed by the 
energy regulator (CRE), and the case was still pending as of summer 2013. In 
the US, the reverse is occurring - the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
has designed an inefficient rule (‘pay pa’), which is currently under appeal after 
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the action of a large number of economists and energy companies at the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.40
Increasing the flexibility of the demand for electricity should be a priority 
(Hogan, 2009). The ever-rising cost of fossil fuels and the growing importance 
of environmental externalities prohibit the business-as-usual approach of 
continuing to invest in production facilities to meet a demand insensitive to 
price. The information and communication technologies applied to electrical 
networks should make possible significant changes in demand response in the 
near future. As consumers become more concerned with their energy bill and are 
increasingly able to delegate control of their consumption to service providers, 
we will gradually reach a state of the industry where demand plays a fully active 
role in the balancing process. We must therefore encourage R&D leading to 
the installation of electronic tools that allow consumers to control their demand 
efficiently. 
Nevertheless, the solution is not just technical. It also requires a regulatory 
framework that respects the principles of an efficient allocation of resources, 
which means, in a market economy, a system of rights and fees that can 
decentralise optimal dispatch and re-dispatch (Torriti et al., 2010). When 
consumers are allowed to freely choose either to consume or to be paid for not 
consuming, then the quantity of put options they acquire, the price they pay 
to acquire them, and the price they receive when they exercise them must be 
objective and verifiable in order to be included in detailed subscription contracts. 
The legal framework for firms that will develop the service of distributed load-
shedding must also be clearly defined, since they will progressively acquire a 
lot of information on the behaviour of consumers and will intervene at critical 
periods under the supervision of the market operator.
concluding rEmArks
With the European environmental and energy programme aimed at (i) 
reducing polluting emissions, (ii) using more renewable sources of energy, 
and (iii) consuming less energy, the EU authorities have swung open the door 
of energy markets to state aid. Because the problem to be solved is global 
warming, it is clear that market mechanisms cannot work efficiently without 
public intervention. The environmental externalities created by greenhouse gas 
emissions must be reduced, and this requires a specific public policy. However 
the solution cannot come from the superposition of uncoordinated policies, in 
particular because the promotion of renewable sources of energy and reductions 
in energy consumption should not be considered as intrinsic objectives on a par 
with the curbing of greenhouse gas emissions. The cap-and-trade system should 
be sufficient to reach the objective, provided allowances of pollutants are not 
given away free or auctioned in excessively large quantities. 
40  See www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/2012/Economists%20amicus%20brief_061312.pdf
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Indeed, the basic problem at stake is the allocation of rights to use common 
resources. This should be done by an independent ‘intergenerational regulation 
fund’ created to manage common natural resources in the joint interest of present 
and future generations, independently of the myopic and egoistic interest of 
industrial and political decision-makers. Such an agency will not escape the 
bureaucracy curse. However, by efficiently allocating the rights to emit pollutants 
and using the resulting revenue to initiate green and white R&D programmes and 
to sustain social programmes against fuel poverty, the proposed agency would 
internalise the overlapping effects of separate policies. Having a single unit in 
charge would make it easier to implement the maximisation of intergenerational 
welfare. 
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Do European Climate and Energy 
Policies Threaten to Postpone  
  the Energy Transition?
JohAn AlbrEcht
3
European climate and energy policies are under stress. The Emissions Trading 
System (ETS) of the EU suffers from a severe over-allocation of emission 
permits, leading to a very low CO
2
 price. In almost all European countries, 
wholesale electricity prices are declining and are already too low to trigger 
investments in new generation and network assets. Such investments are essential 
to prepare for the coming transition towards a more sustainable global energy 
system.41  Estimates of conventional generation reserve margins between now 
and 2020 suggest low electricity prices and a problematic investment climate 
for the next years. As the energy transition is a gigantic investment project, 
the current disincentives to invest are likely to significantly delay the pace of 
decarbonisation efforts in Europe. 
Meanwhile, the production of coal and its use for electricity generation is 
increasing in Europe. In 2011, the consumption of coal in the EU increased by 
3.6%, while demand fell by 1.1% in all other countries of the OECD (Rühl and 
Giljum, 2012). In the UK, the share of coal in electricity generation increased 
from 30% in 2011 to 42.8% in 2012, leading to an increase in coal consumption 
of 32.5% in 2012 (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2013). Similar 
evolutions in Germany and Spain conflict with decarbonisation scenarios for 
Europe. 
In the period between 2000 and 2010, greenhouse gas emissions dropped by 
5.7% in the US, but by only 4.4% in the EU-27 (EC-JRC, 2012). As the very 
complex European climate and energy policy architecture is outperformed by 
a country without explicit climate policy targets – but with a higher economic 
growth rate – how sustainable is the perception that the EU holds the leadership 
in international climate policy? 
41 Fossil fuels have a role to play in all transition scenarios up to 2050.
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The goal of this chapter is to explain and assess some of the problematic 
interactions in European climate and energy policies. Is the complex European 
approach contributing to the problem it was designed to cure? Do we risk delaying 
the European component of the energy transition? How problematic might such 
a delay be? Based on a transition perspective, I conclude by discussing some 
options to improve the effectiveness of policy frameworks in the next decade. 
ovErAllocAtion in thE Emissions trAding systEm And ‘20/20/20’
Too soft a cornerstone 
IHS CERA (2011) estimates that the overallocation of emission permits under 
the ETS is equivalent to 1.4 billion tonnes of CO
2
 in the period between 2013 
and 2020. The steep economic downturn since 2008, combined with the current 
double-dip outlook, is partly responsible for this overallocation. Although Phase 
III of the ETS (2013–20) introduced auctioning for the energy sector, CO
2
 prices 
under the ETS fell further in the first half of 2013 (to €5). Figure 3.1 shows the 
evolution of the CO
2
 price under the ETS between 2005 and 2012. 
Figure 3.1 The ETS CO
2













































The contrast with projections of the ETS price made in 2007 is large. As a 
consequence, the ETS sectors – responsible for close to 45% of total European 
CO
2
 emissions (EC-JRC 2012) – currently do not have a market incentive to 
invest in ambitious carbon-mitigation measures. Without a significant carbon 
penalty, the relative fossil fuel prices of today ensure that old CO
2
-intensive coal-
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powered electricity plants in Europe can easily compete with gas-powered plants 
that are much more carbon efficient but face a higher fuel cost per MWh of 
electricity produced. As the EU unfailingly presents the ETS as “the cornerstone 
of its drive to reduce emissions of man-made greenhouse gases” (EC-JRC, 
2012), the current situation is far from optimal. 
Interactions among climate policy goals and the ETS 
Climate and energy policy options determine technological choices for the 
production of energy services as well as for the mitigation of greenhouse gas 
emissions. An economy-wide carbon tax will result in other technological 
choices than binding targets for renewable energy sources (RES). The European 
‘20/20/20’ approach of 2007 sets an overall emissions reduction target of 20% 
(the first ‘20’ of 20/20/20) but also imposes very direct technological choices 
by 2020 (European Commission, 2007). Economic agents are required to invest 
in RES and in energy efficiency projects, irrespective of the availability of low-
cost sources and technologies. By its nature, the 20% reduction target suggests 
that economic agents are free to decide how to meet the mitigation target. But 
emissions trading or carbon pricing is limited to those emissions not yet reduced 
by RES and efficiency policies. 
Important decisions on the future allocation of CO
2 
emission permits up to 
2020 under Phase III of the ETS were also taken in 2007. The time horizon of 
the 20/20/20 package and of Phase III of the ETS is often presented as offering a 
long-term perspective to investors. However, the lifetime of energy system assets 
is typically in the range of 25 to 50 years. From this perspective, targets through 
2020 mainly affect short-term investment decisions.
Twenty per cent or 30 per cent?
The EU initially wanted to commit to a 30% reduction target by 2020 upon the 
condition that other leading economies, such as the US, would commit to similar 
efforts. This easy switch of emission reduction targets reveals that the 20% target 
is a soft one because of the ongoing deindustrialisation of Europe. With less 
energy-intensive activities in Europe and more imports of manufactured goods 
from outside the EU, it is rather easy to lower the domestic production of CO
2
 
emissions (Helm, 2012). From a strategic perspective, Europe risks losing 
credibility by choosing domestic reduction targets as a bargaining chip. 
Why supplemental policies?
The 20/20/20 package contains two additional policies to support carbon pricing 
as the core policy instrument to trigger a least-cost market response to the 
challenge of climate change. Because of multiple market barriers and failures 
(imperfections), carbon pricing alone will not fully unlock the existing potential 
for energy efficiency. Without technology-support policies, no radically 
new low-carbon technologies will hit the market in the coming decades. The 
availability of cost-effective energy-efficiency opportunities offers the potential 
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to meet a given emission-reduction goal at a low carbon price. Without the 
emission reduction from energy efficiency investments, other sectors – such as 
industries exposed to international competition – need to take additional and 
more expensive mitigation measures (IEA, 2011). 
Unfortunately, the use of supplementary policies adds additional uncertainty 
to the ETS market. The companies participating in the ETS base their strategic 
behaviour on price expectations. If supplementary policies such as RES and 
efficiency targets over- or under-deliver on their expected level of emissions 
reductions, the needed abatement within the ETS and, hence, the ETS price will 
be affected. These additional fluctuations in the CO
2
 price can delay investment 
decisions. 
Recent policy experiences show, furthermore, that the cost of supplementary 
policies can be higher than expected. Deployment targets for RES threaten to 
bring  (too) expensive technologies into the market because of the historical 
under-investment in energy research, development, and demonstration (RD&D). 
Premature support for immature technologies should be avoided (Kramer and 
Haigh, 2009). It is not a coincidence that EU countries with very generous 
support schemes for photovoltaics today face a real explosion of retail electricity 
costs (see CEER, 2013). This could have been avoided by scaling up past public 
RD&D efforts in order to set more ambitious deployment targets at a lower 
cost to society. As the high cost of deploying RES is partly channelled to ETS 
companies through higher electricity network costs, this supplementary measure 
risks undermining the competitiveness of energy-intensive ETS companies on 
international markets. 
Finally, measures to accelerate the potential for energy efficiency often are not 
justified from a market failure perspective. Many energy efficiency opportunities 
are neglected because of high discount rates, differences in preferences, or 
limited access to capital. These are not market failures – everyone would like to 
have more capital – and hence do not justify the use of expensive fiscal subsidies 
that primarily benefit those economic agents with higher and middle incomes. 
These fiscal subsidies do not have a direct impact on the electricity price but they 
do have an opportunity cost (for example, by crowding out resources available 
for public R&D). Policy interventions should focus on traditional market 
failures such as principal-agent relationships, split incentives (landlord-tenant), 
and adverse selection. Such market failures can partly be addressed with smart 
regulation at a lower cost. 
Policy interactions and impact on the ETS price
Because of the economic crisis, electricity demand in many European countries 
was lower in 2012 than in 2007. Overcapacity in conventional generation 
increased during that period, and wholesale electricity prices in northwestern 
Europe fell from €75 in 2007 to less than €50 in 2012. More than five years after 
the start of the crisis, Europe is entering a new – or perhaps just another – crisis 
in the steel industry, with job losses and plant closures. Energy demand can be 
further reduced, leading to an even greater over-allocation of permits in the ETS. 
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But the efficiency of the ETS is also affected by the 20% RES target and the 20% 
energy efficiency target. 
The obligation to invest in RES serves to reduce emissions, especially from 
gas-powered plants in markets with stagnating demand. As a consequence, CO
2
 
emissions in the electricity sector – a major sector in the ETS – are in principle 
lower than in scenarios without high RES obligations. Because the electricity 
sector has to execute a technological mandate, the 20% RES mandate affects the 
remaining demand for emission permits. Simultaneously, all economic sectors 
– including the ETS sectors – are required to improve their energy efficiency 
performance between now and 2020. Higher energy efficiency levels lead to 
lower consumption of fossil energy and lower CO
2
 emissions. 
IHS CERA (2011) and Roques (2012) estimated the impact of both targets on 
CO
2 
emissions – 20% RES and 20% energy efficiency – to conclude that their 
potential impact on emissions from ETS companies is large enough that the cap 
of the ETS Phase III can be met without any further mitigation effort. Figure 
3.2 shows that subtracting the CO
2
 reductions from both 20% targets by 2020 
leads to emissions very close to the ETS Phase III cap. From this perspective, the 
20/20/20 package seems to be a deliberate effort by policymakers to make the 
ETS redundant. After 2013, projected emissions exceed the ETS cap in Figure 
3.2. However, the 2007 projection of baseline emissions for the period 2007–20 in 
the figure dates from the pre-crisis era. Since 2008, emissions of ETS companies 
followed a bumpy road. In 2009 alone, there was a reduction of 200 million 
tonnes of CO
2
 (Roques, 2012). So while the economic crisis has had a profound 
impact on over-allocation in the ETS, even without the crisis the cap would be a 
soft one. With the crisis, the cap has no relevance whatsoever. Even with a 30% 
reduction target for the EU, this would likely be so – an embarrassment for the 
‘backbone of European climate policy’.
The assessment by IHS CERA (2011) shows that energy efficiency measures, 
in particular, can lead to very strong emission reductions, even in a few years. 
This may be an overly optimistic presentation of the emission-reduction potential 
of energy efficiency measures in the short run. Nevertheless, the conclusions of 
this quantitative assessment are largely confirmed in other assessments. The IEA 
(2012) also argues that the strong growth of renewable energy, driven by policies 
outside the trading system, undermines the efficiency of he ETS. The IEA 
therefore concludes that ”policy considerations aimed at enhancing coherence 
between renewable policies and the ETS would be justified” (IEA, 2012, p. 569). 
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Source: Roques (2012) and IHS CERA (2011).
Although 20/20/20 is a soft package in terms of reduction ambitions, its design 
is not responsive to external factors such as the ongoing economic crisis or the 
rise of unconventional energy sources. The ETS faces the same rigidity – the cap 
cannot be adjusted to a new economic reality. The rigidity is problematic because 
of the use of short-term targets in 20/20/20 and in the ETS. With a longer time 
horizon – for example, 2030 or 2035 – unforeseen events would have a less 
dramatic impact on the relevance of policy goals because markets would have 
a better chance to adjust before the end of the longer commitment period. The 
alternatives of flexible reduction targets and flexible caps in the ETS by 2020 – 
for example, a cap inversely indexed to EU GDP – would severely complicate 
the ability to plan long-term energy technology investments. The alternative of 
a general carbon tax not connected to a specific short-term emission reduction 
target would avoid the current situation of economic incentives too low to trigger 
investments, but at the cost of creating another challenge: paying the carbon tax 
at times of severe economic crisis. 
ElEctricity gEnErAtion ovErcApAcity
European electricity markets today face a significant generation overcapacity 
despite phase-out scenarios for old nuclear and coal capacity. In major economies, 
the reserve margin for conventional generation, or the available or remaining 
generation capacity at times of peak load, is in the range of 10% to 25%. 
E.ON AG (2011) projects a reserve margin of 15% between 2013 and 2020 for 
Germany, France, and the Benelux countries. For the Nordic region, the reserve 
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margin is close to 25% in the same period. Spain, too, faces an overcapacity of 
close to 20% in the period 2013–20. Only in the UK does the reserve margin fall 
back to zero around 2016. 
Because of additional investments in renewable energy technologies between 
now and 2020, the reserve margin will remain rather high in coming years. For 
onshore wind, generation capacity in Europe is expected to triple between 2008 
and 2020 while offshore wind capacity will increase more than tenfold (E.ON 
AG, 2011). The prospect of sustained overcapacity puts pressure on electricity 
prices. In fact, electricity prices below €40 per MWh are no longer exceptional 
on forward markets (European Commission 2012a). The contrast with pre-crisis 
prices is large.
The downward price evolution is enforced because of the very low marginal 
generation cost of intermittent renewable technologies. As the supply of 
generation technologies on wholesale markets is based on marginal costs, 
subsidised RES technologies push conventional generation technologies with 
the highest marginal generation costs out of the wholesale market under optimal 
weather conditions. This combination of structural overcapacity and the low 
prices on electricity wholesale markets excludes investment possibilities in 
generation technologies that do not benefit from subsidy regimes.
The low prices on electricity wholesale markets are of little relevance for 
photovoltaic (PV) and wind projects, as they benefit from subsidy schemes 
(FITs) that cover their full cost. From a societal perspective, the high cost of PV 
and offshore wind – not to be confused with their very low marginal generation 
cost (Table 3.1) – increases the cost of short-term climate policy targets. 
In other words, the current support schemes for energy from RES shelter a 
large sector from market dynamics, while the expansion of subsidised RES 
exerts a significant impact on wholesale prices and on investment opportunities 
in conventional generation. It remains unclear how long this type of market 
distortion can be sustained in a market that should be liberalised and fully 
integrated at the European level. The differences among the national RES 
support schemes already distort investment decisions in renewables. 
Table 3.1 compares the marginal generation cost – for simplicity restricted 
here to fuel costs – to the total generation cost for the main generation 
technologies. The levelised cost of electricity (LCOE) is used to calculate 
the full generation cost. The LCOE values in Table 3.1 are based on a 10% 
discount rate but exclude a carbon or a CO
2
 cost per technology. For wind and 
solar technologies, optimistic load factors from northwestern Europe have been 
selected: 25% for onshore wind, 35% for offshore wind, and 12% for PV. For 
conventional generation, the high load factors typical of the pre-crisis period 
have been selected – for example, 70% for gas-powered plants – although the 
current generation overcapacity and the expansion of RES do lead to much lower 
load factors that preclude investment.
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Table 3.1 Marginal versus total electricity generation costs for NW Europe in 
2012
Fuel cost (€/MWh)




PV (photovoltaics) 0 198
Wind onshore 0 107





Source: Albrecht et al. (2012).
An assessment of the LCOE is based on a stand-alone perspective for the 
technologies considered. This implies that the necessary costs of backup, 
balancing, and system flexibility are not included in the LCOE of intermittent 
generation technologies.
Table 3.1 confirms that in Europe, gas-powered electricity is not competitive 
once (wholesale) electricity prices are close to €50/MWh. As a consequence, 
coal-powered generation with a much lower marginal cost – €30/MWh in 
northwestern Europe – remains in the market and replaces gas capacity. This 
merit-order effect explains why electricity companies close down gas-powered 
plants but burn more coal. The most efficient coal-powered electricity plants can 
emit 740 g CO
2
/kWh, whereas state-of-the-art gas-powered plants emit less than 
400 g CO
2
/kWh (IEA, 2012). In northwestern Europe, many old coal-powered 
plants are still in use today, so we can assume that emissions are close to 1,000 
g CO
2
/kWh. With a high CO
2
 price in the ETS, efficient gas-powered plants 
would be much more competitive. But the electricity prices of today exclude all 
investment projects – including coal-powered generation – that do not benefit 
from production subsidies such as FIT. 
The closings of gas-powered plants in northwestern Europe are not attributable 
solely to low wholesale electricity and CO
2
 prices. In the first months of 2013, 
European gas prices were three times as high as gas prices in the US. This 
price gap is partly due to Europe’s historical preference for gas contracts with 
oil-indexed prices. Meanwhile, the US economy benefits from low gas prices 
because of the ongoing shale gas revolution. Coal-powered plants are being 
closed in the country; new electricity plants are efficient gas-powered plants. As 
a consequence, CO
2
 emissions in the US are decreasing, and the surplus of coal 
on the US market is shipped to Europe and Japan. 
Investing in new gas-powered plants is consistent with decarbonisation 
scenarios because flexible gas plants offer the capacity needed to balance 
intermittent or weather-based generation. Hence, investments in flexible new 
gas-powered plants avoid the risk of a carbon lock in. Because the attractiveness 
of gas-powered electricity depends on gas prices, Europe not only needs to 
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reconsider its climate policy goals but also the current organisation of its gas 
markets. 
The energy transition as an investment challenge
The energy transition is a global project, and all economic regions should 
contribute to it. When economic agents do not face CO
2
 mitigation incentives and 
the investment climate excludes the construction of flexible new gas-powered 
plants and intelligent energy networks, investments in crucial components of the 
transition to a low-carbon economy risk being delayed by several years. Can we 
afford the current levels of inactivity and uncertainty? What policy options can 
be considered to break the current stalemate?
A transparent assessment of the investment needs of the energy transition can 
be found in Energy Technology Perspectives 2012 of the International Energy 
Agency (IEA). We focus now on the global investment needs in the electricity 
sector to support the energy transition (Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2 Global investment needs in the electricity sector, 2010–50  
(US$ trillion)
2010–20 2020–30 2030–50 Total
Expansion of the electricity system without 
the transition investments
5.9 6.5 15.9 28.3
Expansion of the electricity system with 
transition investments
6.5 8.7 20.7 35.9
Additional transition investments in the 
electricity sector
600 2.2 4.8 7.6
Source: Based on IEA (2012).
According to IEA (2012), close to $28 trillion will have to be invested in the 
global electricity system by 2050 to replace old assets and expand the electricity 
system in response to global economic and population expansion. Most of these 
investments will occur in emerging markets and be triggered by market forces. 
If the expansion of the electricity system also has to support the goals of the 
global energy transition, additional decarbonisation investments will be needed. 
To support the energy transition, total investment will have to amount to $36 
trillion in the period 2010–50. 
The additional investment cost of the energy transition is close to 30% of the 
projected investment needs to modernise and expand the electricity system. Of 
the total investment needs in the electricity sector of $36 trillion by 2050, $25.4 
trillion is allocated to generation technologies, while $10.5 trillion needs to be 
invested in transmission and distribution. Table 3.2 shows that the bulk of the 
transition investments should take place in the period 2030–50. In optimisation 
models such as those used for IEA (2012), a carbon value is introduced to trigger 
the deployment of available technologies and to invest in the development of 
new and much more efficient technologies. To minimise the cost of the energy 
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transition, the models assume massive investments in energy R&D in the first 
model periods, thereby lowering future deployment costs while also avoiding 
premature investments. 
The expected increase in investments in the electricity system is geographically 
concentrated in Asia. Between 2010 and 2020, close to 30% of all investments 
will take place in China. With a total investment of $1.8 trillion by 2020 – 
including energy transition investments – China will invest more than Europe 
and the US together. Energy technology companies know this. Because of its 
economic expansion, investments in Asia will be largely market-driven, which is 
definitely not the case in Europe. Total investment needs in Europe – including 
energy transition needs – are estimated by the IEA (2012) to amount to $950 
billion between 2010 and 2020. In case the transition investments in Europe 
cannot take place because of the problematic investment climate of today, the 
amount needed in the period 2020–30 will increase by a similar amount. 
As long as energy R&D projects remain financed – even in times of crisis 
marked by budget cuts – at a level sufficient to deliver efficient low-carbon 
technologies over the coming decades, the energy transition as a whole will not 
be endangered because of a decade of bad investment climate. Unfortunately, it 
remains uncertain whether energy R&D efforts are indeed high enough to prepare 
for an ambitious energy transition. The share of energy R&D expenditures in the 
total R&D budgets of OECD countries has been decreasing – from 12% in 1980 
to less than 4% today (IEA, 2012). In an earlier publication, the IEA (2010) 
compared current annual energy R&D spending levels to the estimated annual 
R&D investments needed to realise ambitious energy transition targets. That 
publication concluded that the annual estimated R&D spending gap ranged from 
$40 to $90 billion. To benchmark this R&D spending gap, consider that current 
public energy R&D spending is less than $13 billion. 
As a final note, all discussions about low-carbon electricity systems should 
include the other components of the global energy system that also need to be 
transformed – among them, manufacturing processes and the electrification of 
transportation. 
tEchnologicAl choicEs in uncErtAin timEs
Investing in energy assets is a risky business today. Investment decisions hinge on 
market expectations; poor market outlooks will delay investment programmes. 
Investors may wonder how energy markets will respond to a decade of low 
economic growth. We now know that the high economic growth rates of recent 
decades were artificially boosted and reflected unsustainable overconsumption 
based on the excessive and unsustainable debt positions of governments, private 
companies, and households (Rajan, 2010). Unfortunately, the unavoidable 
deleveraging (or reduction of outstanding excess debt) will take place at a time 
when the increasing cost of an ageing population will make it more difficult for 
governments to balance budgets. The weak economic outlook will continue to 
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have a direct impact on prices and energy demand expectations, and hence on 
investment decisions. 
The energy transition is premised on the development of new technologies that 
are then selected by investors. To minimise the cost to society of the transition, 
no single technological trajectory should be favoured; instead, the selection of 
technologies should be based on competitive mechanisms. Today’s climate and 
energy policy framework strongly influences the way technologies are selected. 
In Europe, the selection process is very complex because of the coexistence 
of technology-neutral and technology-imposing instruments. The ETS as the 
backbone of European climate policy is a technology-neutral policy instrument 
designed to ensure the selection of least-cost mitigation options by market forces. 
By contrast, the 20/20/20 package, with its RES and efficiency obligations, 
directly imposes specific technological choices. Other environmental policies, 
such as the Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCP Directive 2001/80/EC) to 






, dust particles, and 
ozone precursors), also affect the use of old power plants and hence can lead to 
significant CO
2
 emission reductions. The LCP Directive can even accelerate the 
phase-out of old (coal) power plants. At the national level, nuclear phase-out 
scenarios in Germany and Belgium directly affect technological choices.  
Technology-neutral and technology-imposing measures
As many policy goals and processes can affect technological choices, Table 
3.3 distinguishes between European policy processes, goals, and instruments 
that are technology-neutral and those that can be considered as imposing 
technological choices on economic agents. The simultaneous use of technology-
neutral and technology-imposing processes, as found in Europe today, can be 
counterproductive. In Europe, a blurred combination of multiple views on how 
to select technologies is the heart of the problem. Eskeland et al. (2012) and 
Böhringer et al. (2009) provide estimates of the additional cost to society of 
some of Europe’s multiple targets and approaches. 
Table 3.3 Technology-neutral versus technology-imposing processes, goals and 
instruments in European climate and energy policy
Technology-neutral processes, goals, 
instruments
Liberalisation of energy markets, ETS,  
20% reduction target of 20/20/20
Technology-imposing processes, goals, 
instruments
20% RES target of 20/20/20, 20% efficiency 
gains target of 20/20/20, phase-out scenarios, 
LCP Directive
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Because the short-term technology-imposing instruments (such as the 20% 
RES goal) are not backed up by historical energy R&D support schemes, the 
mandatory investments in renewable generation are very expensive, while the 
opportunity of selecting less expensive mitigation options is foregone. 
From a philosophical perspective, the imposition of very specific technological 
targets is typical of the economic planning tradition, whereas the use of 
technology-neutral processes or instruments expresses belief in the power 
of market forces. However, as there is no monolithic attitude with respect to 
economic planning versus market forces within the EU, it is not surprising that 
European climate and energy policies combine both approaches. In principle, 
there is nothing wrong with this combination (IEA, 2011). What matters is that 
public R&D spending trajectories must be planned to avoid important market 
failures. Short-term penetration rates for young technologies should not be 
planned when it is more appropriate to invest first in better technologies.
Two extreme abstract views on the selection of technologies and the evolution 
of the energy system can be teased out of Table 3.3. When the free-market 
approach dominates, energy markets must be fully liberalised and a European 
carbon tax or cap-and-trade system applies to all economic sectors. From an 
investment perspective, a carbon tax is more predictable than the fluctuating CO
2
 
price in the ETS. An escalating carbon tax provides the strongest incentive to 
invest in new mitigation technologies. As market forces will select technologies 
and trigger investment decisions, national policymakers are mainly observers or 
gatekeepers. Domestic preferences for technological mixes become irrelevant as 
the European landscape will adjust to the European policy targets. 
Even in this free-market approach, policymakers have to invest in public 
R&D to ensure that more efficient energy and mitigation technologies can hit 
the markets in the next decades. Otherwise, the carbon incentives will bring 
only mature technologies into the market. Radical innovation projects such as 
the energy transition are impossible to realise without multiple policies working 
together in a synergistic package. That package includes supply-push measures 
– mainly public R&D expenditures followed by demonstration projects – and 
demand-pull measures such as the creation of niche markets, public procurement 
or fiscal incentives (Norberg-Bohm, 2002). Once technologies evolve into 
concepts ‘close to the market’ the balance will shift toward demand-pull 
measures. An effective and efficient package of policies measures should be 
based on a consistent view of how to select and diffuse technologies.
National phase-out scenarios and short-term obligations to invest in renewable 
energy and energy efficiency technologies are not consistent with this market-
oriented view on the organisation of energy markets. But because the energy 
landscape of today reflects historical choices and preferences, the pure free-
market approach alone is not a realistic option for the selection of energy 
technologies. 
The other extreme is a completely planned energy system. This option, too, 
requires the allocation of sufficient resources to energy R&D projects, in this case 
by planning departments. Under this scenario, planners define short-term and 
Do European Climate and Energy Policies Threaten to Postpone  
the Energy Transition?   57
long-term policy targets and regulate the optimal mix of energy and mitigation 
technologies. Economic agents lobby for adequate support mechanisms, and 
investments are made in a low-risk environment. As energy decisions are still 
made at the national level, liberalisation can only disturb the implementation of 
planning decisions. 
The ideal scheme of policy measures should be based on the dynamic 
interactions between supply-push and demand-pull measures. As it often takes 
decades to develop radically new but efficient technologies, the obsession with 
short-term targets in international climate negotiations and in the 20/20/20 
approach of the EU is problematic. For policymakers, however, the selection of 
short-term targets is tempting because many new and promising technologies are 
already available. Why not push massive deployment of the new technologies to 
realise a quick switch to low-carbon energy? 
Kramer and Haigh (2009) challenge this view on the grounds that the mere 
availability of a new technology should be distinguished from the economic 
significance (in their terms, the “materiality”) of this new technology. When 
reaching 1% of the global energy mix is taken as a benchmark, history teaches that 
it can take 30 years before a new technology achieves some market importance. 
PVs supply just 0.01% of world energy today and enjoy exponential growth rates. 
As it takes a few hundred billion dollars to bring new technologies to materiality 
and many years to build the human and industrial capacity to realise this, the 
relevance of short-term national targets on the evolution of new technologies is 
limited. Furthermore, exponential growth rates for new technologies will always 
be replaced by linear growth rates. Because energy technologies have a long 
lifetime – between 25 and 50 years – replacement rates have to be low to avoid 
large capital losses. Technological targets become especially expensive when 
technologies that are too young or too inefficient are selected too early, or when 
it becomes necessary to replace existing capital too early. 
Liberalisation or ‘small is beautiful’? 
Climate and energy policy goals through 2020 were established around 2007, 
when the liberalisation of European energy markets was in full swing. In 
principle, the liberalisation process should be complete by 2014. However, several 
member states are already experiencing a significant delay in implementing the 
liberalisation directives. Abolishing price regulation, particularly, appears to be 
very difficult in some countries. 
Liberalisation can have a strong impact on energy market decisions in the 
period during which energy and mitigation technology choices should align with 
the climate policy goals. From an investment perspective, it is challenging to 
predict the possible interactions between liberalisation as an ongoing process 
and progress with the climate policy goals. 
The liberalisation of energy markets purports to replace historical national 
energy monopolies with a larger, more efficient, transparent, and interconnected 
system in which economic agents compete and invest at the European level. 
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To ensure high levels of competition and economic efficiency, domestic market 
barriers need to be abolished. And to trigger investments and production decisions 
in the open European energy market, market forces need to be empowered. 
Ultimately, market forces will select technologies based on their market merits 
at the European scale. 
The final configuration of liberalised energy markets has never been explicitly 
specified, but capital-intensive industries are typically evolving into oligopolies 
dominated by a few transnational companies. Indeed, a likely consequence of 
the EU’s wish to foster energy companies with the capacity to pursue strategic 
goals at the European level may be that European energy markets will be 
dominated by a small number of large companies by 2030, or even earlier. The 
European Commission (2012b) has identified as a recent achievement that by 
2012 “at least 14 European electricity and/or gas companies are now active 
in more than one Member State.” We can assume that these 14 international 
companies are not small. This potentially oligopolistic market outcome may 
conflict with popular visions of decentralised generation in local energy clusters 
of small companies. In several member states, governments have taken certain 
measures to limit the power and market share of the incumbent utilities. In 
Germany, there is a gathering trend away from the mega-integrated utilities, 
back to the Stadtwerke. The German government even wants to fund 15% of 
new-plant capital expenditures of small utilities with a market share of less 
than 5% (HSBC, 2011). Schumacher’s ‘small is beautiful’ principle (1974) is 
again a very popular concept for national energy policy makers, while Europe 
is preparing the energy landscape for the rise of a limited number of powerful 
transnational corporations.
The opportunity of emerging markets for energy companies
Once energy companies operate with a European perspective, it is a small step 
to approach energy markets from a global perspective. Because the growth 
prospects for the European economy are meagre when compared with the 
emerging economies, the major European energy companies may well shift their 
focus. In the emerging markets, close to 1.8 billion people will enter the global 
consuming class over the next 15 years. Because of this expansion, McKinsey 
(2012) projects that global consumption will nearly double to $64 trillion before 
2030. Developing countries will continue to drive global growth in demand 
for manufactured goods as well in demand for energy system investments. 
The needed expansion of the Chinese electricity system alone over the next 
decade offers a market opportunity of $1.8 trillion (IEA, 2012). Why invest in a 
stationary European market with uncertain returns when emerging markets offer 
a guaranteed profit?
Do European Climate and Energy Policies Threaten to Postpone  
the Energy Transition?   59
WhAt’s nExt?
The current climate and energy policy framework is not optimal. Several options 
can be considered to improve its overall effectiveness. We can distinguish between 
short-term and long-term options. Their relevance depends on a more consistent 
view of how to change the energy system. In the short run, it is unlikely that 
Europe’s policy framework will change radically – for example, by phasing out 
the ETS after 2020 or suddenly eliminating the 20% RES or the 20% efficiency 
target from the 20/20/20 package. Radical changes in policy development are 
possible only in the long run.
Between now and 2020
The European Commission has launched a debate over so-called backloading 
options to increase the ETS price in the next years. Backloading refers to 
temporarily removing from the market a huge volume of permits – for example, 
a billion ETS permits in the period between 2013 and 2015 – and re-injecting 
them into the market later on. With backloading, there is no destruction or 
buyback of permits. As such, it can alter the average CO
2
 price in a given year 
but will not lead to a structural change in the CO
2 
price. Hence, backloading will 
hardly affect decisions on mitigation investments by ETS companies in ETS 
Phase III. Moreover, ETS companies object to backloading strategies because 
they further complicate investment decisions without offering a real solution. 
The ETS price could easily be regulated by installing a price floor that would 
vary over time. It could be limited to auctioned permits or set for all transactions 
in the ETS. Given the low CO
2
 prices of today, the floor would set the market 
price. The ETS would then be transformed into a carbon taxation scheme. This 
is not a desirable transformation of the cornerstone of European climate policy 
and the ETS was thus the wrong choice. Although public authorities count on 
ETS revenues to finance energy R&D projects and a price floor could secure 
sufficient resources to finance the needed research efforts, ETS companies 
would object to a shifting floor as an unpredictable and discriminatory market 
intervention. (Discriminatory because the floor would be especially beneficial 
for companies with excess permits that they could now sell at higher prices.) It 
would be difficult to introduce a price floor without discriminatory consequences. 
Because the low CO
2
 price in the ETS reflects some structural economic trends – 
partly embedded in the design of European policies – why tamper with a market 
mechanism intended to reveal information? If a price floor were to be installed, 
a European floor should be preferred over different floors in different member 
states. 
A much more attractive option relates to the cap for ETS Phase IV. Around 
2015, Europe should present a clear post-2020 climate policy perspective to 
all ETS and non-ETS economic agents. The cap for ETS Phase IV should be 
consistent with the overall CO
2
 reduction target by 2030 or by 2035. When the 
energy transition is taken as the reference perspective, it would make sense to set 
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a long-term reduction target with ETS caps up to 2035, or even later. In that case, 
the next ETS phase would run from 2021 until 2035. But if saving the ETS as the 
cornerstone of climate policy is the main priority, a 2028 or 2030 cap for the next 
phase will have more impact on the ETS market in the period 2015–20. Because 
of banking (i.e., transferring non-used permits from one Phase to another) 
between Phase III and Phase IV, a very challenging ETS cap by 2028 or 2030 
would increase demand for permits before 2020 and push prices up. To avoid 
the risk that complementary targets (articulated in a possible 30/30/30 follow-
up to the 20/20/20 package) would again reduce the demand for ETS permits 
and hence the relevance of the ETS as a cost-minimising policy instrument, it is 
essential that no RES target and no energy efficiency target should be set after 
2020. Europe should support the future deployment of energy from renewable 
sources and efficiency technologies by allocating a significant share of ETS 
revenues to R&D projects dedicated to future generations of renewable and 
efficiency technologies. In the absence of binding targets for RES after 2020, 
member states would be able to phase out subsidy regimes, thus lowering the 
cost of the energy transition. The removal of an important sheltered sector with 
an impact on the investment climate for conventional generation technologies 
would facilitate the completion of the internal market. 
Some ETS companies argue that the low CO
2
 price in the ETS should not be 
seen as a problem because European industry still faces a recession. A higher 
CO
2
 price would increase the operational costs of energy-intensive companies 
that are already struggling with the crisis. Some ETS companies state that those 
not pleased by the current functioning of the ETS are free to buy CO
2
 permits 
to increase the price; given the estimated overallocation of 1.4 billion permits, 
buying permits to eliminate the overallocation would cost close to $7 billion. 
This clearly is not a realistic option. But if some governments decide to buy 300 
million CO
2
 permits in 2014 as an exceptional intervention to restore market 
fundamentals and announce their intention to buy additional volumes in Phase 
III when deemed appropriate, market expectations could adjust to a lower level 
of overallocation, leading to higher prices. Although ETS companies with excess 
permits would support this type of intervention, European institutions and 
national authorities should not participate directly in the market because they 
designed the ETS and will later decide on its future caps. Regulators, too, should 
stick to their role and not act like the market participants they regulate. Another 
aspect relates to insider trading. When public authorities today buy permits at a 
low price and later introduce a very ambitious cap for 2030, they can sell their 
permits at much higher prices. Such an abuse of market power to create profits 
would not be acceptable to private market parties.
Long-term options
The ETS can be saved. At the same time, phasing out technology-imposing 
measures would increase the consistency of European climate and energy policy. 
A phase-out of RES targets would also be consistent with the goal of integrating 
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energy markets. The continuation of the ETS in its next phases – possibly 
through 2050 – does not eliminate the risk that external factors, such as a new 
recession between 2020 and 2025, might again depress CO
2
 permit prices, bring 
on a temporary excess in generation capacity, and cloud the investment climate. 
The situation today does not immediately threaten the prospects for the 
energy transition by 2050, because most transition investments will have to take 
place after 2030 to avoid expensive lock-ins of young technologies. But that 
could change if we face several recessions between now and 2050. Since 1975, 
financial crises that have a sizable impact on the real economy have become more 
frequent (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). With today’s excessive debt positions, 
the frequency of future financial crises accompanying economic downturns 
may even increase. The prospect of several such periods in which investment 
incentives dry up because of economic slowdowns may fundamentally endanger 
the energy transition. 
We saw from Table 3.2 that the transition of the electricity system will require 
a total investment of $4.8 trillion between 2030 and 2050. That is a small part 
of the total energy transition investment needs of $36 trillion between now and 
2050, which come on top of a total investment of $120 trillion to modernise and 
expand the global energy system irrespective of transition targets (IEA, 2012). 
Financing $120 trillion will be an enormous challenge. A severe economic crisis 
between 2030 and 2035 could easily slow investment in expansion and transition. 
After such a recession, investment would resume, but is unlikely that all of the 
investments needed for the period 2030–40 could be executed in the second half 
of that period. Without very strong economic incentives – comparable to the 
attractiveness of investing in growing markets – energy transition investment 
would likely be crowded out by investment in deferred conventional expansion. 
As capital markets and technology companies face limitations in their ability 
to manage and execute projects, it is quite likely that a severe economic crisis 
between 2030 and 2035 would lead to a very low level of transition investments 
between 2030 and 2040. As long as future economic downturns do not endanger 
energy R&D spending levels, the constant technological improvements can 
provide a permanent incentive to re-launch transition efforts after the next crisis. 
But if a crisis leads to cuts in public and private spending on energy R&D, the 
energy transition may become a utopian project. For a long-term investment 
project such as the energy transition, stable and strong economic incentives, as 
well as a guaranteed investment in energy R&D, are essential. 
Whatever policy design is selected, a severe economic crisis will always 
affect investment behaviour and can delay the pace of the energy transition. 
Some policy instruments will respond more strongly to economic downturns 
than others. Because of its design, the ETS, for example, with its rigid caps 
will always respond strongly to economic downturns. A carbon tax offers a 
stable price incentive to invest in mitigation technologies. With carbon taxation, 
fiscal revenues are rather easy to predict as long as the economy avoids cyclical 
extremes. Although a severe recession would certainly cut carbon taxation 
revenue, once the economy recovered that revenue would bounce back. (The 
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ETS price, by contrast, could remain at too low a level for much too long.) 
However, carbon taxes will not be popular during recessions, and rigid taxes 
could even deepen or extend the recession. This could be avoided by relating 
the carbon tax rate to GDP growth rates. During recessions and early recoveries, 
carbon tax rates could be cut by some specified amount. During good economic 
times, revenue from carbon taxes should be reserved to finance future energy 
R&D expenditures, thereby reducing the risk of R&D investment being cut 
during downturns. 
The crowding out of energy transition investments by energy expansion 
investments may be the main long-term challenge for the energy transition. To 
protect transition investments, the economic attractiveness of energy transition 
technologies should be enhanced through a decisive increase in energy R&D 
efforts. 
conclusion
The energy transition is a gigantic global investment project. However, because 
of the current economic crisis and the design of European climate and energy 
policies, Europe today faces a very unfavourable investment climate for low-
carbon initiatives. The EU ETS suffers from a severe overallocation of emission 
permits, which has depressed the CO
2
 price. ETS companies have no market 
incentive to invest in mitigation technologies. Because of overcapacity in 
conventional generation, wholesale electricity prices are falling and are already 
too low to trigger investments in new generation and network assets. The resulting 
dispropensity to invest could significantly delay the pace of decarbonisation 
efforts in Europe. 
Europe’s current policy design combines technology-neutral instruments, such 
as the ETS, with technology-imposing targets, such as the 20% RES target for 
2020. Conflicts between policy goals, meanwhile, reduce the effectiveness of the 
ETS. To make matters worse, European policy goals have a short time horizon 
and are not responsive to external factors such as an economic recession. The 
most likely solution (i.e., the most feasible from a pragmatic policy perspective) 
for the current inefficiencies is the introduction of an ambitious Phase IV cap 
for the ETS by 2028 or 2030. Because of banking between Phase III and Phase 
IV, the future cap would influence market behaviour and the CO
2
 price between 
2015 and 2020. After 2020, no further mandatory targets for energy from RES or 
for efficiency investments should be set. Targets for subsidised RES have created 
a large, sheltered sector that is not consistent with energy market integration and 
liberalisation. 
Today’s poor investment climate need not endanger the energy transition as 
a long-term project because the bulk of the needed transition investments will 
take place after 2030. Unfortunately, the world is sure to experience global 
recessions between now and 2050, and today’s excessive debt will aggravate 
economic vulnerability in the next decades. To avoid a crowding out of 
investment in the energy transition by deferred investments in energy system 
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expansion at the end of each recession, policy frameworks will have to ensure 
the continuous funding of energy R&D at very high levels. The more attractive 
energy transition technologies become, the lower the risk that investments in 
those technologies will be crowded out. Allocating carbon taxation revenues to 
energy R&D budgets offers the advantage of a relatively predictable flow of 
revenue. Future recessions will always have the effect of depressing the CO
2
 
price in the ETS, thereby putting mitigation investments on hold and lowering 
the revenue derived from CO
2
 auctions. A carbon tax, by contrast, offers a 
permanent economic incentive. Because the energy transition will be delayed 
by stop-and-go investment dynamics, policy designs should try to maximise 
predictability and stability. A radical reform of the European policy framework 
is therefore essential. Reconsidering the 1992 proposal for a European carbon 
tax could offer inspiration.
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Reducing Energy Use Without  
Affecting Economic Objectives:  
A Sectoral Analysis
lAurEns chErchyE, brAm dE rock And bArnAbé WAlhEEr
4
Energy use has become an important issue when assessing the productivity of 
nations. In particular, it can give rise to greenhouse gas emissions, which are 
generally seen as an undesirable side-effect of economic growth. In this chapter, 
we conduct a macro-efficiency analysis of European countries that explicitly 
accounts for these undesirable side-effects of energy use. We present an 
efficiency-assessment method that is specially tailored for addressing this issue. 
A distinguishing feature of our efficiency analysis is that it concentrates on the 
sector level (agriculture, transport, and other industry) rather than the aggregate 
country level, which allows us to formulate more refined policy advice than 
would otherwise be possible.42
Undesirable outputs and input efficiency 
Our analysis models the production behaviour of a particular economic sector as 
using two inputs (capital and energy) to pursue two main economic objectives – 
economic growth (measured as added value) and job creation (measured by the 
employment rate) – under the restriction that greenhouse gas emissions should 
be kept as low as possible. We explicitly model greenhouse gases as undesirable 
by-products of the production process. Formally, this means that European 
sectors use two inputs (capital and energy) to produce two good outputs (added 
value and employment) and one bad output (equivalent CO
2
 emissions).43
The specific focus of our efficiency analysis is on the input side of the 
production process. Our method of measuring efficiency quantifies the maximum 
input reduction for a given level of output. This can provide useful policy data in 
42 Other industry stands for construction, manufacturing, electricity, gas and water.   
43 Equivalent CO2 emissions is an aggregate measure of greenhouse gas emissions; see the section on 
data for more details.
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at least two ways. First, our efficiency results provide information on profitable 
input allocations: they tell countries to what extent a given sector can reduce 
its inputs, information that can then be used (more) productively in a different 
sector. Second, (fossil) energy use and, to a somewhat lesser extent, capital use is 
often directly linked with the emission of CO
2
. As such, identifying an inefficient 
(over)use of energy or capital can directly suggest possibilities for reducing 
pollution (CO
2
) while preserving the given level of the other good outputs.
A tailored efficiency model 
A very popular method for analysing the productive behaviour of decision-making 
units (DMUs) such as countries, sectors, and firms is data envelopment analysis 
(DEA), which was originally introduced by Charnes et al. (1978). Essentially, 
this method benchmarks DMUs by measuring their input-output performance 
relative to other (observed) DMUs that operate in a similar production 
environment.44 We see two main reasons for the widespread popularity of DEA. 
First, it is easily implemented. The computation of DEA efficiency measures 
merely requires solving simple linear programming problems. Second, DEA is 
intrinsically non-parametric. It does not require any prior (and typically non-
verifiable) parametric assumptions about the functional relationship between 
inputs and outputs (that is, about the production technology). As such, it 
provides the greatest possible assurance that functional misspecification will not 
contaminate the efficiency analysis.
As indicated above, we compute the maximum input reduction for a given 
level of output. In this respect, we make use of a tailored DEA model that is 
designed for dealing with bad inputs. In particular, we build on original work 
of Cherchye et al. (2012) and Cherchye et al. (2013) to design an efficiency-
measurement methodology that models the production of each (bad and good) 
output in terms of a separate output-specific production technology, while at the 
same time allowing for interdependencies between production processes through 
inputs that contribute simultaneously to multiple outputs. In other words, we 
explicitly account for the simultaneous production of different (good and bad) 
outputs through joint inputs while avoiding the requirement for specific (often 
non-verifiable) technology assumptions to model the production of bad outputs. 
As extensively discussed in Cherchye et al. (2012) and Cherchye et al. (2013), 
this approach significantly increases the discriminatory power of the efficiency 
analysis without making extra (non-verifiable) assumptions and, importantly, it 
also accounts naturally for the fact that it is usually impossible to produce good 
outputs without generating some bad output.
44 See, for example, Färe et al. (1994a), Cooper et al. (2007), Fried et al. (2008), and Cook and Seiford 
(2009) for extensive reviews of DEA.
Reducing Energy Use Without Affecting Economic Objectives   67
Related literature 
We can distinguish two different approaches to incorporating bad outputs in 
‘traditional’ DEA.45 The first approach consists of using standard efficiency 
models and translating the undesirable (bad) outputs into desirable (good) 
outputs through an appropriate transformation. Scheel (2001) points out three 
ways	 to	do	 this:	 (i)	 take	 the	 additive	 inverse	of	 bad	outputs	 (multiply	by	�1,	
following Koopmans (1951)); (ii) take the multiplicative inverse of the bad 
outputs (following Golany and Roll (1989)); (iii) or incorporate bad outputs 
as inputs. The second approach consists of using the concept of a so-called 
‘environmental’ DEA technology, which requires making the (usually non-
verifiable) technological assumptions of weak disposability (reducing bad output 
requires a proportional reduction of the good output) and null-jointness (zero bad 
output requires zero good output). Färe and Grosskopf (2004) provide a detailed 
discussion of this last approach. As we explain in the section on methodology, 
we adopt the first approach in exposition and so avoid extra technological 
assumptions. In particular, we explicitly consider CO
2
 emission as an output of 
the production process, and we use joint inputs to model the interdependency 
between this output and the other outputs.
At this point, it is also worth mentioning that the literature on efficiency 
measurement has already devoted considerable attention to the question of 
whether and to what extent countries act efficiently in producing GDP and 
creating jobs while minimising undesirable greenhouse gases (see, for example, 
Ramanathan (2006), Zhou et al. (2008), and Lozano and Gutierrez (2008) for 
surveys). Most of this existing work used one of the two approaches described 
above and focused on the country level. A main conclusion of these earlier 
studies is that ignoring CO
2
 emissions (as negative externalities of the production 
process) may lead to severely biased efficiency results. All this provides a direct 
motivation for our own empirical analysis, which focuses on a sectoral efficiency 
analysis while taking CO
2
 emissions into account.
Our main contributions 
Summarising, our study contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, 
we apply a tailored method to deal with bad (environmental) outputs in DEA 
evaluations of productive efficiency. We believe that modeling bad and good 
outputs as being associated with different (interdependent) technologies yields a 
more realistic modeling of the production environment.
Second, we do not consider the aggregate country efficiency, but rather 
measure efficiency at the sectoral level (Agriculture, Transport and Industry). In 
our opinion, a sector-level analysis leads to more balanced (i.e., sector-specific) 
policy recommendations. In particular, our empirical application considers the 
sectoral performance of 18 European countries from 2000 to 2007. We use the 
added value per capita and employment rate as ‘good’ outputs, and the equivalent 
45 See Zhou et al. (2008) for a survey.
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CO
2
 emissions per capita as a ‘bad’ output.46 Our inputs are capital and energy 
consumption per capita.47
Outline 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The first section presents 
our methodology for efficiency measurement, the second introduces our data, the 
third presents our empirical application, and the last section draws conclusions.
mEthodology
As indicated above, we consider a DEA method that assesses input minimisation 
for a given level of output. In this section, we build on original work of Cherchye 
et al. (2012) and Cherchye et al. (2013) to present a method that is specially 
tailored for dealing with both good and bad outputs. The section is structured 
as follows. The first subsection introduces our notation and terminology. The 
second defines our measure of technical efficiency. The third shows how 
our framework can be used for dynamic efficiency analysis that focuses on 
intertemporal efficiency trends.
Preliminaries
We start by introducing our notations and the concept of input requirement sets. 
Using a different input requirement set for every individual output (good or bad) 
explicitly recognises that each output is characterised by its own production 
technology.
Inputs and outputs
We assume a production technology that uses N inputs, captured by the vector 
X, for producing M outputs, captured by the vector Y. As we will explain below, 
the output vector Y can contain both good outputs (those related to GDP and job 
creation) and bad outputs (related to CO
2
 emissions).
The inputs (capital and energy) can be characterised as joint since they 
are used to produce all outputs simultaneously.48 These joint inputs obtain 
interdependence between the different outputs that are produced. Actually, 
this interdependence is directly relevant for our own application to good and 
bad outputs: it indeed seems to be impossible to produce good outputs without 
producing the bad output. 
Formally, we represent good outputs by the vector YG ∈ ℝ+
Mgood, which thus 
contains the desirable outcomes of the production process, and bad outputs 
46 The added value is often used as a proxy for GDP when the DMUs are sectors or states; see, for 
example, Färe et al. (2001).
47 We use per capita figures for inputs and outputs to correct for scale differences across countries.
48 At this point, we indicate that our methodology can actually be extended to deal with inputs that are 
not joint but specific to individual outputs. We will abstract from such an extension in what follows. 
See Cherchye et al. (2012) for dealing with output-specific inputs in a setting similar to ours.
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by the vector YB ∈ ℝ+
Mbad, which captures the undesirable by-products of the 
production process. By construction, we obtain that Mgood + Mbad = M. As 
indicated in the introduction, the application that follows will use added value 
and the employment rate as the good outputs and equivalent CO
2
 emissions as 
the bad output, which yields Mgood = 2 and Mbad = 1.
To operationalise our approach, we must integrate the undesirable feature of 
bad outputs in our construction of the output vector Y. This requires converting 
bad outputs into good outputs. Referring to our discussion in the introduction, 
such a conversion may be achieved, for example, by multiplying the bad output 
by –1 or by taking the reciprocal of the bad output values. In general, we can 
represent the transformation of the bad outputs by the function g(YB). Our two 
examples then comply with g(YB) = –YB or g(YB) = 1/YB. For a given specification 
of the function g(YB), we obtain the output vector Y as:
Y= y1,…,yM '= Y
G
g YB  
At this point, it is important to note that the value of our efficiency measure 
(introduced in the next section) will be the same for the two specifications of 
g(YB) that we presented above (namely, multiplication or taking reciprocals), 
which we see as an attractive feature of our method. See Cherchye et al. (2013) 
for a more detailed discussion.
Input requirement sets 
It follows from our discussion above that we assume all outputs Y to be produced 
simultaneously by the inputs X. When using ym to represent the mth (m = 1, ..., 
M) output, we then associate a production technology with each individual ym, 
which describes the relation between the joint inputs X and the output ym. In 
terms of our application, this defines separate production technologies for the 
outputs of added value, employment rate, and CO
2
 emissions. Importantly, these 
technologies are interdependent because of the joint inputs.
Formally, the technology of each output m is represented by input requirement 
sets Im(ym), which contain all the combinations of the joint inputs X that can 
produce the output quantity ym: 
Im(ym) = {X ∈ ℝ+N|(X, ym) ∈ T m}
where T m  = {(X, ym) ∈ ℝ+N+M|X can produce ym} is the production technology 
set containing the feasible combinations of input quantities X and output 
quantities ym. By explicitly describing this production technology in terms of 
output-specific input requirement sets, we obtain a more precise modeling of the 
interaction between inputs and outputs. As formally discussed in Cherchye et 
al. (2012), this approach significantly enhances the discriminatory power of the 
efficiency analysis without making extra (non-verifiable) assumptions.
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Technical efficiency measurement
In what follows, we will first define our technical efficiency measure for 
some given input requirement sets I m(yt
m). In practice, however, because we 
typically do not observe the ‘theoretical’ sets I m(yt
m) we need to use empirical 
approximations Îm(yt
m). To obtain these empirical sets, we follow the usual 
DEA practice and construct Îm(yt
m) on the basis of some maintained technology 
axioms. Using the resulting empirical input sets then allows us to compute our 
technical input efficiency measure in practical applications.
Defining technical input efficiency
In practice, technical efficiency measurement starts from an observed set of 
input and output data associated with a sample of DMUs. For each DMU t = 
1, ... T (in our case production sectors of European countries), we observe the 
inputs Xt and the (good and bad) outputs Yt (with ytm the quantity of output m). 
Taken together, this gives the dataset S:
S = {(Xt, Yt) | t = 1, ..., T}
Following our previous discussion, for some given set S we can define the input 
sets I m(yt
m) which contain all the input combinations that can produce the output 
quantities yt
m. These input sets are bounded from below by the input isoquants 
IsoqI m(yt
m) which are defined as:
IsoqI m(yt
m) = {X ∈ I m(ytm) | f or b < 1, bX ∉ I
m(yt
m)}
Intuitively, (X, ytm) ∈ IsoqI
m(yt
m)  means that the inputs X can be thought of as 
‘minimal’ input quantities to produce the output quantity yt
m; it is impossible to 
further reduce these inputs (equiproportionately) for the given output. We say 
that IsoqI m(yt
m) represents the ‘technically efficient frontier’ of the set I m(yt
m) .
Given that the set IsoqI m(yt
m) contains all technically efficient input quantities, 
it is natural to quantify technical efficiency of some evaluated input combination 
in terms of the distance to this isoquant. A popular distance measure is the radial 
input distance function Dt(Yt, Xt)  that was originally proposed by Shephard 
(1970). This distance function measures the maximum equiproportionate 
reduction of all inputs Xt for a given output production Yt. Formally, Dt(Yt, Xt) 
is defined as:
Dt Y t, Xt =max ∀m:
Xt
∈ I m yt
m  |
We can verify that Dt(Yt, Xt)  ≥ 1 if, for all m, Xt ∈ I m(ytm) . Next, Dt(Yt, Xt)  = 1 
indicates that, for some m, Xt ∈ IsoqI m(ytm)  and thus, given our above discussion, 
technically efficient production.
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In what follows, we will take the reciprocal of the function Dt(Yt, Xt)  as our 
measure of technical efficiency: 
TEt Y t,Xt =
1
Dt Y t,Xt
=min ∀m: Xt ∊Im yt
m
This measure is known as the Debreu-Farrell measure of technical efficiency. It 
has a natural interpretation as indicating the degree of efficiency; it is situated 
between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating better performance (i.e., less 
technical inefficiency). More specifically, TEt(Yt, Xt)  defines the maximal 
equiproportionate input reduction (captured by θXt) that still allows the DMU to 
produce the output Yt. This Debreu-Farrell input-efficiency measure is the most 
commonly used efficiency measure in the DEA literature. We have tailored it to 




The input efficiency measure TEt(Yt, Xt)  that we defined above is not directly 
useful in practice. It is defined in terms of the ‘theoretical’ sets I m(yt
m), which are 
typically not observed. In what follows, we will build an empirical approximation 
Îm(yt
m) of any input set I m(yt
m).
As is standard in DEA, we proceed axiomatically. In particular, we start 
from four axioms regarding the production technology. We assume that the 
input requirement sets are nested (Axiom 1), monotone (Axiom 2), and convex 
(Axiom 3). We also assume that what we observe is feasible (Axiom 4).49 Then, 
any empirical set Îm(yt
m) satisfies the ‘minimum extrapolation principle’, which 
means that it is the smallest approximation of I m(yt
m) that effectively satisfies 
the four stated axioms. This minimum extrapolation principle guarantees that 
Îm(yt
m) ⊆ I m(yt
m) – that is, the empirical set Îm(yt
m) provides an inner bound 
approximation of the true (but unobserved) set I m(yt
m).
Axiom 1 (nested input sets): ym ≥ ym' ⇒ I m(ym) ⊆ I m(ym').
In words, Axiom 1 says that, if some input X can produce the output ym, then it 
can also produce less output (i.e., ym'). Essentially, this means that outputs are 
freely disposable.
Axiom 2 (monotone input sets): X ∈ I m(ym) and X' ≥ X ⇒ X' ∈ I m(ym).
Axiom 2 complements Axiom 1 and states that inputs are freely disposable – that 
is, more input never leads to less output. Again, this is often a very reasonable 
assumption to make.
49 See, for example, Varian (1984), Tulkens (1993), Petersen (1990), Bogetoft (1996), and Cherchye et 
al. (2012) for discussions of these technology assumptions in a (DEA) production context similar to 
ours.
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Axiom 3 (convex in put sets): X ∈ I m(ym) and X' ∈ I m(ym) ⇒ ∀λ ∈ [0,1]: λX + 
(1 − λ)X' ∈ I m(ym).
Axiom 3 says that, if two input combinations X and X' can produce the output 
ym, then any convex combination of these inputs can also produce the same 
output. Intuitively, it imposes that marginal rates of input substitution are 
nowhere decreasing when moving along the isoquant of the set I m(ym).
Axiom 4 (observability means feasibility): (Xt, Yt)  ∈ S ⇒ ∀m: Xt ∈ I m(ytm).
 
Axiom 4 states that what we observe is certainly feasible. Or, if we observe Xt 
in combination with Yt, then we conclude that Xt can effectively produce Yt. 
Basically, this axiom guarantees that our empirical input requirement sets Îm(yt
m) 
will effectively be based on the observed input-output combinations contained 
in the dataset S.50
Using the minimum extrapolation principle, we define the empirical input sets 
Îm(yt
m) as the smallest input sets that are consistent with the Axioms 1–4. We can 
verify that, for any output yt
m, these sets are defined as:51 
Î m yt
m = X  









Measuring technical input efficiency 
Using our approximations Îm(yt
m) of the sets I m(yt
m), we can now define an 
empirical counterpart of the input efficiency measure TEt(Yt, Xt) . Specifically, 
our following application will use the empirical measure:
TE
∧
t(Yt, Xt)  = min{θ|∀m: (θXt) ∈ Îm(ytm)}
As before, we have that TE
∧
t(Yt, Xt)  is situated between 0 and 1, with lower 
values indicating greater technical inefficiency. Because Îm(yt
m) ⊆ I m(yt
m), 
we also have that TE
∧
t(Yt, Xt)  ≥ TEt(Yt, Xt). In words, TE
∧
t(Yt, Xt)  provides a 
‘favourable’ estimate of the theoretical measure TEt(Yt, Xt). Intuitively, by taking 
the best possible efficiency score, this favourable estimate gives the benefit of 
the doubt to the DMUs under evaluation in the absence of complete technology 
information. 
Interestingly, using our above definition of Îm(yt
m), we can compute TE
∧
t(Yt, 
Xt)  through simple linear programming. In particular, it suffices to solve the 
programme:
50 We note that Axiom 4 actually assumes that all input and output data are measured accurately. We 
will return to the possibility of extending our methodology to deal with measurement error in the 
beginning of the section on efficiency analysis.
51 See Cherchye et al. (2012) for a formal proof.
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TEt Yt,Xt = min
s
m (m∊ 1,…,M ,s∊ 1,…,T )
 ( )
s.t.
(1) ∀m: Σs λsm Xs ≤ θ Xt for all s: ysm ≥ ytm
(2) ∀m: Σs λsm  = 1 for all s: ysm ≥ ytm
(3) ∀m: ∀s: ys
m ≥ 0
(4) θ ≥ 0
As a final remark, we indicate that the technical efficiency measure TE
∧
t(Yt, Xt) 
also has an interesting interpretation as a measure of multioutput cost efficiency. 
In particular, Cherchye et al. (2012) demonstrate that the dual version of the 
above linear programming problem represents our technical efficiency measure 
as the ratio of minimal over actual cost defined at shadow prices. These authors 
argue that this allows for multi-output cost-efficiency analysis that naturally 
extends the single-output cost-efficiency analysis originally considered by 
Afriat (1972), Hanoch and Rothschild (1972), Diewert and Parkan (1983), and 
Varian (1984). See Cherchye et al. (2008) for more details on this cost-efficiency 
perspective.
Dynamic efficiency measurement
In our application, we will use the methodology introduced above for assessing 
the technical efficiency of DMUs (in our case production sectors of countries) 
at a given point of time (a particular year), which effectively boils down to 
static efficiency measurement. In our application, we use a panel dataset, which 
means that we observe the same DMUs in multiple consecutive time periods. 
Interestingly, this panel data structure allows us to conduct a dynamic efficiency 
evaluation.
Specifically, in our case we will evaluate dynamic efficiency in terms of 
technical efficiency changes over time. To introduce our dynamic efficiency 
measure, we need to introduce some additional notation, which relates to 
the panel structure of our dataset. Specifically, let us consider a setting with 
observations on T DMUs for K periods. We now have a dataset Sk for each period 
k:
Sk = {(Xtk, Ytk) | t = 1, ... , T}
On the basis of each such dataset, we can use our above methodology to define 




 (Xtk, Ytk)  for each DMU t and period k. 
Essentially, this measure evaluates the static efficiency of DMU t by comparing 
its input-output performance to those of all other DMUs observed in the same 
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period. Using this, we can define, for each DMU t, the following measure of 








The interpretation is immediate: if CE
∧
t
k+1 > 1 then the technical efficiency of 




k+1 < 1. In our case, improved (or deteriorated) technical efficiency 
signals a better (or worse) allocation of inputs in period k + 1 than in period 
k (accounting for the possibly different output quantities produced in the two 
periods). Clearly, this reveals interesting information from the perspective of 
policy evaluation, which is particularly relevant for our following application
As a concluding remark, it is interesting to relate our efficiency change 
measure to the literature on dynamic DEA. See, for example, Färe and Grosskopf 
(1992), Kumar and Russell (2002), and Henderson and Russell (2005). Based 
on the original work of Caves et al. (1978), these authors set out a DEA-based 
framework for disentangling changes in total productivity (i.e., changes in the 
ratio of aggregate output over aggregate input) according to alternative sources 
of productivity change. In this framework, our efficiency measure CE
∧
t
k+1 is a 
so-called catch-up indicator, which quantifies the degree to which a particular 
DMU catches up with (or, conversely, falls behind) the best-practice DMUs in 
period k + 1 (as compared with period k).
From this perspective, it may actually be fruitful to extend our methodology 
to include the other components of productivity change included in the above 
mentioned framework. A particularly useful extension here pertains to the 
possibility of quantifying technology change (as a component of productivity 
change), which in the setting of our application can also be interpreted as ‘change 
in the (policy) environment’. Specifically, this indicator of environmental 
change captures the extent to which, between any two periods k and k + 1, the 
environment of the DMU under evaluation has become more or less favourable 
for achieving particular economic objectives (i.e., for creating added value and 
employment while reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases).52 Clearly, such 
a measure may reveal interesting policy information, especially for the type of 
questions (related to European countries) that we address in this chapter. For the 
sake of compactness, however, we will not explore this further in what follows. 
But we do see this as a potentially interesting avenue for follow-up research.
52 Technically, the more or less favorable nature of the environment is then quantified by comparing the 
performances of the (reference) best practice DMUs in periods k and k+1. See Cherchye et al. (2007) 
for a detailed discussion of the interpretation of ‘technology change’ indicators in terms of changes 
in the policy environment in a European context comparable to ours.
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dAtA
As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, we focus on three sectors 
(agriculture, transport, and other industry) of 18 European countries (EU-18), 
which we evaluate over the period 2000–07. The countries are Austria, Belgium, 
the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
and Sweden. Aggregated over all countries, the three sectors represent 28% 
of total production (GDP), 35% of total employment, and 40% of total CO
2
 
emissions for the period under consideration (Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1 Size of the sectors, 2000–07 (%) 
Agriculture Transport Industries Total
GDP 2 6 20 28
Employment 4 6 25 35
CO
2
 emissions 10 18 12 40
For each sector and every country, we consider three outputs and two inputs. Our 
good outputs are added value per capita and the employment rate, the bad output 
is CO
2
 emissions per capita. Our inputs are capital per capita and energy per 
capita. We use per capita normalisations to account for scale differences across 
countries. Our data on CO
2
 emissions and energy consumption come from the 
Eurostat database, while our data on capital, employment and added value are 
taken from the OECD database.
In what follows, we will highlight some sector characteristics through a 
descriptive analysis. In particular, we present trendlines depicting the evolution 
of each input and output dimension at the sample (EU-18) level. The Appendix 
reports additional details on our data. 
Outputs
In this section, we present our three outputs. First, we consider the bad output, 
CO
2
 emissions. We then turn to the good outputs of added value and employment.
The bad output: CO
2
 emissions 
The measure for CO
2
 emissions is expressed in equivalent tonnes per capita and 







. The respective greenhouse gases are weighted by their global-warming 
potential. Figure 4.1 presents the trendlines for our three sectors, taking averages 
over the countries.
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Figure 4.1 CO
2
 emissions in the EU-18
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The trendlines for agriculture and industry are more or less the same and 
decrease only slowly during our sample period. On average, the agriculture 
sector produced 1.34 equivalent tonnes per capita in 2000 and 1.18 in 2007, 
while the industry sector generated 1.16 equivalent tonnes per capita in 2000 
and 1.09 in 2007. For the transport sector, we observe a clearly different pattern. 
CO
2
 emissions are much higher when compared to the other two sectors and, in 
addition, the trendline is increasing. On average, the greenhouse gas emissions 
for transport amount to no less than 2.56 tonnes per capita in 2000 and 2.97 in 
2007.
Importantly, from Tables 4A.5 and 4A.6 in the Appendix we conclude that 
one should not focus solely on these average emissions. For our sample of 
observations, we find a great deal of heterogeneity in CO
2
 emissions both across 
sectors and across countries. For instance, some countries exhibit increasing CO
2
 
emissions in the three sectors (e.g., Luxembourg and Ireland), while others have 
decreasing CO
2
 emissions in two of the three sectors (e.g., Germany and Czech 
Republic). Not one country shows decreasing CO
2
 emissions in all three sectors.
The good outputs: added value and employment 
Our measure for the employment rate is given in full-time-equivalent workers as 
a percentage of the active population. Our proxy for GDP is gross added value 
(GAV) expressed in euros per capita. GAV is a measure of the value of goods 
and services produced in a particular sector of the economy. It is defined as the 
difference between outputs and intermediate inputs. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 depict 
the associated trendlines for the three sectors under study, where we again take 
averages over our 18 countries.
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Figure 4.2 Employment in the EU-18
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Just as for CO
2
 emissions, we again conclude that it is important to conduct a 
sector-level analysis. Industry is clearly dominating the other two sectors in the 
good outputs, while transport is slightly ahead of agriculture. Actually, these 
findings should not come as a big surprise given the numbers we reported in 
Table 4.1. However, the trendlines suggest that the pattern of evolution over time 
is quite different for the three sectors. In terms of the employment rate, industry 
and agriculture show a decreasing pattern, whereas transport remains more or 
less constant. With respect to added value, we find that the trendline is more or 
less stable for agriculture, while sharply increasing for the other two sectors.
Finally, Tables 4A.7–4A.10 in the Appendix confirm our earlier point on cross-
observational heterogeneity. Specifically, even though most countries exhibit 
patterns that are fairly similar to the average patterns described above, we do 
observe a lot of variation over countries, sectors, and time.
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Inputs
In this section we present our two inputs. We will first consider energy and then 
focus on capital.
Energy
We use final energy consumption in tonnes of oil equivalent (toe) per capita.53 
Final energy consumption in industry includes consumption in all industrial 
sectors with the exception of the energy sector. Final energy consumption 
in transport covers consumption in all types of transportation (rail, road, 
air transport, and inland navigation). Figure 4.4 presents the corresponding 
trendlines for our sample.
Figure 4.4 Energy in the EU-18
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As one may have expected, the transport sector is the biggest energy consumer 
(1.05 toe on average), and its energy consumption is increasing over time (0.99 
toe on average in 2000 and 1.14 in 2007). In fact, the average energy consumption 
of the industry sector (0.98 toe) is quite similar to that of the transport sector, 
but the trendline is clearly different. Specifically, the energy consumption in 
industry is slowly decreasing from (on average) 1.00 toe in 2000 to 0.96 in 2007. 
Finally, the pattern of energy consumption of the agriculture sector is totally 
different. Compared with the other two sectors, this sector appears not very 
energy intensive (0.09 toe on average). In addition, its consumption of energy is 
more or less stable over time.
From Tables 4A.11 and 4A.12 in the Appendix we again conclude that these 
average figures hide a lot of heterogeneity in sectors and countries. For instance, 
we find quite different values for the standard deviations associated with the 
three sectors. In our opinion, this suggests that patterns of energy consumption 
53 One toe = 1.07 x 10 cal (thermochemical) = 44.769 GJ = 42.46 MBtu (thermochemical).
Reducing Energy Use Without Affecting Economic Objectives   79
are not only sector-specific, but also country-specific. As argued before, our 
efficiency analysis will account for this feature.
Capital
We use gross fixed capital formation (expressed in euros per capita) as an 
indicator for the capital input. At this point, it is worth indicating that other 
studies have focused on more specific capital indicators (such as tractors, lands, 
human capital, and so on). For our study, however, we opt for gross fixed capital 
formation to enhance comparability over the three sectors. Figure 4.5 presents 
trendlines for our capital input.
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Just as for the energy input, we conclude that industry and transport are very 
comparable in terms of average values. In this case, too, the trendlines depict the 
same (increasing) pattern. As before, the agriculture sector uses much less of the 
capital input than the other two sectors and, although its capital use is increasing 
over time, the increase is also much more modest. Finally, and consistent with 
our earlier findings, Tables 4A.13 and 4A.14 in the Appendix plead once more 
for a country-specific and sector-specific analysis.
What do we learn from all this?
The patterns described above strongly indicate that the production of outputs and 
the use of inputs is country-specific and sector-specific. Similarly, the evolution 
of output and input over time also varies significantly by sector and country. 
These are important observations for the policymaker who wants to set objectives 
in terms of CO
2
 production or energy use. For instance, our findings suggest that 
one should better specify sector-specific and country-specific objectives to reach 
the Europe 2020 objectives (stated in the EU’s growth strategy for the coming 
decade).
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This being said, the numbers that we have discussed above are only one side 
of the story. For instance, although transport is much more energy intensive than 
agriculture, it could well be that agriculture is not as efficient as transport in its 
use of energy. That is, the agriculture sector may well have more potential to 
reduce its energy consumption.
This is what we will investigate in the following (non-parametric) efficiency 
analysis. In particular, we will compare the performance of a given sector in 
one European country to the performance of that same sector in other countries. 
For the country under evaluation, this will identify whether and to what extent 
sector-specific efficiency gains are possible (meaning that less input can be 
used for the given output level). As explained before, a specific feature of our 
empirical analysis is that it simultaneously accounts for CO
2
 emissions as an 
undesirable output.
EfficiEncy AnAlysis
Using the data presented in the previous section, we next evaluate the productive 
efficiency of the three sectors under study for our sample of countries. In 
particular, for every sector and country we compute the input efficiency measure 
TE
∧
t(Yt, Xt)  for each year of the time period 2000–07. This gives us information 
on the extent to which inputs have been allocated efficiently to achieve the three 
economic objectives that we focus on: reducing greenhouse gas emissions, 
creating jobs, and generating productivity growth. Attractively, the panel 
structure of our dataset also allows us to evaluate efficiency trends over time.
Before beginning our analysis, it is important to observe that sampling issues 
(e.g., measurement error and small-sample bias) may be a concern in the 
application at hand.54 In turn, these problems may affect the reliability of the 
efficiency results that we report. In this respect, it is worth noting that the DEA 
literature has proposed alternative procedures to resolve sampling issues (see 
Daraio and Simar (2007) for a survey). For example, bootstrap (or subsampling) 
procedures can correct small-sample bias, and robust frontier procedures 
(such as order-m and order-a procedures) can improve the robustness of the 
efficiency scores with respect to outliers in the data. For compactness and to 
facilitate our discussion, we will not report results for these extended procedures 
here. However, we did apply alternative methods to check the extent to which 
our results were robust with respect to sampling issues. Our main qualitative 
conclusions proved quite robust.55
The remainder of this section unfolds as follows. The first subsection reports 
on the efficiency levels of the different sectors and countries under study. 
The second focuses on feasible input reductions that are revealed through 
our efficiency assessment. The third takes a dynamic viewpoint and looks at 
54 The difference between the ‘true’ and estimated efficiency scores is called the bias. This bias can be 
greater with the smaller samples.
55 Detailed results of our robustness checks are available from the authors upon request.
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efficiency trends over time. In particular, it considers whether we can discern 
specific catch-up patterns in the three sectors under evaluation.
Efficiency results
The results of our efficiency analysis are presented in Table 4.2. This table 
contains the average efficiency score (over the eight years in our sample) for 
each country and sector.
When considering the average scores per sector, we conclude that transport 
is clearly the most efficient sector. Again, this means that transport is the sector 
that uses its inputs most effectively to produce the given outputs. In particular, 
we find that the transport sector can reduce its inputs by no more than 4% (on 
average) for a fixed output. The possible input reductions for the agriculture and 
industry sectors are substantially more pronounced (14% and 12%, respectively). 
This confirms what we suggested before: although transport uses large amounts 
of input, there appears to be more potential for input reduction in the other two 
sectors.
Table 4.2 Efficiency scores
Country (DMU) t Agriculture Transport Industries
Belgium 0.83 0.95 0.84
Czech Republic 0.95 0.97 0.83
Denmark 0.50 1 1
Germany 0.96 1 0.93
Ireland 1 0.76 1
Greece 1 1 1
Spain 1 0.85 0.92
France 0.99 1 1
Italy 0.96 1 0.77
Luxembourg 0.80 1 0.60
Hungary 0.89 1 1
Netherlands 0.62 0.99 1
Austria 0.80 0.90 0.88
Slovenia 0.93 0.90 0.83
Slovak Republic 1 1 0.82
Finland 0.89 1 0.90
Sweden 0.76 0.99 0.68
Norway 0.55 1 0.90
Average 0.86 0.96 0.88
Generally, we observe a great deal of heterogeneity in the efficiency scores 
across sectors and countries. This being so, it makes little sense, when focusing 
on a specific sector, to formulate objectives that do not take the identity of the 
country into account. Efficiency-enhancing strategies ought to be country-
specific. For example, our results tell us that the Czech Republic should focus on 
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industry to improve its overall efficiency level, while Ireland should concentrate 
on transport.
Possible energy reduction
To further illustrate our results in Table 4.2, we next quantify the possible energy 
reductions for every sector and country. This shows the extent to which countries 
can reduce their energy use in a given sector, without decreasing its output 
production. In fact, because (fossil) energy is directly linked with the production 
of CO
2
 emissions, our results here also shed light on the degree to which CO
2
 
emissions can be decreased by behaving more efficiently.
As explained in the first section of the chapter, our input-oriented measure of 
technical efficiency TE
∧
t(Yt, Xt)  is defined as:
TE
∧
t(Yt, Xt)  = min{θ|∀m: (θXt) ∈ Îm(ytm)}
and gives the maximal equiproportionate input reduction (captured by θXt) that 
still makes it possible to produce the given output (Yt). Based on this definition, 








A = Input Reduction (Absolute) = Xt × (1 − θ)
Table 4.3 reports the feasible absolute energy reductions for our sample of 
countries. Between brackets we present the associated relative input reductions, 
which correspond to the efficiency scores given in Table 4.2. The results in 
Table 4.3 clearly demonstrate the value added of computing absolute input 
reductions corresponding to efficiency improvements and so further illustrate 
the usefulness of an efficiency analysis such as ours in arriving at effective 
policy recommendations. In our opinion, the absolute numbers in Table 4.3 are 
quite impressive. This is all the more true because, by construction, the input 
reductions given by our model define only the upper bounds on possible input 
savings of evaluated DMUs (i.e., the ‘benefit of the doubt’ interpretation of DEA 
measures that we indicated before).
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Table 4.3 Energy reduction (toe/persons)
Country (DMU) t Agriculture Transport Industries
Belgium 0.012 (17%) 0.045 (5%) 0.221 (16%)
Czech Republic 0.0026 (5%) 0.012 (3%) 0.162 (17%)
Denmark 0.082 (50%) 0 0
Germany 0.013 (4%) 0 0.052 (7%)
Ireland 0 0.278 (24%) 0
Greece 0 0 0
Spain 0 0.133 (15%) 0.0564 (8%)
France 0.002 (1%) 0 0
Italy 0.0024 (4%) 0 0.157 (23%)
Luxembourg 0.0107 (20%) 0 0.833 (40 %)
Hungary 0.0067 (11 %) 0 0
Netherlands 0.0963 (38%) 0.0015 (1%) 0
Austria 0.0141 (20%) 0.110 (10%) 0.119 (12%)
Slovenia 0.0023 (7%) 0.070 (10%) 0.136 (17%)
Slovak Republic 0 0 0.146 (18%)
Finland 0.0166 (11%) 0 0.245 (10%)
Sweden 0.0211 (24%) 0.012 (1%) 0.460 (32%)
Norway 0.0750 (45%) 0 0.139 (10%)
Average 0.0191 0.0367 0.152
Efficiency trends
While our results in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 already reveal interesting conclusions, 
they do not shed any light on efficiency trends. Specifically, they do not tell us 
whether or to what extent sectors and countries are behaving more efficiently 
over time. We conclude our empirical application by exploring these issues of 
dynamic efficiency.
To do so, we use the measure of efficiency change (or catch-up) that we defined 
previously, which we calculate as the ratio of efficiency scores corresponding 
to two consecutive periods of time. A value for this catch-up measure above 
(or below) unity then indicates an efficiency improvement (of deterioration) of 
the DMU under study between the two periods. Essentially, this means that the 
DMU allocates its inputs more (less) optimally in the second period than in the 
first period.
Table 4.4 presents our results on efficiency change for the three sectors under 
study. We find that, on average, the catch-up measure is about one in the transport 
sector, which suggests that, for this sector, the average efficiency score remained 
more or less constant over the period 2000–07. For agriculture, the measure of 
efficiency change is slightly more than one, suggesting that the average country 
is catching up in terms of its efficiency performance. The opposite is true of the 
industry sector.
All in all, these (average) numbers are fairly similar over sectors and seem 
to indicate that there is not much improvement in terms of efficient input use 
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for the given outputs. However, we also observe from Table 4.4 that there is 
(often substantial) variation in sector-specific efficiency change over years. In 
this respect, it is also important to recall that catching-up effects represent only 
one part of dynamic efficiency. As we indicated in the section on measuring 
dynamic efficiency, it may be interesting to complement the efficiency-change 
measure that we consider here by a measure of technology-change effects on 
the observed sector productivity. We see the development of such a technology-
change measure for our type of multi-output DEA analysis as a valuable avenue 
for follow-up research.
Table 4.4 Catch-up effects
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Mean
 Agriculture 1.01 0.96 0.98 1.09 0.99 0.97 1.05 1.01
Transport 0.98 1 1 1.01 0.99 0.99 1 1
Industry 0.93 1.05 0.88 1.10 1.04 0.99 0.93 0.99
conclusion
Focusing on three sectors (agriculture, transport, and other industry) in 18 
European countries, we have evaluated the efficient use of two inputs – energy 
and capital – to achieve two main economic goals: economic growth and job 
creation. A distinguishing feature of our analysis is that we explicitly account for 
the negative side-effects of energy use by including the reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions as a third main economic objective. We represented the first two 
objectives as ‘good’ (desirable) outputs and the last as a ‘bad’ (undesirable) 
output.
Building on Cherchye et al. (2012) and Cherchye et al. (2013), we presented a 
specific DEA methodology that describes the production of each output (good or 
bad) as resulting from a separate technology, while at the same time accounting 
for interdependencies in the production processes through joint inputs. This 
effectively accounts for the fact that it is usually impossible to produce good 
outputs without generating the bad output. Moreover, our approach does not 
require specific (often non-verifiable) technology assumptions to model the 
production of bad outputs (such as weak disposability or null-jointness).
Our empirical application demonstrated the value-added of both our sector-
level orientation and our efficiency-measurement methodology. In particular, 
our analysis allowed us to identify sector-specific efficiency levels, efficiency 
trends, and feasible energy reductions (removing not only input inefficiencies, 
but also greenhouse gas emissions). A most notable finding was that countries 
often exhibit quite different performance patterns depending on the sector that 
is evaluated. In our opinion, this directly suggests the usefulness of evaluating 
productive efficiency at the sector level (and not only at the aggregate 
country level). In this respect, our results can lead to sector-specific policy 
recommendations for every country.
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 emissions for each year (tonnes per person)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Agriculture
Mean 1.34 1,31 1.28 1.25 1.24 1.21 1.24 1.18
Max 5.20 4.99 4.86 4.80 4.68 4.54 4.88 4.11
Min 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.63 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.60
Std 1.03 0.98 0.95 0.94 0.91 0.89 0.96 0.79
Transport
Mean 2.56 2.63 2.70 2.81 2.94 2.99 2.96 2.97
Max 10.96 11.51 12.16 13.30 15.00 15.25 14.63 13.85
Min 0.78 0.89 0.92 0.94 0.99 1.17 1.08 1.22
Std 2.18 2.29 2.43 2.68 3.06 3.11 2.97 2.78
Industries
Mean 1.16 1.12 1.11 1.09 1.13 1.11 1.10 1.09
Max 2.58 2.45 2.28 2.13 2.27 2.18 2.15 2.12
Min 0.51 0.54 0.54 0.56 0.56 0.45 0.47 0.47
Std 0.53 0.50 0.49 0.47 0.51 0.49 0.49 0.49
Table 4A.2 CO
2
 emissions for each country (tonnes per person)
Country (DMU) t Agriculture Transport Industries
Belgium 0.97 2.48 1.42
Czech Republic 0.81 1.56 1.37
Denmark 1.87 2.41 0.55
Germany 0.80 2.05 1.23
Ireland 4.70 3.06 0.88
Greece 0.88 1.96 1.14
Spain 1.01 2.32 0.78
France 1.59 2.25 0.70
Italy 0.66 2.19 0.66
Luxembourg 1.49 13.33 1.66
Hungary 0.90 1.06 0.61
Netherlands 1.17 2.14 1.02
Austria 0.94 2.81 1.31
Slovenia 1.04 2.13 0.59
Slovak Republic 0.62 0.99 2.01
Finland 1.11 2.58 1.14
Sweden 0.98 2.31 0.76
Norway 0.95 3.11 2.23
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Table 4A.3 Employment by year (workers per active people)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Agriculture
Mean 0.0537 0.0516 0.0493 0.0477 0.0456 0.0444 0.0429 0.0414
Max 0.145 0.137 0.131 0.127 0.109 0.108 0.104 0.100
Min 0.0221 0.0217 0.0211 0.0206 0.0202 0.0196 0.0196 0.0195
Std 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Transport
Mean 0.0657 0.0670 0.0647 0.0639 0.0626 0.0616 0.0613 0.0612
Max 0.105 0.112 0.109 0.121 0.126 0.124 0.127 0.119
Min 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Std 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
Industries
Mean 0.172 0.174 0.116 0.172 0.158 0.164 0.159 0.158
Max 0.261 0.269 0.262 0.261 0.263 0.259 0.263 0.261
Min 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Std 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
Table 4A.4 Employment by country (workers per active people)
Country (DMU) t Agriculture Transport Industries
Belgium 0.018 0.063 0.135
Czech Republic 0.039 0.067 0.261
Denmark 0.029 0.063 0.144
Germany 0.021 0.050 0.181
Ireland 0.060 0.059 0.145
Greece 0.120 0.053 0.102
Spain 0.046 0.051 0.151
France 0.032 0.057 0.126
Italy 0.038 0.047 0.195
Luxembourg 0.023 0.115 0.171
Hungary 0.051 0.072 0.218
Netherlands 0.031 0.056 0.113
Austria 0.070 0.062 0.156
Slovenia 0.094 0.053 0.242
Slovak Republic 0.037 0.056 0.196
Finland 0.048 0.067 0.171
Sweden 0.023 0.062 0.163
Norway 0.028 0.081 0.114
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Table 4A.5 Gross added value by year (€ per person)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Agriculture
Mean 468.1 481.8 469.9 460.1 469.9 423.9 415.6 457.3
Max 764.8 752.9 753.1 729.5 733.2 710.6 643.7 876.3
Min 209.2 239.1 234.6 223.8 254.1 208.6 214.2 239.4
Std 191.3 189.1 168.2 178.1 163.4 160.3 137.1 166.8
Transport
Mean 1590.4 1673.5 1753.5 1796.7 1868.0 1921.8 1982.8 2087.7
Max 4734.6 4880.4 5041.3 5005.8 5251.5 5444.6 5710.3 6181.8
Min 359.2 410.3 479.2 490.6 549.0 582.28 593.9 704.4
Std 1052.4 1081.2 1099.0 1061.4 1097.2 1154.8 1199.7 1253.2
Industries
Mean 3787.9 3865.1 3975.7 3949.8 4050.3 4154.0 4383.2 4665.6
Max 8110.1 8650.1 9673.4 8904.4 8426.0 8162.5 8348.3 8555.7
Min 988.1 1130.4 1295.8 1342.1 1494.2 1636.0 1707.4 1862.0
Std 1930.1 1939.6 2063.3 1911.6 1807.3 1745.3 1817.5 1906.0
Table 4A.6 Gross added value by country (€ per person)
Country (DMU) t Agriculture Transport Industries
Belgium 259.1 2023.1 4336.1
Czech Republic 244.4 846.2 2079.2
Denmark 540.5 2545.9 4650.6
Germany 253.1 1376.8 5531.1
Ireland 667.4 1709.9 8603.8
Greece 671.7 1282.6 1476.1
Spain 585.4 1253.8 2903.9
France 562.9 1503.2 3309.6
Italy 486.1 1597.5 4096.1
Luxembourg 295.3 5281.3 5421.0
Hungary 292.3 521.1 1460.9
Netherlands 600.4 1943.3 3867.6
Austria 476.1 1768.8 5144.0
Slovenia 313.3 837.6 2815.3
Slovak Republic 301.0 666.6 1772.4
Finland 742.8 2280.4 6245.4
Sweden 499.1 2154.2 5724.9
Norway 413.7 3424.9 4433.0
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Table 4A.7 Energy by year (toe per person)
Country (DMU) t Agriculture Transport Industries
Belgium 0.069 0.940 1.39
Czech Republic 0.057 0.540 0.95
Denmark 0.168 0.940 0.54
Germany 0.029 0.772 0.71
Ireland 0.077 1.146 0.61
Greece 0.104 0.715 0.39
Spain 0.067 0.887 0.67
France 0.060 0.824 0.60
Italy 0.058 0.766 0.70
Luxembourg 0.039 5.20 2.08
Hungary 0.058 0.388 0.34
Netherlands 0.252 0.919 0.90
Austria 0.071 1.01 0.96
Slovenia 0.030 0.72 0.75
Slovak Republic 0.030 0.314 0.79
Finland 0.015 0.910 2.38
Sweden 0.087 0.927 1.46
Norway 0.167 1.04 1.42
Table 4A.8 Energy by country (toe per person)
Country (DMU) t Agriculture Transport Industries
Belgium 0.069 0.940 1.39
Czech Republic 0.057 0.540 0.95
Denmark 0.168 0.940 0.54
Germany 0.029 0.772 0.71
Ireland 0.077 1.146 0.61
Greece 0.104 0.715 0.39
Spain 0.067 0.887 0.67
France 0.060 0.824 0.60
Italy 0.058 0.766 0.70
Luxembourg 0.039 5.20 2.08
Hungary 0.058 0.388 0.34
Netherlands 0.252 0.919 0.90
Austria 0.071 1.01 0.96
Slovenia 0.030 0.72 0.75
Slovak Republic 0.030 0.314 0.79
Finland 0.015 0.910 2.38
Sweden 0.087 0.927 1.46
Norway 0.167 1.04 1.42
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Table 4A.9 Capital by year (€ per person)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Agriculture
Mean 138 141 148 152 153 163 178 201
Max 260 293 281 329 303 319 422 456
Min 47 59 67 46 58 63 55 73
Std 72 72 73 82 78 82 101 114
Transport
Mean 664 693 683 640 726 760 748 872
Max 1841 2300 2217 1528 2076 2201 1868 2622
Min 163 147 160 154 185 233 227 249
Std 412 482 469 331 436 465 400 572
Industries
Mean 643 692 674 660 648 685 717 803
Max 1055 1047 1250 1220 1042 1177 1440 1801
Min 242 240 177 176 221 271 206 266
Std 245 243 259 219 206 221 270 325
Table 4A.10 Capital by country (€ per person)
Country (DMU) t Agriculture Transport Industries
Belgium 76 729 790
Czech Republic 62 412 2501
Denmark 302 1106 1402
Germany 78 410 739
Ireland 192 1293 708
Greece 145 605 225
Spain 86 654 553
France 164 361 500
Italy 188 606 1035
Luxembourg 307 2082 1211
Hungary 71 190 180
Netherlands 209 542 513
Austria 220 796 782
Slovenia 103 506 673
Slovak Republic 66 351 630
Finland 278 643 772
Sweden 161 783 1910
Norway 161 957 1010

Can Smart Grids Reduce the  
Costs of the Transition to a  
Low-Carbon Economy?
sArAh dEAslEy, clAirE thornhill And AlEx WhittAkEr
5
The UK is committed to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) by at least 
80% by 2050, relative to 1990 levels. Smart grid investments may reduce the costs 
of the transition to a low-carbon carbon economy by increasing the efficiency 
of existing infrastructure and thereby postponing the need for investment in new 
network capacity. But any investment in smart grid technologies will require an 
assessment of the costs and benefits of smart technologies in comparison to those 
of conventional alternatives. That is the goal of this chapter, which develops a 
framework for evaluating smart grids using a two-stage decision tree to account 
for option value.  
The chapter builds on research commissioned by Ofgem (the regulator of 
gas and electricity markets in Great Britain). The research was undertaken in 
collaboration with EA Technology, to feed into the work programme of the 
Smart Grids Forum (SGF).56 Established in early 2011, the SGF brings together 
key opinion-formers, experts, and stakeholders to help shape Ofgem’s and the 
UK Department of Energy and Climate Change’s (DECC) leadership in smart 
grid policy and deployment and to establish a common focus in addressing 
future network challenges. 
We first describe the smart grid characteristics that must be considered in an 
evaluation, we then present our approach to evaluating smart grids, we next 
present the results of our analysis, and finally we present our conclusions. 
56 The terms of reference are available here: http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Pages/MoreInformation.
aspx?docid=7&refer=Networks/SGF 
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thE chArActEristics of smArt grids
There is no single definition of a smart grid. We use the Smart Grid Routemap 
developed by the Energy Networks Strategy Group (ENSG) as our starting point 
(ENSG 2010), which states that: 
[A] smart grid is part of an electricity power system which can intelligently 
integrate the actions of all users connected to it – generators, consumers and 
those that do both – in order to efficiently deliver sustainable, economic and 
secure electricity supplies. 
Expanding on this definition, DECC identified several common characteristics 
of a smart grid (DECC, 2009).
•	 Observable: The ability to view a wide range of operational indicators 
in real time, including where losses are occurring,57 the condition of 
equipment, and other technical information.
•	 Controllable: The ability to manage and optimise the power system to 
a far greater extent than currently possible, which may include adjusting 
some electricity demand according to available supply, as well as 
enabling the large-scale use of intermittent renewable generation in a 
controlled manner.
•	 Automated: The ability of the network to make certain automatic 
demand response decisions (it will also respond to power fluctuations 
or outages, for example, by reconfiguring itself).
•	 Fully integrated: Integrated and compatible with existing systems and 
with other new devices such as smart consumer appliances.
At the transmission level, the network is already relatively ‘smart’, given its 
requirement to manage frequency, voltage, and current in an active manner. Our 
framework therefore focuses on ‘smart’ investments at the distribution level, 
where networks are currently more passive. Distribution network operators 
(DNOs), both in the UK and internationally, have conventionally operated 
networks with relatively straightforward flows of electricity. Although DNOs 
have occasionally made trade-offs between investment and active management 
options, they have generally limited active management. Many of the near-
term activities required to transition to a low-carbon energy sector will require 
more flexibility in the current electricity distribution network. Smart grids are 
therefore likely to be focused on the distribution networks.
A smart grid evaluation framework must account for a range of characteristics. 
57 We note that the prominence given to loss management in this definition has been questioned. 
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Smart grids as enabling technologies 
A smart grid is an enabling technology, rather than an end in itself. While it may 
help meet the goals of high-level decarbonisation and security of supply, these 
can also generally be achieved through traditional reinforcement of networks. 
Our evaluation therefore focuses on smart grids as a means to these ends. 
Holding objectives such as overall emissions and supply reliability constant, our 
framework compares the costs and benefits associated with different ways of 
achieving these outcomes (Figure 5.1). 
Figure 5.1 Overview of our approach
Required outcomes to be achieved at 
least cost  
Security of supply 
Maintain network standards  
Facilitate connection of required plant  
Keep system balanced 
Decarbonisation  
Facilitate connection of low-carbon 
plant, distributed generation, electric 
vehicles and heat pumps  
Strategies for achieving the outcomes  
Smart  
Invest in smart and conventional 
distribution grid technologies  
Conventional  




benefits   
Source: Frontier Economics.
Multiple solutions 
A smart grid is not one technology. There are multiple solutions available in 
different combinations and for different circumstances. While solving for the 
‘optimal’ mix of smart grid technologies was beyond the scope of this work, 
our evaluation framework had to pay close attention to the potential interactions 
between technologies.
We therefore assess the costs and benefits of representative smart grid 
investment packages or strategies, rather than considering individual technologies 
in isolation. 
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Scale and profile of investment required 
The relationship between the costs and benefits of smart grids and the scale and 
profile of investment may be complex. Solutions may differ in the following 
ways: 
•	 the extent to which they must be applied in a coordinated fashion to be 
effective;
•	 the extent of up-front capital investment required and the subsequent 
lifespan of these assets; and
•	 the speed with which they can be deployed.
To take account of these differences, we assess two smart grid investment 
strategies: one based on a top-down or holistic implementation, the other based 
on a more incremental, reactive rollout. 
Uncertainty and option value 
There is a high degree of uncertainty over future demand and supply conditions 
in the electricity sector to 2050. So our evaluation must not only consider which 
technology performs best under a given future scenario, but also convey which 
technology is best suited to the range of possible scenarios. In practice, this 
means our evaluation framework must:
•	 consider more than one possible scenario; and
•	 take account of the ‘option value’ that arises from networks’ ability to 
modify their investment strategies in future years in response to new 
information. 
To capture these uncertainties, we consider three scenarios that represent potential 
developments in the electricity sector to 2050, and employ a real options-based 
approach in our evaluation framework. 
our ApproAch 
First, we set out our assessment of the factors likely to drive the value of smart 
grids. Varying the level of these factors then forms the basis of our scenario 
development. 
Second, we identify the ‘conventional’ and ‘smart grid’ technologies that 
could be deployed in response to these challenges, and we set out an approach to 
defining the deployment strategies that we will evaluate in our model. 
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Third, we describe the model we have developed, including our approach to 
assessing the impact of uncertainty in this context. 
Value drivers and scenarios 
We have focused on the factors most likely to affect the net benefits of smart 
grids. Where there is significant uncertainty over these factors, they must be 
varied across scenarios. 
Our value driver analysis suggests that the following developments are the 
most important. 
The electrification of heat and transport. The change in the level and profile 
of demand associated with the electrification of heat and transport will pose 
a range of challenges for networks. This electrification may also increase the 
amount of demand available for customer demand-side response (DSR). By 
DSR, we mean changes customers can make to the time of their electricity 
consumption.  For example, to undertake DSR, customers may shift electricity 
demand from the early evening peak to the off-peak overnight period, or from 
weekdays to weekends.  Our framework will therefore assess the impacts of 
electric vehicles, plug-in hybrids, vehicle-to-grid technology, heat pumps, and 
heat pumps with storage. 
The increase in distributed generation. The increase in generation connected 
to the distribution network will raise network challenges. We will therefore assess 
the impacts of solar PV, small-scale wind, and large-scale wind and biomass 
generation connected to the distribution network. 
The increase in intermittent and inflexible generation. Changes in the 
large-scale generation mix are likely to increase the role for DSR. Where this 
DSR aims to follow the pattern of large-scale intermittent generation, it may 
increase peaks on distribution networks. Our framework therefore includes an 
assessment of changes in the generation mix. 
The importance of DSR. Some smart grid technologies will help facilitate 
DSR. Assessing the value of this service will likely be integral to assessing the 
value of smart grids. However, there is uncertainty over how responsive customers 
will be to various kinds of signals, and there are a number of competing uses of 
DSR (notably, demand-shifting by suppliers to reduce wholesale energy costs), 
which will have different values under different conditions. Given the uncertainty 
over customers’ propensity to undertake DSR, we vary this across scenarios. 
We have developed three scenarios, which vary the level of these value drivers 
(Table 5.1). 
•	 Scenario 1 includes projections of heat and transport electrification 
consistent with meeting the fourth carbon budget. 
•	 Scenario 2 contains the same rollout of low-carbon technologies as 
Scenario 1, but customers exhibit less flexibility with regard to the 
demand associated with each of these low-carbon technologies. 
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•	 Scenario 3 is consistent with a situation where the UK chooses to 
meet its carbon targets through action outside the domestic electricity 
sector (for example, through purchasing international credits). In this 
scenario, the rollout of demand-side low-carbon technologies is slower 
than expected, and the generation mix contains less inflexible and 
intermittent low-carbon plant. 
Table 5.1 Summary of scenarios















high heat (consistent 





high heat (consistent 
with Scenario 1 of the 
Government’s Carbon Plan)
Medium Medium Low 
Scenario 3 Low Low Low Medium
Source: Frontier Economics.
Definition of investment strategies 
Our model includes three investment strategies. Each strategy maintains current 
levels of security of supply and facilitates the same quantity of connections of 
low-carbon plant and demand-side technologies. The strategies will differ solely 
in terms of how they deliver these outcomes. 
•	 A top-down smart grid investment strategy. This entails an initial 
investment in control and communication infrastructure and lower 
associated costs of ongoing investment in smart technologies, with 
conventional technologies deployed where cost-effective.  Under this 
strategy, investments in smart or conventional technologies required to 
maintain security of supply to today’s levels are undertaken on each 
feeder.58 
•	 An incremental smart grid investment strategy. Once again, smart 
and conventional technologies are delivered as required on each feeder 
type, with the lowest-cost solutions chosen first. The incremental 
strategy differs from the top-down strategy in that it does not include 
58 A feeder is a circuit on the distribution network. Feeders include low-voltage circuits connected to 
homes, extra-high voltage circuits that link to the transmission network, and everything in between. 
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an upfront investment in the control and communications infrastructure. 
Because this infrastructure is not in place, all ongoing investments in 
smart technologies cost more than in the top-down investment strategy. 
•	 A conventional strategy. This strategy differs from the top-down and 
incremental strategies in that it only includes conventional technologies. 
We have chosen to focus on a set of representative technologies, including: 
•	 battery electrical energy storage (e.g., flow-cell, Li-Ion, sodium sulphur); 




•	 enhanced automatic voltage control;
•	 active network management (e.g., dynamically reconfiguring the 
network in response to load); and
•	 technologies to facilitate DNO-led DSR.59 
Our model includes the main types of smart grid technologies and strategies 
required for an evaluation, but they do not form a comprehensive set. It should 
also be stressed that there is significant uncertainty over the cost and performance 
estimates of these technologies. Evidence to support and refine these estimates 
will become increasingly available as projects, including the LCN Fund 
projects,60 yield results. 
These alternative strategies are described in Table 5.2. 
59 EA Technology chose, analysed, and characterised these technologies. By DNO-led DSR, we mean 
the shaping of demand specifically to avoid peaks on the local distribution network, as opposed to 
load-shifting carried out to reduce nationwide generation and transmission costs. 
60 Ofgem established the Low Carbon Networks Fund (LCN Fund) as part of the price control that runs 
until March 2013. The LCN Fund allows up to £500 million to support DNO's to trial new technology 
and operating and commercial arrangements.
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Table 5.2 Investment strategies
Characteristics 
Top-down smart grid investment 
strategy 
Upfront rollout of control and communications infrastructure
Rollout of smart and conventional technologies when 
required 
Incremental smart grid 
investment strategy 
Rollout of smart and conventional technologies, and 
associated control and communications infrastructure when 
required 
Conventional strategy Rollout of conventional technologies only, when required 
Source: Frontier Economics/EA Technology
modElling 
The purpose of the model is to increase our understanding of what drives the 
value of smart grids. Therefore, we have aimed to maintain flexibility (by 
ensuring users can vary key assumptions to run sensitivities) and transparency 
(by ensuring that all assumptions are clear) throughout. 
The model, developed with EA Technology, calculates the costs and benefits 
of alternative distribution network investment strategies. This calculation is 
carried out for each of the investment strategies (conventional, top-down, and 
incremental) and across each of the three scenarios.
Smart grid technologies may benefit society in a variety of ways. Our model 
takes the following costs and benefits into account:
•	 Distribution network reinforcement: The value of investments made 
to ensure that distribution networks can handle the load imposed upon 
them. This includes conventional reinforcement options, as well as any 
smart solutions.
•	 Distribution network interruption costs: The cost to customers of 
interruptions caused by distribution network faults.
•	 Distribution network losses: The cost associated with any change in 
losses caused by smart grid solutions.
•	 Generation costs: The resource costs (both opex and capex, and 
including carbon costs) of generating sufficient electricity to meet 
demand at all times.
•	 DSR ‘inconvenience’ costs: An assumed monetary value associated 
with the inconvenience of using DSR to shift load.
•	 Transmission network reinforcement: An order-of-magnitude 
estimate of the cost of reinforcing the transmission network to handle 
UK-wide peak loads.
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Figure 5.2 illustrates the overall structure of the model. 
Figure 5.2 Model overview
• Generation  
• Transmission  
Distribution network 
model  
Real options CBA model  
Wider electricity sector 
model  
Source: Frontier Economics.
The model has three parts.
The ‘distribution network model’ assesses those costs and benefits that 
accrue on the distribution networks. This includes the cost of distribution network 
reinforcement, in addition to interruption and cost of losses. EA Technology 
have developed a parametric, rather than a nodal, approach to this distribution 
network modelling. 
The ‘wider electricity sector model’ considers the costs and benefits that 
depend on nationwide electricity demand and supply at a high level. These 
include generation costs, transmission network reinforcement costs, and any 
costs associated with smart appliances. Smart technologies can impact on the 
wider electricity sector through DSR and embedded storage. For example, if 
measures to encourage DSR result in a shift in consumption to the overnight 
period, more generation will be required overnight. Similarly, if DNOs use 
storage to help manage local peaks, generation that would have been required at 
the time of local peaks will now be required at other times.  
Finally, the ‘real options-based cost-benefit analysis model’ combines the 
outputs of these models to calculate net present values and related indicators for 
each of the investment strategies. 
Model scope 
To maintain flexibility and transparency, some simplifying assumptions have 
been included: 
•	 We do not value the use of DSR or electrical energy storage for system 
balancing. 
•	 Demand and wind patterns have been represented by using typical and 
peak days. 
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•	 We consider the potential to shift demand within days, but not between 
days. 
•	 Full optimisation between different uses of DSR has not been carried 
out.
This work has focused on developing a robust and flexible appraisal methodology 
and formalising this in a model, rather than on carrying out detailed research on 
each of the parameters included in the model. We do not consider this to be the 
definitive dataset for use in this area and we envision that the data in this model 
will be updated as new information becomes available. 
The model’s simplifications and the likelihood of new data becoming 
available mean that the results of this modelling should be seen as a first step in 
understanding the drivers of the costs and benefits of smart grids, rather than a 
definitive assessment of their value. 
AddrEssing uncErtAinty 
The uncertainty surrounding smart grid investment decisions makes conventional 
cost-benefit analysis techniques difficult to apply, particularly when assessing 
options over time under uncertain conditions, which may yield misleading 
results. For example, under a standard cost-benefit analysis, which implicitly 
assumes perfect foresight, a capital-intensive option might have a higher net 
present value than an option that has high ongoing costs, but no upfront costs. 
Once uncertainty over the future outturn scenario is taken into account, the latter 
approach might look more sensible because of the flexibility associated with it; 
you can choose not to run it if it turns out not to be needed.
Given that smart and conventional options have different levels of capital 
intensity, a more innovative method of evaluation should be applied. This method 
must be able to factor in the option value associated with early investment in 
flexible solutions (i.e., potentially ahead of need) or delaying investment until 
more information is available. 
We have based our cost-benefit analysis on the principles of ‘real options’ 
analysis. This recognises the possibility that, under some circumstances, 
networks might be able to adapt their investment strategies in future years as new 
information about the utility of smart grids becomes available. This allows the 
evaluation framework to account for the option value associated with any smart 
grid investments that avoid lock-in to a particular investment path. Examples of 
investments with option value may include: 
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•	 investments that can be incrementally augmented in future periods;
•	 investments that promote learning, which may therefore make future 
investments less costly or more feasible;61 or
•	 investments that entail high upfront costs but reduce ongoing investment 
costs.
Real options-based analysis allows the best strategy to be chosen in the face of 
uncertainty by factoring in:
•	 the impact of new information at a decision point in the future (will new 
information lead to a change in the optimal strategy?); and
•	 the extent to which the investment strategy today facilitates or limits the 
ability of networks to adjust their investment strategies when this new 
information becomes available (have decisions taken in the early period 
reduced the choices available in the later period?)
We capture the differing option values associated with the different strategies by 
looking at the costs and benefits across two time periods. As a default assumption 
in the model, the first time period is between 2012 and 2023, and the second is 
between 2023 and 2050. We use the year 2023 for the decision point in our 
decision tree analysis as this is likely to coincide with the beginning of the first 
price control period after the completion of the smart meter rollout, and is hence 
a logical point for the industry to adjust its smart grids strategy if necessary.62 
However, users can change the date of the decision point in the model.
The model assesses the costs and benefits of each strategy for each scenario 
in the first period. 
The model then considers the second time period. For each strategy that has 
been chosen at the first decision point (2012), a set of strategies is still possible at 
the second decision point (2023). However, not all will be possible. For example, 
if a top-down strategy has been chosen in 2012, it is not possible to change 
to an incremental strategy or a conventional strategy in the mid-2020s without 
stranding a number of assets.
For each scenario, therefore, we identify the best available strategy at the 
second decision point (2023), given:
61 While we do take account of the fact that the cost of smart technologies is likely to fall over time, 
learning is not modelled endogenously in our framework (on the basis that it is likely to be driven at 
least partly by global, rather than UK, deployment). 
62 Many, but not all, consultation respondents agreed with the choice of date for the decision point. We 
note that the industry would begin to discuss any changes to its smart grid strategy for ED2 several 
years before 2023, however, the actual changes would be more likely to occur from the beginning of 
ED2 in 2023. 
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•	 the assumed scenario; and
•	 the optimal investment strategy associated with this scenario, subject 
to the constraints imposed upon the set of available strategies by the 
investment strategy chosen at the first decision point (2012).
The final step is to combine the results of the conventional cost-benefit analysis 
for the first period with the results of the analysis for the second period to identify 
a total net present value (NPV) benefit measure for each scenario and strategy. 
By weighting the NPV benefit estimates by assumed probability of each scenario 
occurring, we can identify a single probability-weighted NPV benefit estimate 
for each investment strategy.
Figure 5.3 provides a diagrammatic illustration of the ‘real options’ approach 
described above.
Figure 5.3 Real options–based approach
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We believe that this kind of decision tree analysis provides the right balance 
between accounting for uncertainty and avoiding the questionable accuracy of a 
more data-intensive modelling approach.
•	 A decision tree analysis takes the principles of real options analysis and 
ensures that path dependency has been taken into account. This assigns 
a higher value to investments that keep options open than to those that 
lock in to a certain path. 
•	 At the same time, this analysis maintains simplicity and transparency. 
Rather than requiring the inevitably subjective development of detailed 
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probability distributions around key variables in the model and their 
interdependencies, decision tree analysis allows assumptions about the 
probability of each scenario to remain explicit and changeable for the 
use in sensitivities analysis. By limiting the decision tree to two periods, 
we will be able to take account of the different option values associated 
with different smart grid investment strategies without allowing the 
evaluation framework to become too complex.
rEsults 
Given the scope and level of granularity of this modelling, it is important that 
results are seen as a first step to better understand the drivers of the costs and 
benefits of smart grids, rather than as a definitive assessment of their value. 
Core results 
We first undertake a straightforward cost-benefit analysis out to 2050. Given the 
set of assumptions used in the modelling, this analysis suggests that smart grid 
technologies can deliver significant savings over the period (relative to using 
only conventional alternatives). This is because including smart solutions in a 
strategy expands the options for DNOs, allowing them to choose less costly 
solutions and defer conventional investment where appropriate. These results 
are shown in Figure 5.4. 
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Source: Frontier Economics.
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Figure 5.4 shows that these savings are demonstrated across all scenarios 
analysed, but are highest where low-carbon technologies have the greatest 
penetration and customer engagement with DSR is highest.
Despite higher levels of peak demand, the net benefits of Scenario 2 are lower 
than in Scenario 1. This is because of threshold effects in network investment. 
When peak demand on the distribution network reaches a certain level, major 
conventional investment programmes can provide the most cost-effective 
solutions. This means that the net benefits for smart grids first rise as peak 
demand on the distribution network increases (for example, due to the rollout 
of low-carbon technologies), but then decline once the level of value-driving 
technologies reaches the point where major work is required. This effect is 
illustrated in Figure 5.5. 
Figure 5.5 Illustration of threshold effects in estimating net benefits of smart 
strategies
Value driver threshold after which 
conventional technologies are more cost 
effective 





Note: There may be more than one threshold.
Decision tree analysis 
The counterfactual underlying the results presented in Figure 5.4 was based on 
pursuing the conventional strategy to 2050, with no option to switch strategy.
To take account of option value, we now apply a two-stage decision tree and 
assume the network investment strategy decision made in 2012 can be changed 
in 202363 in both the conventional counterfactual and the smart investment cases. 
This means that the counterfactual against which we assess our choice of smart 
strategies may itself become smart at the decision point in 2023, if this turns out 
to be a better option than continuing to only employ conventional technologies. 
63 We use the year 2023 for the decision point in our decision tree analysis, as this may coincide with 
the beginning of the first price control period in the 2020s. However, users can change the date of the 
decision point in the model.
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Figure 5.6 sets out the results once a two-stage decision tree has been applied 
to this analysis. The results in the figure suggest that there is not a clear case 
for immediate widespread rollout of smart grid technologies, based on the 
assumptions we use. Under all scenarios, the conventional strategy is marginally 
preferred in 2012, though the net cost of pursuing smart strategies is very 
small and is well within the range of uncertainty associated with the modelling 
assumptions. 
Figure 5.6 Net benefits of choosing smart strategies in 2012 assuming the 
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Source: Frontier Economics.
The large net benefits shown in Figure 5.4 are no longer present because we are 
now focusing on the impact that choosing a smart strategy can have in the period 
to 2023. The reduction in net benefits makes sense, given that the rollout of the 
value-driving technologies such as heat pumps, electric vehicles, and distributed 
generation is unlikely to have a large impact across the system until the 2020s 
(although clustering will cause issues in particular areas). 
The overall conclusion is that smart grid solutions are expected to deliver 
benefits in the coming decades, but more analysis is required to decide at what 
point their significant deployment should begin.
Our engineering analysis suggests that choice of strategy in 2012 only 
constrains the future choice of strategy in one case: if a top-down strategy is 
chosen in the initial period, it must be pursued until 2050. This reflects the fact 
that the assets enabling the top-down strategy have a long lifetime and will 
remain on the system beyond the decision point. If either the incremental or 
conventional strategy is chosen in 2012, any strategy can then be chosen in 2023. 
Under our default assumptions, the model finds that – under all scenarios, 
no matter which strategy was pursued in the first period – a smart strategy is 
optimal after 2023 (with the top-down strategy being marginally preferred to the 
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incremental strategy). This makes sense, as after 2023 penetration of low-carbon 
technologies has reached significant levels in these scenarios. 
These results suggest that continuing with a conventional strategy in the near 
term does not lead to lock-in to a costly strategy over the long run and that 
there is not a clear case for the immediate widespread rollout of the smart grid 
strategies, based on the assumptions we use. The results also suggest that the 
option value associated with smart grids is low since widespread rollout of smart 
strategies today does not increase the set of options available in 2023. 
We note, however, that if there are long lead times associated with some aspects 
of the smart strategies, immediate action may be required in some areas. For 
example, experience with implementing the smart technologies (for example, 
as part of LCN Fund projects) may be very helpful in driving down their costs. 
Sensitivity analysis 
We also looked at a range of sensitivities around the core results (presented in 
Figure 5.4). The results of the sensitivities are presented in Figure 5.7. While the 
results are sensitive to these changes, the positive net benefit of smart strategies 
relative to conventional strategies is maintained in each case. 
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Figure 5.7 shows that the results are particularly sensitive to the assumptions 
made about the clustering of low-carbon technologies and that the effect of 
changing this assumption differs depending on the scenario. This is because 
reducing the clustering of low-carbon technologies has two impacts:
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•	 It reduces the pressure on the parts of the distribution network where 
low-carbon technologies were clustered. This will tend to reduce the net 
benefits of smart strategies. 
•	 It increases the pressure on the parts of the distribution network that had 
fewer low-carbon technologies when clustering was in effect. This will 
tend to increase the net benefit of smart strategies. 
In Scenario 3, the penetration of low-carbon technologies is low. In this case, the 
first impact dominates. A reduction in clustering reduces pressure on the feeders 
on which low-carbon technologies were clustered, but there are not sufficient 
low-carbon technologies to require widespread investment once these are spread 
evenly across the network. 
In Scenarios 1 and 2, the penetration of low-carbon technologies is higher. In 
these cases, the second effect dominates, and reducing clustering increases the 
benefit of smart grid strategies because the number of feeders that require smart 
or conventional investment increases. 
Figure 5.7 also shows that increasing the technology costs of smart grids by 
50% does not have a significant impact on the net benefits of smart technologies. 
This suggests that the results are relatively robust to the high degree of uncertainty 
around these costs. This is because most smart grid technologies included in the 
model turn out to be more cost-effective than the conventional alternatives under 
our base case assumptions about costs and network conditions, and because the 
smart strategies contain significant levels of conventional investment. 
conclusions 
It is important that the results of this modelling are seen as a first step in 
understanding the drivers of the costs and benefits of smart grids, rather than as 
a definitive assessment of their value.64 
Under the set of assumptions used in the modelling, this analysis suggests 
several conclusions. 
Smart grid technologies can allow significant savings in distribution network 
investment costs over the period to 2050. Including smart solutions in a strategy 
widens the set of options available to DNOs, allowing them to choose less costly 
measures and defer conventional investment. 
64 The Smart Grid Forum has recently carried out additional work to extend the model described in this 
chapter, the latest output of which is available in Smart Grid Forum (2013). A number of assumptions 
were altered for this piece of work (for example, there are lower costs to conventional reinforcement), 
which lead to lower network investment costs under all scenarios and strategies. The overall results 
reported in this chapter are robust to these changes: Smart Grid investment is still associated with a 
positive NPV over the long run, however the vast bulk of such investment is required after 2023.
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The benefits of smart grid strategies are highest under the scenarios with the 
most low-carbon technologies. When penetration of low-carbon technologies 
is low, both conventional and smart distribution network investment levels are 
much lower. However, our analysis suggests that smart grid investments have 
a positive net benefit, even when the penetration of low-carbon technologies is 
relatively low. 
Although the benefits of smart grid strategies at first rise with an increase in 
peak demand on distribution networks, when a certain threshold in peak demand 
is reached, major conventional investments become more cost effective. This is 
due to the ‘lumpy’ nature of many conventional reinforcement options (which, 
while costly, can often free up large amounts of headroom on networks). For this 
reason, among others, it is often difficult to predict the way in which a change in 
a value driver may affect the incremental value of the smart strategy. 
Some smart grid technologies aim to facilitate DSR. In addition, smart meters 
on their own may facilitate some forms of DSR (which will itself lead to a 
change in the load imposed on distribution networks). There is a great deal of 
uncertainty over the extent to which customers will engage with DSR. Under 
our assumptions, a reduction in the level of customer engagement with DSR has 
two impacts:
•	 It increases peak demand on networks in the counterfactual, since the 
impact of smart meters on peak demand is reduced. Whether this has a 
positive or negative impact on the net benefit of smart grids will depend 
on threshold effects. 
•	 It reduces the effectiveness of smart grid technologies that facilitate 
DSR. This will have a negative impact on the net benefit of smart grids. 
Overall, under our assumptions, a reduction in the level of customer engagement 
with DSR reduces the net benefit of smart grids in Scenarios 1 and 3, and 
increases the net benefit of smart grids in Scenario 2. 
Because the penetration of low-carbon technologies is relatively low until the 
2020s under the scenarios presented by WS1, there is not a clear case for the 
immediate widespread rollout of smart grid technologies. However, where they 
are clustered there may be opportunities to reduce distribution network costs 
through the use of smart investments in the near term. Further, if there are long 
lead times associated with some aspects of the smart strategies, action in the near 
term may be required. 
Our real options-based analysis suggests that the option value associated 
with the widespread rollout of smart grids is low. Undertaking conventional 
investments now does not lead to lock-in to expensive strategies. However, there 
is likely to be significant option value associated with piloting new smart grid 
technologies, where this provides learning. 
These results are robust to changes in assumptions around clustering, the 
functionality of smart meters, the cost of technologies, the extent to which 
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customers engage with DSR, transmission investment costs, and the variability 
of wind. 
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The Impact of Changes in Regulatory 
Regime on Productivity of Spanish 
Electricity Distribution Firms
lEticiA blázquEz, humbErto A. brEA-solís And Emili grifEll-tAtJé
6
Since the beginning of the 1990s, many countries have experienced a wave of 
regulatory reforms in their electricity sector. A common pattern can be observed 
in all cases: unbundling the electricity business by introducing competition 
in production and sales; creating wholesale markets and granting access to 
networks; designing or redesigning incentive-based regulatory schemes in 
transmission and distribution, which are still considered natural monopolies; 
creating independent regulators; and privatising public utilities (Newbery, 2000). 
Spain is no exception to this trend. It began its liberalisation process in 1998, 
though the sector had been regulated by means of incentive-based schemes since 
1988. In this sense, Spain could be considered a pioneer in the application of 
these regulatory mechanisms. Preceding its liberalisation, the Spanish electricity 
sector went through an intense process of privatisation that led to mergers 
between companies, substantially increasing concentration in the sector.
With reference to distribution, from 1988 to 1997, preceding the liberalisation 
process, a price-cap scheme with some characteristics common to yardstick 
competition was in place. Since 1998, however, a revenue-cap scheme has been 
in force, benchmarked on the performance of a reference utility. Currently, Spain 
is one of the few countries that still use a reference model based on engineering 
standards. Other countries that apply a revenue-cap model, such as Norway, 
Germany and Austria, use parametric and non-parametric methods to set their 
benchmarks (see Farsi et al. (2007) for a description). Of course, one of the main 
objectives of any regulatory system is to encourage the growth of the regulated 
companies’ productivity; that is, to make more efficient use of inputs to produce 
outputs, to incorporate technological innovations and technical progress in a 
timely way, and to exploit economies of scale. The ultimate goal is to share 
these productivity gains with consumers in the form of lower electricity prices. 
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In the case of Spain, attaining this ultimate objective is crucial, since it is more 
than probable that electricity prices will increase steadily in coming years, a 
trend that started in 2008. This escalating tendency is the consequence of both 
an incoherent electricity pricing policy and an imperfectly designed wholesale 
production market.65 This combination has kept revenues and costs of regulated 
activities from converging, leading the government to accumulate a debt of €25 
billion with electric companies, almost 3% of the country’s GDP. This bulky 
debt must be paid off via tariffs charged to current and future consumers. The 
additive nature of electricity tariffs compels the electricity sector to increase its 
productivity in order to slow the rise in prices. In this sense, it is essential to have 
information on companies’ performance and to identify the determinants of that 
performance.
Fuentes et al. (2001) proposed a parametric estimation and decomposition of 
the Malmquist productivity index into two main components: technical change 
and technical efficiency change. Later studies have expanded this approach 
to include the scale efficiency component in the index decomposition. This 
chapter introduces the definition of scale efficiency suggested by Ray and Desli 
(1997) as one of the components of the parametric Malmquist index. We show 
that Ray and Desli’s definition of scale efficiency fits naturally with the other 
two components. Their product produces a parametric Malmquist index that 
correctly measures total factor productivity (Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell, 1995). We 
then apply this methodology to study the impact of different regulatory regimes 
on the performance of Spanish electricity distribution companies from 1988 
to 2010. To do this, we calculate and combine several input-oriented distance 
functions specified in a translog form in a context of stochastic frontier analysis.
Although many studies analysing the efficiency of the electricity distribution 
sector have been published for numerous countries, the empirical evidence for 
the Spanish electricity distribution is scarce. Blázquez and Grifell-Tatjé (2008, 
2011) have studied this industry, but using non-parametric techniques. This study 
intends to fill this gap. Additionally, although the methods proposed in this study 
or alternative decompositions of the Malmquist index have been used to analyse 
other utilities (e.g., Saal and Parker (2006) for the water industry; Pantzios et al. 
(2011) for the aquaculture sector) our approach is still relatively innovative in 
analyses of the electricity distribution industry (e.g., Tovar et al., 2011).
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section presents 
a brief description of the regulatory schemes applied to distribution companies 
in the last two decades. The following section explains the methodology applied 
in the study. The third section discusses the data and econometric specification. 
The fourth outlines the main results of the analysis. The last section offers some 
concluding remarks.
65  See Arocena et al. (2011) for an analysis of the effects of Spain’s electricity sector law on stakeholders.
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thE rEgulAtion of ElEctricity distribution in spAin
The period under consideration (1988–2010) may be subdivided into three main 
regulatory periods: (i) 1988–97; (ii) 1998–2008; and (iii) 2009–10.
The ‘Stable Legal Framework’
During the first regulatory period (1988–97), Spanish electricity companies were 
subject to the Stable Legal Framework (Marco Legal Estable, or MLE), which 
was applied to all electricity-related activities. The most important concept 
within this framework was ‘standard costs’. That is, the government determined 
a set of ‘objective’ system-wide costs with the idea of eliminating unnecessary 
expenditures. Companies’ reimbursements and electricity rates were based 
on those costs. Thus, the MLE was an incentive-based regulatory framework 
that combined aspects of price-cap regulation with features of the yardstick 
competition model, a model that was eventually applied in many countries.
The MLE regulatory framework had two different systems of remuneration for 
distribution according to the level of voltage: low-to-medium voltage (below 36 
kV) and high voltage (36 kV or greater). High-voltage distribution was rewarded 
in terms of physical units (kilometres of line, number of cells, and transformer 
capacity), regardless of their effective use. By contrast, distribution in low-to-
medium voltage was paid in terms of the amount of energy circulated.66
Electricity sector law (LSE) I: 1998–2008
The electricity sector law (Ley del Sector Eléctrico, or LSE), which emerged 
from negotiations between the Ministry of Energy and the electricity companies, 
came into force in 1998. The LSE introduced competition into generation and 
retailing and stipulated consumers’ right to choose a supplier, a right that was 
implemented gradually. Transmission and distribution remained regulated, 
although they, too, were liberalised by widening third-party access to the 
electricity networks. Under the LSE, the average electricity rate was still based 
on the total expected objective costs, which included distribution costs, as 
well as expected final demand as determined by the government. However, a 
revenue-cap system was introduced to remunerate distribution companies, with 
the development of an optimal network (based on engineering standards) as a 
benchmark. 
Reimbursements paid to electricity distributors were based on the following 
factors: (i) capital investment costs (taking into account the distribution facilities 
needed to meet demand, based on a reference network model for nationwide 
66 For a more extensive analysis of the MLE regulatory framework, see Crampes and Laffont (1995). 
Additionally, Blázquez and Grifell-Tatjé (2008) include an empirical analysis of its consequences on 
the revenue of electricity distribution companies.
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distribution),67 as well as actual investments; (ii) operating and maintenance 
costs, based on the reference network and the actual facilities; (iii) electricity 
supplied at various voltage levels, which were used to determine operating and 
maintenance costs; (iv) commercial management costs; (v) incentives to boost 
the quality of supply and reduce electricity losses;68 and (vi) costs incurred to 
reduce electricity consumption.
The overall reimbursements to new distributors (R), which were implemented 
after the LSE came into force, were determined on the basis of the aforementioned 
factors and updated annually using the expected consumer price index (CPI) 
minus a fixed productivity improvement factor (X) of 1%. In addition, the 
increase rate in demand over the entire system was taken into account (DD), 
affected by a correction parameter known as the ‘efficiency factor’ (Fe), which, 
in principle, could not exceed a value of 0.4. The efficiency factor was fixed at 
0.3 until 2008, when it was changed to 0.65:
Rt = Rt�1·(1 + CPI	�	X)·(1 + DD·Fe)
For those distributors operating before 1998, the reimbursement was calculated 
on the basis of the previous remuneration in 1997. We should note that 
remuneration is calculated for the entire distribution system. In 1999, for the 
first time, reimbursement for the distribution of electricity was established in 
conformity with the new LSE, along with the methodology for sharing it among 
the different distributors in succeeding years. Theoretically, the sharing criteria 
were based on the reference network. However, the methodology was curtailed 
in practically every period, and one may reasonably suspect that the percentage 
shares were merely agreed upon by the companies and the ministry in the absence 
of solid knowledge about the criteria upon which they were based. In any case, 
the methodology had some clear problems: 
•	 It did not provide any incentive to the distributor since it does not 
fulfill basic regulatory principles, such as (i) individual treatment of 
companies; (ii) the link between remuneration and quality; and (iii) the 
link between real and necessary investment and compensation.
 The reimbursement scheme did have one incentive – a rise in demand 
did not imply a proportional rise in income. The efficiency component 
67 This is the network needed to link the transmission network with all high, medium-and low-voltage 
customers. It is calculated on the basis of planning criteria, minimising the investment-losses binomial 
while certain supply-quality standards are fulfilled. The latter are represented by the drop in voltage 
and the number of power cuts per customer. Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (2003) analyse the application 
of this reference network under the LSE. In Spain, the reference network follows a model proposed 
by one of the electricity companies, Hidrocantábrico, known as BULNES. Other countries that at 
some point adopted reference-network models are Sweden (Larsson, 2003) and Chile (Rudnick and 
Rainieri, 1997).
68 In 2004, this incentive could not be higher than €50 million. In 2005, that amount increased to €80 
million. Between 2006 and 2008, it was €90 million.
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of the revenue mechanism relies on the possibility for the regulator to 
arbitrarily fix the weight of the demand increase (Fe) as long as it was 
less than 40% (Crampes and Fabra, 2005). Therefore, the estimates of the 
increase in demand did not take into account the territorial differences 
in demand growth. But by setting this limit the regulator assumed the 
presence of very large scale economies in the sector, an assumption 
that runs against empirical evidence in the literature, which indicates 
that scale economies are rapidly becoming exhausted in distribution 
(see, for example, Salvanes and Tjotta, 1994). Moreover, the reward 
mechanism did not explicitly encourage investment, so that distributors 
were adapting to higher demand without developing their facilities. This 
factor signalled a very significant change in the MLE, with investments 
coming to be compensated as soon as they were acknowledged by the 
regulator. The new situation could make distributors more efficient in 
the short term, when facilities are oversized, but could be harmful in 
the long term if it leads to structural congestion. Additionally, if the 
growth rate in demand is not the same for every distributor, some will 
be overcompensated and others undercompensated. 
•	  The productivity growth factor, calculated as the ratio between the 
variation in investments and variation in demand, is not a proper 
productivity estimator associated with the CPI.
•	  The quality incentive could distort companies’ investment plans and 
serve as an incentive to invest less in areas where quality was lower.
•	  The regulation did not specify the period over which the compensation 
base was to be revised or the formula for updating this compensation 
base, nor did it mention the parameter for correcting the CPI. Neither the 
criteria that justified the determination of this value nor the efficiency 
factor for each year explicitly identified.
Based on this schematic analysis, under the MLE and LSE the regulation of 
electricity distribution in Spain faced a fundamental problem – uncertainty. The 
MLE introduced numerous changes, a trend that continued or even increased 
under the LSE. Moreover, the process used to determine the regulated prices 
was far from transparent. Electricity rates were not based on the cost-allocation 
methodology; instead, they were determined on an ad hoc basis within 
government-prescribed limits to meet macroeconomic targets.
Electricity sector law (LSE) II: 2009–10.
From 2001, the electricity companies pressured the regulator to modify the 
remuneration methodology used for distribution. Royal Decree 222/2008 
represented an attempt to solve some of the existing problems by establishing a 
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new methodology that was a huge step forward compared with its predecessor, 
in the sense that it reimburses distributors individually rather than calculating a 
total sector payment to be divided among companies after the fact.
Under the methodology adopted in 2008, each company’s remuneration is 
renewed on the basis of its own demand instead of on average system-wide 
demand. In other words, the efficiency factor is calculated individually for each 
company. The regulation is reviewed every four years.
A reference model is applied, which should be based on these two models: (i) 
A ‘zero base reference network’ that connects customers with transmission (or 
distribution) networks. This network is mainly used for calculating the reference 
remuneration at the beginning of a regulatory period. (ii) An ‘incremental 
reference network’ for new customers that takes into account either horizontal or 
vertical expansion of demand, given the existing network.
The reference remuneration level for distribution company, i, in the baseline 
year is proposed by the regulator (CNE, the national energy commission) and 











 is the remuneration for investment, calculated as the sum of the 
straight line linear depreciation term for fixed assets and a remuneration term 
for net assets for each distributor (return on assets) calculated with a weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC) that is representative of distribution activities;69 
(ii) COMi
base
 is the remuneration for operating and maintenance costs of the 
network facilities according to their typology and use, with a yardstick factor 
being applied to these costs;70 and (iii) OCDi
base
 is the remuneration for other 
distribution costs such as commercial management costs or metering, access, and 
connection to the network, as well as network planning and energy management, 
a yardstick factor being also applied to these costs. To determine the increase 
in investment and operating and maintenance costs, the incremental reference 
model is applied.71
The annual remuneration for distribution activities for each distributor, i, 
during the four years of the regulatory period is determined using the following 
formula:
69 Royal Decree 222/2008 does not specify the methodology to be used to calculate the capital base. 
Most likely, the reference network will play a relevant role in determining it.
70 So far, it is not clear how the unitary operating and maintenance costs are going to be calculated and 
what the yardstick factor will be.
71 The reference remuneration level used to calculate the remuneration of distribution 
activity “i” for regulatory period 2009–12, is adjusted according to the following formula: 
Ri0-2008 = R
i
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 is the weighted index price corrected for efficiency.72 Additionally, 
Yi
t-1
 represents the increases in revenue derived from the increase in the number 
of customers or connections.73 Finally, Qi
t-1
 can have a positive or negative 
value reflecting either a reward or a penalty to each distributor based on the 
degree to which they achieved the established quality objectives in the previous 
year.74 Similarly, LRi
t-1
 is a reward or penalty term applicable for reducing 
network losses.75 Therefore, the system for resetting remuneration is based on 
investigating the efficiency of each company using the last recorded actual costs 
and setting efficiency targets for the next regulatory period.
mEthodology
Caves et al. (1982) introduced a productivity index based on the work of 
Malmquist (1953). Their productivity index required that the observations under 
evaluation be either revenue maximisers or cost minimisers. Farë et al. (1994, 
1992) generalised the method by allowing for inefficiency. When inefficiency 
is permitted, the Malmquist index can be expressed as the ratio of two distance 
functions. An input distance function as defined in Shephard (1970) is the 
potential radial contraction of a firm’s input vector up to the input set isoquant 
(boundary), given an input vector xt = (x1t, ... , x
t
K
) ∊ ℝK+ and an output vector yt 
= (y1t, ... , y
t
M
) ∊ ℝM+ at time t=1,…, T. Formally, an input distance function is 
defined as follows:
DtI = max{Φ:(xi,t/ Φ) ∊ Lt(yi,t, xi,t)},    t = 1, ..., T (1)
where Lt(yi,t, xi,t) is the feasible production technology, defined as:
Lt(yi,t, xi,t) = {xi,t can at least produce yi,t},    t = 1, ..., T (2)
by definition, the input distance function is homogenous of degree +1 in inputs, 
non-decreasing in inputs, and non-increasing in outputs (Khumbakar and Lovell, 
2000). It is assumed that DtI (yt, xt) ≥ 1, with D
t
I (yt, xt) = 1 if xt is located in 
72 In particular, IAt = 0,2*(CPIt�1	�	1		�	χ) + 0,8(IPRIt�1	�	1	�	ψ), where CPI and IPRI are, respectively, 
the annual change in consumer and producer price index for equipment goods, and x and y efficiency 
factors which are χ=80 percentage points and ψ=40 percentage points for the period 2009–12.
73 This variation covers the increase in investment costs, operation and maintenance costs, and other 
costs caused by an increase in demand; it is calculated using the ‘incremental reference network’ 
model.
74 It could fluctuate between ±3 percent of R
base
. See Annex 1 of Royal Decree 222/2008.
75 See Annex 2 of Royal Decree 222/2008.
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the efficient boundary of the input requirement set, and hence it is technically 
efficient in the manner of Farrell (1957).
Following Coelli and Perelman (1999, 2000) and Coelli et al. (2003), the input 
distance function is estimated using a translog specification of Lt for a panel of 
i=1,…I producers observed over t=1,…T periods, in which technical progress 
is defined in the usual form as a trend variable (t) and z represents exogenous 
variables outside the control of firms but which could influence their input 
requirements. Thus,






















































where the parameters of the function satisfy a set of restrictions as symmetry 
akl = al,k with (k, l = 1, ..., K) and bmn = bmn with (m, n, = 1, ..., M) and with 
homogeneity of degree +1 in inputs:











and ηk = 0.Σ (4)
Fuentes et al. (2001) proposed a parametric Malmquist index following 
the approach of Farë et al. (1994). As in Fuentes et al. (2001), we define the 
Malmquist index in period t as the ratio between two parametric distance 
functions corresponding to input and output vectors of the i-th firm in periods t 
and t+1. However, in line with Pantzios et al. (2011), our approach differs from 
that of Fuentes et al. (2001) in two respects. First, we use an input-oriented 
distance function instead of an output-oriented one to calculate the Malmquist 
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productivity index. Second, we apply to the case of Spanish electricity distribution 
the definition of scale efficiency proposed by Ray and Desli (1997) as one of the 
components of the parametric Malmquist index. Thus, together with change in 
technical efficiency and technical change, we include a scale efficiency effect 
as an additional driver of growth in productivity. The product of these three 
components produces a parametric Malmquist index that accurately measures 
total factor productivity (Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell, 1995). This decomposition is 
shown in Table 6.1, in which the symbol (~) indicates an input distance function 
associated with constant return to scale (CRS).
Therefore, initially, by using the framework provided by Färe et al. (1997), 
the Malmquist index can be expressed as the product of two components: 
technical efficiency change (TE), which measures the producer’s capacity to 
improve technical efficiency from period t to period t+1; and technical change 
(DTC), which measures the radial shift in the input set (measured with period 
t+1 data). We can further break technical change down into two components: 
(i) technical change with period t data, which measures the technical change 
for unchanged inputs and outputs; and (ii) a bias index to collect potential input 
bias, which compares shifts in the input set in period t and t+1 corresponding to 
changes in the bundle of inputs, as well as potential output bias, which compares 
shifts in the input set in period t and t+1 corresponding to changes in the 
combination of outputs between the two periods. Additionally, we can complete 
the decomposition of the Malmquist index by using Ray and Desli’s (1997) 
input-oriented scale effect (SE), which measures the change in scale efficiency 
relative to period t technology using data (xt,yt) and (xt+1,yt+1). We can further 
break down this scale effect into two components: the scale efficiency change 
(SEC) and the scale efficiency/input mix effect (IME), both defined in terms of 
an input-oriented scale efficiency measure that evaluates the productivity of an 
observed input-output bundle (xt,yt) relative to that of the technically optimal 
scale, for which production exhibits CRS and average ray productivity reaches 
its maximum. SEC, proposed by Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (1999) and used by 
Balk (2001) and Pantzios et al. (2011), is greater (less) than one when the output 
bundle in period t+1 lies closer to (farther away from) the point of technical 
optimal scale than the output bundle of period t, given the input mix of period 
t – and thus scale efficiency increases (decreases). Meanwhile, according to Balk 
(2001), IME measures how the distance of a frontier point to the frontier of cone 
technology (CRS) changes when the input mix changes, conditional on the same 
output mix, that from period t. Thus, it measures the contribution of the change 
in the input mix to the change in scale efficiency. It is easy to show that when xt 
= λxt+1 (with λ being a scalar equal or greater than 0), IME takes a value equal 
to one. Logically, as Balk (2001) points out, “if the technology exhibits global 
CRS, then IME is identically equal to one” (p. 169). However, insofar as the 
value of IME depends on the distance between the technologies with constant 
and variable returns to scale, there could be many situations other than global 
CRS in which IME = 1.
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Note that these decompositions require the computation of several distance 
functions different from DtI (xi,t,yi,t) As in Perelman et al. (2001), we used the 
estimated parameters of the translog distance function in order to compute 
technical change and the input bias index. The definitions of these effects in 
terms of the estimated parameters are shown in Table 6.1.76
dAtA And EconomEtric spEcificAtion
We gathered information on the major electric distribution utilities that operate 
in the Spanish electricity sector throughout the period 1988–2010: Unión Fenosa 
(UNF), Gas Natural-Fenosa (GN-UNF), Hidroeléctrica del Cantábrico (HC), 
Iberduero (IBE), Hidroeléctrica Española (HDE), Iberdrola (IB), Hidroeléctrica 
Ribagorzana (ENHER), Eléctricas Reunidas de Zaragoza (ERZ), Eléctrica 
del Viesgo (EV),77 Fuerzas Eléctricas de Cataluña (FECSA), Hidroeléctrica 
de Cataluña (HECSA), and Sevillana de Electricidad (CSE). The result is an 
unbalanced data panel made up of 149 observations. The unbalanced nature 
of the panel reflects the intense concentration process that took place in the 
Spanish electricity sector during the period analysed. In 1991, the merger of 
Iberduero and Hidroeléctrica Española, the largest companies in 1990, gave rise 
to Iberdrola. Between 1996 and 1999, ENHER, ERZ, EV, FECSA, HECSA, 
and CSE all merged into ENDESA, until then the largest Spanish electricity 
generation company and, after the integration process, the largest complete cycle 
company.78 Finally, in 2009, Unión Fenosa merged with the largest Spanish gas 
company, forming Gas Natural-Fenosa.
The most important factors affecting electricity distribution are, on the output 
side, the amount of energy distributed, the total number of customers served, 
the dispersion of consumers in the service area and the size of the distribution 
area; and, on the input side, the building and maintenance of tangible assets, 
in particular distribution lines, mains, and transformers. Because of the high 
correlation between these variables and the small number of observations, it 
is not possible to introduce all these variables into the model specification. 
Additionally, some of them could be considered exogenous in the sense that they 
are beyond the control of companies, while still affecting companies’ technology 
and relative efficiency. In order to solve the multi-collinearity problem and take 
into account the exogenous nature of some of the variables, we decided to use for 
the model the number of customers per kilometre of distribution network as an 
76 One important difference from the framework used by Perelman et al. (2001) is the fact that we 
incorporate a control variable in the estimation procedure.
77 In 2002, Electra Viesgo was acquired by the Italian company Enel in 2008, it was acquired by E.ON. 
Unfortunately, neither Enel nor E.ON offer separate information for their subsidiary Viesgo in Spain.
78 Two important additional changes took place in the sector during the period analysed. The asset 
exchanges between companies in 1994 and the operation exchanges between the companies and REE, 
the public high-voltage transport corporation. In Spain, since 1985, transmission has been carried out 
by REE, which today owns all the transmission assets, but during the period under analysis some of 
the high-voltage lines were owned by the other companies and considered part of their distribution 
business for the purposes of revenue allocation.
124 The Next Generation of Economic Issues in Energy Policy in Europe
exogenous determinant of technology.79 The introduction of this variable into the 
model, in combination with the energy distributed, is necessary because input 
and output mixes vary notably depending on customer density. In particular, 
capital density varies substantially across customer density quintiles (Coelli et 
al., 2012).
Therefore, our model includes one output – electricity distributed to end 
customers, measured in GWh (y) – and two inputs – capital (x
1
) and labour (x
2
). 
We estimated the company’s amount of capital by means of an indirect approach 
similar to the method of depreciated replacement value.80,81 Labour input is 
proxied by the personnel cost attributed to the distribution activity, measured in 
constant 2010 euros. As mentioned above, we included the number of customers 
per kilometre of distribution network as a control variable (z).82 Annual reports 
from the electricity companies furnished the information on these variables.83
Table 6.2 offers the descriptive statistics on these variables and clearly shows 
the intense concentration of the sector over the period, especially during the 
years preceding the liberalisation process. This concentration and privatisation 
of public companies is a particular feature of the Spanish liberalisation process. 
Also noteworthy is the coexistence of large and small companies operating 
within the sector, especially after the consolidation of the sector. Another 
interesting fact is the slowdown in the pace of capital growth during the early 
years of liberalisation after an expansive period while the MLE was in force. We 
can also observe the effect of the financial crisis, which is reflected both in the 
capital strategy of companies that disinvested in 2009–10 and in the decrease in 
the amount of energy distributed. Finally, a moderate increase in labour costs can 
be noticed throughout the period under consideration.
79 The problem of this small dataset has to be borne in mind when interpreting the results.
80 Coelli et al. (2003) show that the depreciated replacement value gives a more accurate measure of 
capital than the depreciated nominal capital stock, which is more common in applied studies because 
it introduces lower disparity between the companies owing to their different investment profiles.
81 Thus, we take as a starting value the net tangible assets of 1988, published by the utilities. To construct 
the capital stock for period t (xtl), we first discount the annual asset depreciation from the capital stock 
existing at the end of the previous period (xlt�1). To do this, we use the average depreciation rate of the 
electricity sector for the distribution activity (d) computed from the annual reports of the industry 
association UNESA (the Spanish Electricity Industry Association, comprising the major electricity 
companies in the country). Second, this value is updated by the annual capital inflation rate by means 
of the deflator of gross fixed capital formation reported in the national accounts of Spain (f). Third, 
we add the investment made by the company in year t (It). Finally, capital stock is valued at constant 
1988 prices by applying the deflator f cumulatively from 1988 to year t (f1988). Thus, the amount of 
capital employed by a distribution company in year t valued at 1988 prices (x2t) is calculated as: 
xtl = [(xlt�1)·(1 � dt)·(1 + ft) + It]/(1 + f1988)    t = 1989, ..., 2010.
82 When measuring outputs it should be borne in mind that after the liberalisation process distribution 
companies could distribute energy to other companies’ customers and vice versa. Therefore, the 
amount of energy distributed is not exactly equivalent to the amount of energy sold
83  Because of the vertical integration of companies, before 1997 we do not have separate information 
on labour costs for distribution activities. Therefore, the data for 1988–96 have been estimated based 
on the information on tangible assets and employees included in the companies’ annual reports. This 
shortcoming must be taken into account when interpreting the results.
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An approach such as the one offered by parametric distance functions and 
Malmquist indexes is clearly appropriate for electricity distribution firms. 
Additionally, the translog function is a suitable form insofar as it offers desirable 
properties such as flexibility, ease of derivation, and the possibility of imposing 
homogeneity. Bearing in mind that electricity distribution companies have a 
statutory obligation to meet demand for electricity, it is appropriate to assume 
that outputs are exogenous and inputs are endogenous (Jasmab and Pollit, 2000). 
Taking advantage of the homogeneity property for the econometric estimation 
of the input distance function, we follow Lovell et al. (1994) and arbitrarily 
select one input, (labour, x
2
), as the dependent variable and as the variable of 
normalization of the other input, capital (x
1
). Therefore, we have modelled the 
distance function i,t in the following way:
DtI(y
i,t, xi,t) = x
2








i,t, xi,t) = lnx
2






Then, equation (3) can be written as:
lnDtI (y
i,t, xi,t) =  lnx
2
i,t + TL(yi,t, x~
1
i,t, t; z, θ) (7)
with TL indicating the translog distance function (3), or equivalently:
�lnx
2
i,t = TL(yi,t, x~1i,t, t; z, θ)	�	lnD
t
I (x
i,t,  yi,t) (8)






i,t, i = 1, ... , I and t = 1, ... , T. Since lnDi,tI (y
i,t, 
xi,t)	 is	unobservable,	we	can	write	�lnDi,tI (y
i,t, xi,t) = ui,t (Coelli and Perelman, 
1999; 2000), where u
i,t
 is a one-sided, non-negative error term representing the 
stochastic shortfall of i company’s output from its production frontier owing to 
technical inefficiency. Then, we can rewrite the input distance function model as: 
�lnx
2
i,t = TL(yi,t, x~
1
i,t, t; z, θ) + ui,t + vi,t , (9)
where vi,t ~ N(0, σ2v) is a symmetrically distributed error term that represents data 
noise, while ui,t corresponds to the one-sided error term that captures inefficiency. 





 are distributed independently of each other. Thus, the 
econometric specification of the parametric input distance function would be as 
follows:
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The technical efficiency score is then computed as E[exp(�ui,t |vi,t + ui,t). From 
here, the input distance function is the inverse of the technical efficiency 
computed.
The additive and non-interactive specification of the z variable implies the 
assumption that it simply shifts the input distance function and therefore provides 
net efficiency estimates (Coelli et al., 1999; Saal and Parker, 2005).
Table 6.3 Parametric input distance function estimationa
Variables
Maximum likelihood parameters
Coefficient Std. Dev. t-ratio




1 0.381 0.095    3.999 **
(ln x
1
















11 -0.295 0.051   -5.760**
Technical change T γ
∧
1 0.062 0.009    6.821**
t2 γ
∧





1 -0.033 0.025   -1.324
(ln y
1




-0.006 0.076   -0.084
Other ML parameters σ
∧2 0.127 0.013    9.788**
γ
∧
0.982 0.033  29.555**
Notes: **indicates that estimates or test statistics are significant at the 1 percent level. Number of 




 = 0.619; (ln x
2









) = 0.296; (ln x
2
)t = 0.033. LRχ2 test on one-side error = 6.4.
EmpiricAl rEsults
Input distance function estimation
Table 6.3 shows the results of the input-oriented distance function estimation. 
From a methodological standpoint, the results seem to indicate that the maximum 
likelihood coefficients are accurately estimated. Technical inefficiency is 
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correctly identified within the error term composed: (i) the LR test on the one-
side error is highly significant; ii) the share of technical inefficiency in total 
variance is high γ
∧ 
 = 0.982; and (iii) the expected mean efficiency, E[exp(-u) \ ε], 
is equal to 0.757.
The magnitude and highly significant first-order coefficient on energy 
distributed  (b
∧
1 = 0.963) reveal that this output has, as we could expect, an 
extraordinary impact on the increase in input requirements: inputs increase 
almost proportionally to output. However, the second-order coefficient (b
∧
11) 
is not statistically significant. The coefficient and significance of a∧1 (0.381) 
would suggest that, as expected, as the relative level of fixed capital increases 
(or decreases) so does the magnitude of labour requirements, albeit by a smaller 




11 would indicate a 
rate of technical change of 6.2% per year with an estimated rate of technical 
change growing by 0.5% per year. However, technical change seems not to 
significantly affect either the input or the output elasticities. Finally, we can 
observe that, as expected, the impact of customer density on the estimated model 
is negative, although it is not significant. Therefore, the input requirements are not 
significantly affected by variations in customer density. An initial overcapacity 
in the distribution system could explain this result.
Malmquist index decomposition
Table 6.4 sums up the main results of the Malmquist index decomposition, 
which are presented in average values per year. In Table 6.4, the second column 
shows that the average technical efficiency scores have been around 0.767 over 
the period analysed. Average efficiency declined substantially under the MLE. 
During the first few years of the liberalisation period, technical efficiency rose 
rapidly until 2004 and then worsened steadily. The sector was 26.4% less efficient 
in 2010 than in 1988. Additionally, we can observe that the variation in the 
technical efficiency rating is moderate, with the average standard deviation being 
around 10%. Our results show an inverse relationship between concentration and 
efficiency levels.
The third column of Table 6.4 shows estimates of Malmquist productivity 
indexes with constant returns to scale technology. The indexes are on average 
over unity and, therefore, it seems that over the period reviewed the average 
productivity in the Spanish electricity distribution sector increased by 3.3% 
annually, on average. In the first regulatory period, when the MLE was in force, 
we can see a widespread, though moderate, improvement. However, during 
the liberalisation stage, we can observe two clear periods. In the first period 
(1997–2008), the sector increased its productivity sharply, while in the second 
it underwent a significant decline, losing 20.3 percentage points of productivity 
in only two years.
The fourth, fifth, and sixth columns of Table 6.4 show the contribution of 
technical efficiency change and technical change to the growth in productivity, 
the latter being broken down into its two drivers according to the approach 
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presented in Table 6.1: technical change, with period t data; and the bias index, 
which collects and input and output bias.84 We can see a continuous rise in 
technical change that has managed to offset the general worsening of technical 
efficiency change. While the former grew at an average annual rate of 5.6%, the 
latter declined at an average rate of 2.0% per year. This balance was especially 
prominent during the second part of the MLE (1991–96) and the last part of the 
LSE (2005–10). Considering the components of technical change, we could not 
say that the positive technical change has been associated with the bias effect – 
that is, specific combinations of inputs (capital and labour). Indeed, this result 
is in accordance with the lack of significance of the corresponding estimated 
parameter.
Therefore, the technical change component has been the main source of 
improvements in the sector. That is, distribution companies have managed to 
satisfy electricity demand with relatively fewer resources. In this sense, we 
should bear in mind that during the first stage of the LSE, there was no a link 
between companies’ investment effort and remuneration. This fact, together with 
an overcapacity in the distribution system inherited from the previous regulatory 
framework, the MLE, allowed the companies to slow down their capital 
investments and to adjust their labour force and still manage to satisfy demand 
without major compromises in quality. In this context, we can see that from 
1998 to 2004 there is an improvement in efficiency as well as positive technical 
change. It seems paradoxical, however, that, after that point, efficiency levels 
declined while technical change increased, in particular in the later years of our 
study. During those years, input requirements were adjusted as companies tried 
to weather the economic crisis and subsequent decreases in demand. However, in 
an industry like electricity distribution, the speed with which inputs, particularly 
capital, are adjusted to demand is fairly limited, insofar as companies must not 
only maintain their installations but also expand their investment to serve new 
customers and increases in local demand. As a result, the inefficiency of the 
industry increases.
It is worth noting that during the years in which demand underwent important 
contractions, the recent reforms in the regulation were already in force. As 
explained earlier, since 2009, companies’ investments have been reimbursed 
according to the reference model instead of the variation in activity of the system 
as a whole. Under the previous regulatory system, as we also saw, the drop in 
demand would have meant a decrease in companies’ reimbursement, which in 
our view not only would discourage necessary investments but could also, as a 
consequence, negatively affect the quality of service, which was not specifically 
considered under the previous system. Furthermore, we should recall that the 
Gas-Natural–Union Fenosa merger took place in 2009 and had a major impact 
on the relative performance of an industry that was already highly concentrated.
84 Farë et al. (1997) show that the condition of one output is not enough to make the output bias equal 
to one. Constant returns to scale technology is required. Our results show that the output bias is on 
average equal to one (1.0002) but not exactly one. The main component of the bias is the input bias, 
although it is also very close to one on average (0.9983).
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1988 0.785        
1989-88 0.782 1.016 1.004 1.011 1.001 1.025 1.002 1.023
1990-89 0.814 1.072 1.053 1.017 1.000 0.990 1.002 0.987
1991-90 0.812 1.040 1.016 1.024 0.999 0.987 1.003 0.984
1992-91 0.785 0.994 0.964 1.033 0.999 0.978 1.002 0.977
1993-92 0.765 1.011 0.975 1.037 1.000 0.974 1.000 0.975
1994-93 0.717 0.975 0.939 1.042 0.996 1.035 1.006 1.029
1995-94 0.696 1.031 0.989 1.043 1.000 0.957 1.002 0.955
1996-95 0.615 0.923 0.884 1.048 0.996 0.993 1.001 0.992
1997-96 0.687 1.158 1.113 1.049 0.992 0.938 1.002 0.937
Average MLE 0.746 1.024 0.993 1.034 0.998 0.986 1.002 0.984
1998-97 0.668 1.049 1.004 1.046 0.998 1.022 1.000 1.023
1999-98 0.780 1.133 1.074 1.056 0.998 0.965 1.007 0.959
2000-99 0.869 1.200 1.137 1.059 0.996 0.969 1.004 0.966
2001-00 0.902 1.102 1.042 1.060 0.998 1.008 1.000 1.008
2002-01 0.895 1.056 0.994 1.063 1.000 1.003 1.000 1.003
2003-02 0.901 1.094 1.024 1.068 1.001 0.962 0.999 0.963
2004-03 0.921 1.105 1.034 1.074 0.995 1.058 1.000 1.058
2005-04 0.810 0.942 0.876 1.074 1.002 0.971 0.999 0.972
2006-05 0.791 1.057 0.980 1.081 0.998 1.009 1.000 1.009
2007-06 0.767 1.044 0.966 1.084 0.997 1.014 1.000 1.015
2008-07 0.699 0.989 0.914 1.086 0.997 1.046 1.000 1.046
Average LSE (I) 0.819 1.070 1.004 1.068 0.998 1.003 1.001 1.002
2009-08 0.653 0.790 0.726 1.087 1.003 1.067 1.000 1.066
2010-09 0.521 0.944 0.863 1.089 1.003 0.891 0.996 0.894
Average LSE (II) 0.587 0.867 0.795 1.088 1.003 0.979 0.998 0.980
        
Mean 0.767 1.033 0.980 1.056 0.999 0.994 1.001 0.993
Stand. Deviat. 0.100 0.089 0.091 0.023 0.003 0.041 0.002 0.041
Finally, the scale effect (SE) is presented in column seven of Table 6.4, and 
its two drivers – scale efficiency change (SEC) and input-mix effect (IME) – 
are shown in columns eight and nine, respectively. The input-mix effect had a 
moderately negative contribution to scale efficiency over the entire period under 
consideration. Its average value indicates that scale efficiency associated with 
the change in the input mix decreases at an annual rate of 0.7%. This effect 
can be seen as residual, which may explain its inconsistent behaviour over 
time. By contrast, the average value of SEC – 1.001 – indicates that the radial 
scale efficiency associated with the output combinations (conditional upon the 
same input mix) was almost neutral with respect to productivity growth. That 
means that, given the input mix, the output bundle was close to the optimal 
scale over practically the entire period. This result is consistent with the first-
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order coefficient on energy distributed (0.963) in Table 6.3, the value – close to 
one – shows a technology with few returns to scale. Moreover, this component 
exhibited stable behaviour over time, with significant deterioration only in the 
last period of the LSE. We should note that the regulation in force from 1998 to 
2008 reimbursed the companies as if they were operating with significant returns 
to scale. Our results are not in line with this assumption.
The combination of the two components, SEC and IME, results in a scale 
effect that slightly decreased productivity growth by 0.6% annually. Hence, the 
IME was damaging enough to outweigh the almost non-existent positive effect 
of the SEC on productivity. But the singular contribution of the IME to scale 
efficiency advises us to take these results with caution. One might say that the 
Spanish distribution network has been at least big enough and dense enough to 
meet increases in demand without substantial increases in inputs. Additionally, 
it seems that further consolidation of the sector is not justified by the quest for 
improvements in productivity.
Therefore, we can say that technical change has been the main source of 
productivity improvement of the distribution sector over the period analysed, 
outweighing the significant negative effect of the technical efficiency change and 
the detrimental (though more moderate) scale effect. However, it is noteworthy 
that during the first stage of the liberalisation process, productivity grew steadily 
and the contribution of each driver was positive. Recent consolidation processes 
and the economic crisis, by contrast, have negatively affected technical efficiency 
and the scale effect, causing significant deterioration of the sector’s productivity.
The company analysis presented in Table 6.5 also shows interesting results. 
First of all, two of the four companies operating at present have managed to 
improve their productivity – HC and ENDESA. The recently consolidated 
company GN-UNF seems not to have been as promising as expected in terms of 
productivity gains. Curiously enough, some of the companies that were acquired 
had achieved larger productivity improvements than those obtained by the larger 
companies that emerged from consolidation, such as UNF and IBERDUERO 
(which merged with HDE into IBERDROLA). However, the formation of 
ENDESA could be considered successful from the standpoint of productivity 
improvements, although its success has not stemmed from its larger scale. In 
fact, we can see that for the majority of companies, technical change again 
has been the main source of productivity growth, while changes in technical 
efficiency have had, overall, a negative impact on productivity growth. The most 
significant improvements in technical change are seen in the largest companies, 
and these large companies also show an SEC effect, with values close to one. 
These results are consistent with the previous literature pointing to the rapid 
exhaustion of scale economies in electricity distribution.
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ENDESA 0.671 1.057 0.989 1.072 0.999 0.997 0.999 0.998
ENHER 0.700 1.032 0.999 1.038 0.996 1.031 1.006 1.025
ERZ 0.814 1.022 0.985 1.040 0.998 0.979 1.004 0.975
EV 0.550 1.025 0.997 1.030 0.998 1.012 1.000 1.012
FECSA 0.664 1.052 1.022 1.030 0.999 0.999 1.001 0.998
GAS 
NATURAL
0.804 0.697 0.645 1.068 1.012 0.640 0.988 0.648
HC 0.901 1.033 0.989 1.046 0.999 1.031 0.998 1.033
HDE 0.792 0.958 0.952 1.008 0.998 1.004 1.000 1.004
HECSA 0.680 0.991 0.968 1.024 0.999 1.003 0.999 1.004
IBERDROLA 0.807 1.061 0.982 1.084 0.997 0.918 1.007 0.912
IBERDUERO 0.963 1.060 1.045 1.014 1.000 1.005 1.001 1.004
CSE 0.784 0.992 0.955 1.041 0.998 0.989 1.005 0.984
UNF 0.746 1.042 0.998 1.045 0.999 1.004 0.998 1.005
concluding rEmArks
In this chapter, we analysed the performance of Spain’s electricity distribution 
companies over the period 1988–2010. During this period, two major regulatory 
regimes were in force. From 1988 to 1997, a price-cap system with some 
characteristics of yardstick competition was applied. In 1998, a revenue-cap 
system was implemented. This system was broadly modified in 2008 to amend 
serious deficiencies in the previous framework. The transition between the two 
major systems brought with it the liberalisation of the sector and a significant 
increase in its concentration, characterised by numerous mergers and acquisitions.
We performed our analysis by extending the parametric approach framework 
proposed by Fuentes et al. (2001) and estimating a translog specification for the 
input-oriented distance function underlying production technology.
We observed that the sector increased its productivity over the period under 
consideration. We detected a significant improvement after the liberalisation 
process; however, we cannot say that those improvements are the consequence 
of an adequate system of regulation – on the contrary. Distribution companies 
reacted to an opaque and uncertain compensation system that did not encourage 
capital investments and quality improvements and wrongly assumed the existence 
of significant scale economies. The oversized system fostered under the price-
cap regime allowed companies to satisfy demand without making adequate 
capital investments, but also without compromising quality standards, although 
in recent years several episodes of blackouts have happened in some regions. 
This situation has made technical change the main driver of the productivity 
improvements in the sector.
In recent years, in spite of reforms, the sector’s productivity has been severely 
damaged. The rigidity and, in some cases, the indivisibility of some inputs, 
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together with the economic crisis, which has slashed demand for electricity, may 
explain these results. During this later period, the constant significant progress 
on technical change managed to offset the worsening technical efficiency change 
that has moved firms away from the production frontier.
It is too early to evaluate the impact of the recently introduced reforms on 
companies’ performance, and it is possible that some of their virtues are 
being obscured by the consequences of the economic crisis on the electricity 
demand. However, from our standpoint, bearing in mind the uniqueness of 
the application of this system around the world, the reforms have entailed 
significant improvements over the previous regulatory system. However, it is 
crucial that authorities allow the regulatory system to function correctly and 
avoid the possibility of using the remuneration of regulated activities to adjust 
electricity prices, as the government has done in recent years. In a context in 
which it is necessary to push down electricity tariffs as much as possible to 
offset the effect of the bulky deficit of demand in the sector, improvement in the 
sector’s performance is fundamental. It is also essential that consumers share 
part of these gains. Additionally, regulations should sufficiently encourage the 
investments that are necessary to guarantee the quality of service and to face the 
crucial future role that network activities will play in the development of more 
sustainable mixes of electrical generation and the implementation of demand 
response systems that respond quickly to demand.
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What Support Mechanism is Needed  
for Flexible Capacity in Belgium?
EstEllE cAntillon
7
In the spring of 2012, Belgians were pondering the timing of the phase-out of 
their country’s nuclear reactors. 85 A 2003 law had set 2015 as the date by which 
the first reactor would shut down. Much political uncertainty had remained 
surrounding this decision, however. Several leading politicians had repeatedly 
mentioned the possibility of delaying or even suspending the phase-out. The 
law itself contained a clause that stipulated that the exit decision could be 
reconsidered if the security of Belgium’s energy supply was at risk.
It is in this context that the Ministry of Economic Affairs was asked in early 
2012 to assess Belgium’s security of supply. The ministry’s report (Wathelet 
Report, 2012) used data on installed capacity and planned capacity additions and 
exits over the 2012–17 horizon to assess the country’s ability to meet electricity 
demand.86 It highlighted a risk of capacity shortage that, in some scenarios, would 
occur even before the decommissioning of the first nuclear reactors in 2015. The 
surprise was elsewhere, however. The report also documented increasing signs 
of excess capacity during base load – installed capacity in inflexible and ‘must-
run’ technologies increasingly exceeded the system’s minimum load.
This report, and its political use by various stakeholders, dramatically changed 
the nature of the policy debate around electricity in Belgium. From the ‘simple’ 
question about the ideal timing of the nuclear phase-out, the central debate 
became how to adapt Belgium’s electricity system to a world characterised by 
more energy from renewable sources. 
85 This chapter builds and expands on a policy brief that the author wrote in June 2012 in the context 
of the debate surrounding the timing of the nuclear phase-out in Belgium. The author is grateful for 
the suggestions, comments and expertise that Jan Bouckaert, Claude Crampes, Eric De Keuleneer, 
Natalia Fabra, and Thomas-Olivier Léautier shared. 
86 The report is available at: http://economie.fgov.be/fr/binaries/Rapport_moyens_production_
electricite_2012-2017_20120702_FR_tcm326-186312.pdf.
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In this chapter, I revisit the economic fundamentals behind the policy discussions 
in Belgium about the ability of liberalised electricity markets to provide adequate 
capacity in the presence of renewables. This discussion echoes similar debates 
that have been taking place in many other European countries (see, for example, 
European Commission, 2012). We argue that part of the specific problem with 
which Belgium is confronted is the consequence of uncoordinated policies for 
the support of renewables, on the one hand, and for the management of reserves 
and market operations, on the other. 
There are many ways to guarantee a country’s security of supply. However, they 
are not equivalent when it comes to their overall costs.87 In order to guarantee the 
country’s security of supply at the lowest cost, and more generally to help the 
transition of the country’s electricity system toward a world with more renewables, 
I define four principles that should guide the design of a solution: neutrality 
between electricity demand and supply, technological neutrality, accountability, 
and price transparency. I then propose a specific support mechanism for flexible 
capacity that Belgium could put in place to restore incentives for flexible capacity 
provision, and thereby ensure the country’s security of supply in the presence of 
renewables. The solution I propose comes down to an expanded role for the 
transmission system operator’s (TSO) tertiary reserves, a new mechanism for 
allocating and activating those reserves, and new cost-sharing rules.88 
This new mechanism has two distinctive features that ensure that security 
of supply is met at the lowest cost today and tomorrow. First, the mechanism 
optimises contributions to flexibility from both the demand side and the supply 
side. Contributions could come from the standard providers of flexible capacity, 
such as turbojets and pump storage, but it could also take other forms, such 
as interruptible contracts, distributed load-shedding, or another technology. 
Second, the mechanism uses a cost-sharing rule that provides incentives to 
market participants to take action and make investments that reduce the size of 
the required reserve. 
This proposal remains preliminary in several aspects. First, several key 
parameters of the mechanism and some technical aspects of its operationalisation 
require fine-tuning. Second, an important part of the fine-tuning has to do with 
political arbitrages – for example, between accountability and overall costs, 
and between taxpayers and consumers. I highlight those political arbitrages and 
discuss the trade-offs that they imply. 
Despite its preliminary nature, the proposal serves to illustrate:
•	 the implementation of the principles of neutrality, accountability, and 
transparency;
•	 the many different elements that make up the proposed flexible-capacity 
support mechanism and the considerations that should drive their design;
87 Independently of the equally important question of who should bear these costs.
88 Tertiary reserves refer to reserves that can be activated manually within 15 minutes. 
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•	 the different arbitrages that need to be made, and their implications; and
•	 the necessary coordination with other existing support and market 
mechanisms for electricity.
cAn libErAlisEd mArkEts providE thE nEcEssAry incEntivEs for AdEquAtE 
cApAcity invEstmEnt?
The liberalisation of electricity markets that has spread across industrialised 
countries since the 1990s rests on the idea that electricity production scales are 
small enough to ensure competition in generation and that wholesale markets can 
be designed in a way to foster competition while preserving system reliability 
(Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983; Al-Sunaidi and Green, 2006). 
A central question is whether markets can both ensure efficient short-term 
allocation of existing capacity and, at the same time, deliver the appropriate 
incentives for capacity investment. In this section, I review three limitations of 
liberalised electricity markets in providing appropriate incentives for capacity 
investment: the so-called missing-money problem that has been at the core of 
much of the discussion in the EU around capacity-support mechanisms, market 
power, and the public-good nature of reserves.89 I argue that the development of 
renewables exacerbates the missing-money problem and increases the role of 
reserves. 
Three sources of market failure for electricity capacity investment
High fixed costs and the missing-money problem
Electricity generation entails high fixed costs owing to the sizable investments 
required before producing the first kilowatt hour. To make these investments 
profitable, wholesale prices must be sufficient to cover not only the marginal 
costs of producing electricity, but also the fixed costs. This condition may not 
be satisfied for all technologies in markets that rely mostly on spot (i.e., day-
ahead and intraday) markets. Indeed, in a competitive wholesale spot market, 
competition pushes prices to the marginal cost of the most expensive technology 
(in terms of marginal costs) used. Thus, while infra-marginal technologies 
benefit from prices that are higher than their marginal costs and that contribute 
to covering fixed costs, this is not the case for the marginal technology (Figure 
89 Under some conditions, markets and the individual pursuit of self-interest by market participants 
guarantee efficient outcomes. When these conditions are not met, there is a case for public 
intervention (which can take many forms – among them regulation, standards, taxes, and subsidies) to 
restore efficiency. These cases are referred to as ‘market failures’ because markets, left unregulated, 
have proved unable to deliver efficient outcomes. Given the objective of this chapter, I focus on the 
ability of markets to generate proper investment incentives in electricity generation capacity and 
leave aside other reasons for public intervention in electricity markets. For simplicity, I also take 
electricity demand as given and ignore the inefficiency introduced by nonresponsive retail prices (on 
this specific problem, see Borenstein and Holland, 2005). 
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7.1).90 In practice, uncertainty about the actual number of hours a plant can hope 
to operate adds risks and further reduces investment incentives for the likely 
marginal plant.
Figure 7.1 The failure of prices to cover the fixed costs of the marginal 




Compeve supply (= ordered





Contribuon to fixed costs
for this technology
!
Prices cover only marginal
costs for the marginal
technology
Infra-marginal technologies
Market power and lack of competition in the generation market
Two peculiarities of electricity make its wholesale markets especially prone to 
the exercise of market power: 
•	 the fact that electricity is difficult to store; and
•	 the inelasticity of demand in the wholesale market. 
These features can make short-term withdrawals of capacity profitable; by 
withdrawing some capacity, a firm can significantly push wholesale prices 
up. The resulting extra profits that these higher prices generate for the infra-
marginal capacities (that is, those units that continue to produce) more than 
compensate for the profits lost from the withdrawn capacities. This is illustrated 
in Figure 7.2, where the withdrawn capacity corresponds to the thick horizontal 
line. These manoeuvres are made all the more profitable by the fact that a high 
fraction of the wholesale market goes through the spot market, and hedging 
activity is small. 
90 Note that this argument is independent from the often-heard argument according to which the source 
of the missing money problem is a price cap or political constraints on the level of spot prices 
(Joskow and Tirole, 2007; Léautier, 2012). The missing-money problem here arises from the different 
time horizon for investment and electricity production; capacity investment is sunk by the time the 
electricity (spot) markets operate. It would occur even in the absence of a price cap. 
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The perverse effects of market power are not limited to short-term capacity 
withdrawals, however. When a dominant firm analyses the opportunity to invest, 
it takes the likely effect of its investment on future electricity prices into account, 
and in particular on the prices at which it sells the electricity generated from its 
existing generation plants. This effect reduces incentives to invest.91 










Security of supply as a public good
A public good is a good that benefits all, in a non-rival way, without the possibility 
of excluding anyone from its consumption. Security of electricity supply92 has 
exactly these characteristics: when the system is balanced, all benefit from its 
quality; when this condition is not met, all are affected by a blackout, which 
effectively disconnects all existing capacities (Abbott, 2001; Joskow and Tirole, 
2007). 
Markets do not offer proper incentives for the provision of public goods. 
Individual market participants (such as generation firms and retail distributors) 
lack sufficient incentives to contribute, on their own, to the security of supply by, 
for example, maintaining sufficient backup capacity in case of failure in one of 
their generation plants. Indeed, such backup capacities are costly, and individual 
market participants will not integrate the benefit they provide to the other market 
participants when deciding on the level of backup they want to keep. 
91 Léautier (2012) argues, on the basis of a model calibrated to the French market, that market power is 
more important as a source of underinvestment than price caps. 
92 Security of supply entails two components: the ability of the system to meet demand (adequacy) 
and the ability of the system to withstand sudden disturbances such as electric short circuits or 
unanticipated electrical plant defaults (reliability).
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The public-good nature of security of supply explains why all liberalised 
electricity markets have a system operator that manages or ensures the availability 
of backup capacity.93
Relevance for Belgium
To what extent do these three sources of market failures (high fixed costs, 
market power, and security of supply as a public good) apply to Belgium? Here 
I argue that the current electricity market organisation and regulatory structure 
in Belgium provide sufficient incentives for capacity investments, except for 
flexible capacity. I further argue that the changing mix of electricity generation 
in Belgium calls for a broadening of the role of reserves. 
Structural factors of the Belgian market that constrain the exercise of market 
power
The Belgian electricity generation market is dominated by one firm; the historical 
operator, Electrabel, has close to a 70% market share. Nevertheless, two 
structural factors alleviate (but do not eliminate) the problem of underinvestment 
in capacity that this dominance can cause. 
•	 Low reliance on short-term markets. Only approximately 18% of 
electricity is traded through spot markets in Belgium. Most wholesale 
electricity is traded through long-term contracts. This reduces the 
effectiveness and profitability of the short-term capacity withdrawal 
manoeuvres described in the discussion of the sources of market failure.94 
Whether this argument also applies to capacity investments depends on 
the length of the ‘long-term contracts’ – that is, on the ability of new 
investments to significantly affect contract prices for current installed 
capacity (since this spillover is the source of the underinvestment), for 
which we have no information.
•	 Interconnections. Imports can provide competition for domestic 
producers, thereby further reducing their ability to exert market 
power. In Belgium, interconnection capacities stand at 3,500 MW 
(approximately 25% of peak load demand), and more is planned for the 
near future. Several signs suggest that these interconnections do play 
their role of increasing competition. First, wholesale prices in France, 
the Netherlands, and Belgium have converged over time as a result of 
the market coupling of power exchanges in the three countries. This is 
93 Typically, part of this balancing responsibility is transferred directly to the market via balancing 
responsible parties (BRPs) who aggregate demand and supply in a given zone and are given financial 
incentives to balance their positions. The residual imbalance is covered by reserves.
94 Note that there is an open case at the Competition Commission against Electrabel for abuse of market 
power through capacity withdrawal between January 2007 and June 2008 (SPF Économie press 
release, February 7, 2013).
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exactly what would be expected if imports were playing their competitive 
role.95 Second, imports respond to economic forces, not to capacity 
problems. Belgium is a net importer of electricity, while maintaining 
excess capacity during peak load. This suggests that imports are cheaper 
than domestic production at those times and that interconnections allow 
market participants to engage in arbitrage and secure lower prices.
The development of intermittent renewables exacerbates the missing-money 
problem for flexible units
The EU has, since 2001, made electricity production from renewable sources a 
priority. In 2008, that priority was expressed in the so-called 20-20-20 targets: a 
20% reduction in carbon, 20% of energy consumption coming from renewable 
sources, and a 20% improvement in energy efficiency by 2020. Belgium has 
committed to having 13% of its energy consumption coming from renewable 
sources by 2020. 
To achieve the national target, the country has put in place a system of tradable 
green certificates that reward electricity production from renewable sources, 
coupled with an obligation imposed on retailers that a fraction of their sales 
be covered by green certificates.96 The number of green certificates issued per 
MWh produced is technology-specific. It is essentially designed to compensate 
investors for cost differences across technologies and to ensure a sufficient 
financial return. Minimum price floors on the price of green certificates further 
reduce the risk that investors bear. 
The resulting growth of renewables in the electricity production mix (14.8% of 
installed capacity in 2012) has changed the residual load profile that conventional 
electricity generation plants have to serve. Figure 7.3 shows the evolution of 
the residual load profile in Belgium between 2010 and 2012.97 Residual load 
has systematically decreased over the past three years, reflecting the increase 
in electricity production from intermittent sources. The maximum load has not 
decreased to the same extent. In fact, the load that must be served just 1% of the 
time (less than 88 hours per year) increased slightly from 1,172 MW in 2010 to 
1,279 MW in 2012. 
95 CREG’s (2012) study on the level and evolution of prices shows a convergence of average monthly 
day-ahead wholesale prices across the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and France (see, in particular, 
Figure 26). Küpper et al. (2009) provide evidence of convergence at higher frequency. Higher 
frequencies are relevant because monthly prices may converge without peak prices converging – for 
example, because capacities are insufficient to ensure arbitrage). In their study of hourly wholesale 
price differences between France, the Netherlands, and Belgium in 2007, they find prices to be the 
same 60% of the time and Belgian wholesale prices to be higher less than 2% of the time. 
96 For the electricity producer, the price of the green certificate comes on top of whatever price it can 
command for its electricity in the market. 
97 For the purpose of Figure 7.3, residual load was computed as the difference between the load on the 
high-voltage grid and the electricity produced by windmills connected to the high-voltage grid, at a 
15-minute frequency (there are no other intermittent renewables connected to the high voltage grid). 
Decentralised electricity production from renewable sources (for example, solar panels on individual 
houses) is implicitly included in the net load observed on the high-voltage grid. The data come from 
Elia, the national TSO.
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Figure 7.3 Residual load in Belgium (in MW), as a function of the number of 
hours in the year it is called, 2010–12
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Figure 7.4 shows the consequence of this changing load profile and of the priority 
that renewables have in the merit order. While the average number of hours of 
operation of nuclear reactors in Belgium has been fairly stable in recent years 
(and close to the maximum of 8,760 hours), the number of hours during which 
combined heat power (CHP) gas turbines have been operating has decreased by 
more than 40% in three years. Operation times for the more expensive peak units 
have decreased by almost 100%.  
Figure 7.4 Evolution of the average number of hours of operation for different 
categories of electricity generation technologies
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Source: Belgian Energy Observatory, 2012, taken from Wathelet Report (2012).
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This is where the current paradox lies: on the one hand, intermittent sources of 
electricity increase the need for flexible backup capacity in the system; on the 
other hand, their effect on prices and on operation times for flexible units actually 
reduces the profitability of these units. As of 2012, four gas turbines were slated 
to close within the next two years, three of them for economic reasons (SPF 
Économie, 2012, pp. 28). 
Broadening the scope of application of the ‘public good’ argument
As argued above, security of supply – in its two dimensions of reliability and 
adequacy – is a public good that liberalised markets will not provide adequately. 
The traditional view of reserves largely focuses on the reliability dimension 
of security of supply (see, for example, Hirst and Kirby, 1997). Reserves are 
designed to cope with unexpected events such as outages and forecast errors. 
The development of intermittent sources of electricity adds additional forecast 
errors into the system and therefore increases the levels of required reserves to 
ensure the reliability of the system. Elia (2013) provides an illustration of this 
phenomenon in the Belgian context. 
There is, however, an argument for extending the role of reserves to cover the 
adequacy dimension of security of supply as well as the reliability dimension. 
Indeed, the structural change in the production mix that is taking place, and in 
particular the increasing need for flexible units and the concomitant reduction in 
the number of hours during which they operate (Figures 7.3 and 7.4), no longer 
guarantees that the known few hours per year during which flexible capacity 
will be called upon will be sufficient to cover their fixed costs. At the same 
time, the public good argument applies equally to the provision of capacity 
for these few hours: ensuring adequate supply during those few hours benefits 
all market participants in a largely non excludable way.98 The role of reserves 
should therefore go beyond the ability to meet unexpected demand and supply 
shocks, to also secure adequacy of supply during these few known hours of peak 
load demand. 
bElgium’s sEcurity of supply in thE broAdEr EnErgy policy contExt
In the previous section, we argued that in the Belgian context, there is an 
argument for expanding the role of reserves to explicitly account for the adequacy 
dimension of security of supply. In this section, we cast this particular issue 
within the broader context of electricity sector policy in Belgium and define four 
principles that should drive the search for a solution. 
Belgium’s electricity system was designed in the 1960s in the context of a 
vertically integrated structure. The vision then was that of a production mix 
relying on nuclear technology to serve the base load and on more flexible 
technologies to serve the rest of the load profile. 
98 Priorities for disconnection can be set to avoid a full blackout. 
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The European energy agenda, and Belgium’s commitments under that agenda, 
are challenging this vision. The development of renewables is decreasing the 
required base load and increasing the need for flexibility. This has operational 
and financial implications at all levels in the system.
Multiple objectives for electricity sector policy
One very simple way to summarise the problem that Belgium faces when it 
comes to its electricity sector policy is to say that the country is juggling four 
different objectives:99 
•	 The development of renewables, as part of its commitments under the 
European energy agenda
•	 The assurance of the country’s security of supply
•	 Cost-effectiveness – that is, the ability to achieve these two first 
objectives at the lowest cost for society100 
•	 Dynamic efficiency – that is, the ability of policies to generate the proper 
signals to secure cost-effectiveness in the long run.
One reading of the situation highlighted in the 2012 report of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs is that the country has had one set of instruments to reach the 
first objective (the system of green certificates and the various capacity subsidies 
and tax breaks) and one set of instruments to reach the second objective (the 
wholesale market and the TSO’s system of reserves), but the two sets of 
instruments were not coordinated. 
•	 On the one hand, the support mechanisms in place for renewables have 
ignored their impact on investment incentives for other technologies and 
on balancing needs. They have increased the need for flexible capacity 
while worsening the economic conditions for private provision of that 
capacity. They have also increased balancing needs.
•	 On the other hand, the TSO’s system of reserves was not designed to deal 
with the impact of renewables on the system’s reliability and adequacy 
99 In reality, the problem is much more complex than the pursuit of these four objectives because of 
additional constraints and concerns. For example, the solution must be politically and institutionally 
feasible, it must be sufficiently simple to implement (administrative feasibility), it must be equitable 
(who will pay?), and it must be able to secure a smooth transition between short- and long-term 
objectives. We will return to some of these additional constraints and objectives when we describe 
our proposal. 
100 Cost-effectiveness is an input to other related objectives such as industrial competitiveness (through 
low electricity prices) and redistribution (through low electricity prices to consumers).
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requirements. More generally, market and reserve operations are largely 
based on the idea that supply reacts to demand, rather than the reverse.
The failure to coordinate these two instruments has introduced a number of 
distortions that endanger security of supply while reducing short-term cost-
effectiveness and dynamic efficiency. 
Four principles to guide the search for a solution
How should we solve this problem? Since we are not starting from scratch, a 
realistic option is to build on the existing instruments, seeking to make them 
more compatible with one another and better adapted to the current and future 
electricity production mix. 
We now describe and discuss four principles that should guide the search for a 
solution in order to ensure that the objectives of development of renewables and 
security of supply are met at the lowest cost (cost-effectiveness) both today and 
tomorrow (dynamic efficiency).
Neutrality between electricity demand and electricity supply
Demand and supply neutrality is a principle that is relevant mainly for the 
security-of-supply objective. It says that the solution should not only allow both 
supply-side (backup capacity, storage) and demand-side (interruptible contracts, 
load-shifting schemes) contributions to the adequacy of supply and demand, but 
also that it should integrate these in a neutral way. That is, the rules for demand-
side and supply-side contributions should be the same and depend only on the 
characteristics of the contributions (size, reliability, duration, ramp-up time, 
etc.), not on where they come from. (Ultimately, what we care about is adequate 
balance between demand and supply, not where the contribution comes from.)
Applying exactly the same rules to all contributions will decrease the costs of 
maintaining the security of supply for at least two reasons: 
•	 Having the same rules of participation for both demand and supply 
contributions will foster competition (since demand-side contributions 
will compete with supply-side contributions).
•	 Rewarding equal contributions from each side equally will ensure that 
we select the most economical way of ensuring adequacy. 
The way tertiary reserves (manual activation, maximum 15-minute ramp-up 
time) are currently procured in Belgium provides an illustration of the failure 
of demand and supply neutrality. Although tertiary reserves are made up of 
both supply contributions and demand contributions (the latter in the form of 
interruptible contracts), the call for tenders is separate for each side, and the total 
size of the reserve is split in advance between the supply side (approximately 
two-thirds of the size of the reserve) and the demand side. Moreover, while the 
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supply-side contributions are selected on a competitive basis, the price at which 
demand-side contributions are rewarded is not set competitively but instead 
is linked to prices observed on the supply side.101 Therefore, demand-side 
contributions and supply-side contributions do not compete with one another to 
secure the lowest cost for the reserves. 
Technological neutrality
Technological neutrality means that the solution should treat technologies as a 
function of their contribution to the objective, not according to their names (gas, 
wind, nuclear, or cogeneration). The motivation for this principle is very much 
like the motivation for demand and supply neutrality: ensuring the largest pool 
of contributors and minimising costs. 
Technologically neutral rules also promote innovation and therefore contribute 
to dynamic efficiency because any new ways of contributing to the objectives 
can automatically be accepted without requiring new rules or regulations. 
One potential concern with technological neutrality is that, sometimes, 
new technologies may need additional support to compensate for significant 
adoption costs or for the learning and economies-of-scale benefits that 
early adopters generate for later adopters. This is fine. What the principle of 
technological neutrality says is that, given an objective (such as security of 
supply), all technologies that can contribute to the objective should be put on 
the same footing. It does not prevent having, in addition, a support scheme for 
new technologies to meet another objective (such as internalising the benefits 
of learning economies). In fact, the transparency principle below will advocate 
making these two schemes as transparent as possible with regard to the objective 
pursued and how the specific support meets that objective. 
Belgium’s system of green certificates provides an example of a support 
mechanism that is not technologically neutral: the number of certificates 
received per MWh produced is largely driven by financial cost differences 
across technologies rather than by their respective contributions to decreasing 
the carbon intensity of electricity or compensating early adopters for the benefits 
that they generate for later adopters. 
Accountability
The principle of accountability says that market participants should be held 
accountable as much as possible for the effect of their actions on the objectives, 
especially when these participants have control over those actions (that is, 
when they can adapt or change them).102 Actions that contribute to meeting the 
objectives should be rewarded. Actions that make the objectives harder to reach 
should be penalised.
101 See http://www.elia.be/en/products-and-services/ancillary-services/purchase-of-ancillary-services 
(accessed July 2013).
102 Otherwise, accountability merely induces a redistribution of the costs.
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Accountability is important because it can trigger changes in actions and 
behaviour that help reduce costs. The following examples help illustrate the 
effect of accountability, or lack thereof, on costs in the context of reserves. 
In both examples, the action of one market participant increases the need for 
flexibility. This has a cost. By holding that market participant accountable for the 
impact of his or her action on the size of reserves, one can direct action toward 
less costly outcomes for society. 
•	 Example 1: Consider two renewable sources of energy; one is intermittent, 
the other is not. Both sources contribute equally to the objective of a low-
carbon economy, but the first increases the need for flexible capacity. 
Accountability implies that this intermittent technology should bear a 
greater fraction of the costs of reserves than the other. This will affect 
the relative profitability of both technologies in favour of technologies 
that do not increase the need for flexible capacity, and it will provide 
incentives for innovations that reduce intermittency. 
•	 Example 2: Consider two large electricity consumers (industrial 
customers), one with a very stable load profile at peak time and one 
with a very variable load profile at peak time. The second consumer 
increases the amount of flexible capacity needed in the system, which 
has a cost. Accountability requires that this consumer should bear a 
greater fraction of the costs of the adequacy reserves, which can trigger 
efforts on the part of the consumer to smooth its consumption or install 
some cogeneration capacity for peak times.
As in most other countries, responsibility for balancing supply and demand 
on the Belgian grid is partly delegated to market participants. This is done 
through ‘balancing responsible parties’ (BRPs), which are supply-and-demand 
aggregators with responsibility for balancing in their predefined areas. This 
responsibility is coupled with penalties in the event of imbalances. The penalties 
help internalise the costs of their demand and supply profile on reserves and 
provide some elements of accountability. It is useful to note, however, that this 
internalisation is partial, because the penalties are based on actual imbalances, 
whereas reserve requirements are based on potential imbalances. Moreover, 
offshore wind benefitted until recently from a preferential treatment in terms of 
penalties (De Vos et al., 2011). 
Price and signal transparency 
As in any other market, transparent prices and signals help guide market 
participants’ behaviour and investments by aligning their economic incentives to 
actions that are desirable at the system level. 
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A support mEchAnism for flExibility in bElgium
The transition of the Belgian electricity system toward a system that is more 
compatible with a high penetration rate of renewables is a long-term endeavour 
that will require changes at many levels – among them, the way renewables are 
subsidised and integrated into the market and the way demand contributes to 
system flexibility. In this section, we propose a solution for the flexible capacity 
problem that Belgium faces as a result of the development of renewables.103 This 
solution takes the form of an expansion of the role of the TSO’s reserves (which 
we will refer to as adequacy reserves) and a new mechanism for allocating and 
activating those reserves. The new mechanism builds explicitly on the four 
principles laid out in the previous section. 
Overview 
The idea is to secure enough flexible capacity, very broadly defined, not only 
to deal with accidents and forecast errors (the traditional role of reserves) but 
also to serve the few hours per year of very high demand when intermittent 
sources are not available. In other words, in our proposal, the TSO not only 
rewards market participants for making capacity available in case of accidents 
and forecast errors, as it is the case today, but also rewards some participants for 
making flexible capacity available to cover the known few hours per year when 
demand is very high or production from renewables is very low. The rationale is 
that explained previously: these market participants provide a public good to the 
rest of the system by avoiding blackouts during these few hours, but the market 
as it is presently configured and regulated does not compensate them for this. 
How to procure this flexible capacity is critical to ensure that this capacity 
comes at the lowest possible cost for market participants and that proper signals 
are generated for future capacity investments. The mechanism we propose has 
two ingredients that help lower costs. 
Demand- and supply-neutral and technology-neutral rules for determining who 
can contribute capacity and how ‘capacity contributors’ are selected
The idea here is to encourage participation from every possible source as long 
as it satisfies a few key technical conditions, such as controllability, a maximum 
activation lag, and minimum time availability. In other words, this capacity 
is likely to come from gas turbines, pump storage, interruptible contracts, 
decentralised load-shedding, and technologies yet to be developed. Applying the 
same rules to all these sources fosters competition, innovation, and the selection 
of the least-cost solution to the flexible capacity problem. 
103 Alternatives include horizontal integration of producers of intermittent and flexible energy, contracts, 
and public subsidies, to cite just a few (see, for example, Ambec and Crampes, 2012). The common 
element in all these solutions is the idea that intermittent sources must cross-subsidise flexible 
sources. In our view, one merit of the proposal offered here is its ability to integrate the demand side 
and its scalability according to needs. 
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Cost-sharing rules that foster accountability
As discussed earlier, the behaviour of some market participants increases the 
need for adequacy reserves. The idea is to make those market participants bear a 
greater share of the costs of the system. This ensures that they have incentives to 
adapt their behaviour in ways that benefit the system as a whole. 
Beyond new rules for participation, selection, and cost-sharing, the proposed 
mechanism also involves new rules for activation. Indeed, a part of the reserves is 
designed to cover predicted peaks in demand. This part is therefore an alternative 
to the spot market for the demand side (energy suppliers/distributors and large 
customers). In the proposed mechanism, reserves can be activated either by the 
TSO or from the demand side (via the TSO). Activations from the demand side 
are charged at full cost to the requesting party to avoid opportunistic behaviour 
by market participants that might be tempted to activate the reserve instead of 
using the spot market. 
This mechanism is compatible with the other support mechanisms in place, 
especially green certificates. To the extent that intermittent sources of energy 
are, as proposed, held accountable for their impact on the required adequacy 
reserves, there is no longer a tension between the objectives of promotion of 
renewables and security of supply. Non-intermittent sources of renewables 
will continue to benefit from the support of green certificates; the support for 
intermittent sources of renewables will be corrected for their impact on the 
reserve requirements. This correction creates incentives for new production 
systems that combine intermittent sources with storage capabilities or make 
them less intermittent and therefore foster dynamic efficiency. 
Details
In this section, we discuss in detail the various components of our proposed 
flexibility support mechanism: (i) the determination of the optimal size of the 
adequacy reserve; (ii) the definition of what should be procured; (iii) bidding 
rules, activation merit order, and award criteria; (iv) activation rules and 
settlement prices; and (v) cost-sharing. For each decision, we highlight the trade-
offs at play, as well as remaining grey areas. 
Size of the adequacy reserve
How large should the adequacy reserve be? Clearly, the larger it is, the lower the 
risk of blackout but the higher the costs. It is therefore important to assess the 
optimal size of the reserve. 
One way to do this is to evaluate the capacity that is called less often than the 
minimum amount of hours per year needed to make that capacity financially 
viable using a given flexible capacity generation technology. 
The value of this ‘unprofitable flexible capacity’ (which needs to be computed) 
depends on several factors, including the importance of installed intermittent 
capacity in the system (the more important, the larger it will be); the degree 
of base-load overcapacity (the higher, the larger the unprofitable capacity); the 
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system load profile, in particular the difference between the peak demand and the 
base demand (the flatter and smoother, the lower the unprofitable capacity); and 
developments in interconnected markets. It can be scaled up or down according 
to changes in these drivers. In particular, any developments in the integration 
of demand-side management into the spot market will reduce the size of the 
adequacy reserve. Note also that because the adequacy reserve is also intended to 
cover expected peaks, its optimal size may vary across time and be larger during 
peak times. 
What should be procured?
In the proposal, market participants are asked to offer flexible capacity over 
some period of time. In line with the principles of demand-supply neutrality 
and technological neutrality, the origin of that capacity or consumption load-
shedding should not matter as long as:
•	 it is dispatchable within 15 minutes (the current standard for Belgium’s 
tertiary reserve);
•	 its reliability has been certified by the TSO (as are all contributions to 
Belgium’s tertiary reserve); and
•	 it is available for a minimum amount of time (to be determined on the 
basis of operational considerations).
One open question concerns the frequency of capacity tender calls and the 
time frame covered by these calls. There is a trade-off here. One the one hand, 
calls that cover a relatively long period (say, one year) and are held sufficiently 
in advance of the time they are used allow for greater planning by market 
participants. This is favourable to new investments in capacity.104 On the other 
hand, commitments of such long term can be difficult to make for demand-side 
participants whose activity is harder to forecast. It would be worthwhile to study 
this trade-off closely using market data and interviews of potential participants. 
It may be optimal to auction part of the capacity well ahead of time and for long 
periods, and the other part through more frequent auctions. 
Bidding rules, activation merit order, and award criteria
In the simplest form of the mechanism, participants should bid on the following 
items: flexible capacity available (MW), a price for making that flexible capacity 
available for a given period of time (€/MW per hour), a price for the actual 
energy used (€/MWh), and a maximum amount of time for which the capacity 
will be available. 
The mechanism should then select the best offers to cover the adequacy 
reserve needs. These best offers are those that cover the adequacy reserve needs 
104 To be clear, in my proposal, the rules apply equally to new and existing sources of capacities. 
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and minimise expected costs, taking into account the probability of activating 
each reserve. This is a fairly straightforward optimisation problem. It also yields 
the optimal activation rule (activation merit order) for the capacity in question.
There are two additional concerns to address. First, to ensure full technological 
neutrality, participants should also be able to bid on activation costs, because 
ramp-up is costly for some technologies. Conceptually this is simple; it makes 
the optimisation problem more complex only because one will now need to 
account for the time profile of activations and the likelihood of these activations. 
The second concern relates to incentives. How can we be sure, given these 
award criteria, that market participants do not manipulate their bids? Ensuring 
enough competition is a first answer to this, which is why ensuring neutrality for 
demand, supply, and technology is essential. A second answer lies in carefully 
crafting the settlement rules (that is, the payments to be made to winning 
bidders), a question to which we turn next.
Activation rules and settlement prices
Because the adequacy reserve substitutes for the spot market in case of extremely 
high demand peaks, demand-side participants should be able to request its 
activation when needed. 
This raises the question of how activations and energy used from the reserve 
should be charged to those participants to avoid abusive activations of the 
reserve (even when supply is available on the spot market or through imports) or 
opportunistic behaviour whereby demand-side participants become less prudent 
than today in their use of long-term contracts and the day-ahead market, thereby 
increasing the size of the adequacy reserve needed (and thus its costs). My 
suggestion is that participants requesting the activation of the reserve be charged 
at full cost (that is, the price of the capacity used, plus the price of the MWh 
drawn, plus the activation fee). 
Cost-sharing and accountability
The costs of the adequacy reserve, as described here, amount to the price paid 
for the unused capacity (since any used capacity is charged at its full cost to the 
market participants that activated it). Because this adequacy reserve is a public 
good that benefits all market participants, it is logical that those who benefit 
from it should pay for it.
The principle of accountability implies that the cost-sharing rule should oblige 
participants whose actions increase reserve requirements to assume a larger 
share of these costs. Such a cost-sharing rule will foster lower costs and generate 
more accurate investment signals than a simple pro rata rule under which all 
consumers are charged according to their consumption.
In the current context, this means taking the model suggested earlier to 
determine the size of the optimal adequacy reserves, and applying that model 
to the task of assessing the required adequacy reserve induced by specific 
consumption patterns or production technologies. The idea is then to charge the 
cost of the added adequacy reserve to these specific market participants (or the 
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relevant BRP).105 What will remain is an incompressible adequacy reserve, the 
cost of which can be charged to all consumers according to their consumption 
or some other metric.106
Accountability is a politically sensitive issue. Three remarks are in order here. 
First, accountability is not new to electricity markets, and in particular to the 
Belgian electricity market, in which BRPs are incentivised to maintain balance 
in their respective areas. Second, accountability is useful only when market 
participants can adapt their behaviour as a result, for example, by smoothing 
their consumption or bundling their windmill-to-storage capability. It has little 
value otherwise (because it is only about the sharing of total costs, rather than 
minimising them). This can be an argument for deciding to protect some market 
participants from accountability. Third, it must be clear that there is a trade-off 
between accountability and total costs. Reducing accountability increases costs, 
which are eventually borne by firms, consumers, or taxpayers. If the goal is to 
keep electricity prices affordable, accountability should be encouraged.
Relationship with other schemes and markets
Relationship with Elia’s current system of reserves
The proposed mechanism would be managed by the TSO as part of its public 
service obligation. Because the flexibility requirements for the adequacy reserve 
are essentially the same as those for the existing tertiary reserve, there is an 
argument for merging the adequacy reserve with the tertiary reserve (with the 
result that the resulting reserve would be the sum of the adequacy reserve and 
the tertiary reserve). Indeed, it can be difficult in practice to determine which 
events are supposed to be covered by the traditional role of the tertiary reserve 
as opposed to the adequacy reserve. Furthermore, any non-fungibility between 
the two reserves can only raise costs. The proposed procurement scheme (Who 
can offer capacity? How are offers selected?), the proposed activation rules, and 
the proposed cost-sharing rules differ very much from those currently in play for 
the tertiary reserve. They are, however, entirely compatible with the role of the 
tertiary reserve.
Role for interconnections
Interconnections increase the size of the ‘effective market’ over which demand 
and supply interact. This has great economic benefits: more competition and 
therefore lower electricity prices. At the technical level, interconnections bring 
105 Note that this is a harder problem than it seems because marginal impacts may not be well-defined. 
The marginal impact of a windmill will be different depending on whether there is another windmill 
in the system whose production is not perfectly correlated with that of the first. In the latter case, the 
volatility in production is lower, requiring lower reserves. 
106 There are many alternative possibilities, depending on redistribution concerns (making retail 
consumers bear less) and competitiveness concerns (making industrial customers bear less). The rule 
adopted does not influence the cost of the mechanism.
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both costs (exposure to supply or demand shocks abroad) and benefits (lower 
variability of intermittent sources). 
One open question concerns the potential role of interconnections and imports 
in the proposed flexible capacity mechanism. A priori, allowing bidding by 
providers of flexible capacity abroad can only decrease the costs of the support 
mechanism, which is a good thing. On the other hand, periods of peak demand 
are fairly correlated within the interconnected grid, and risks of blackouts abroad 
could affect the availability of imported flexible capacity. There is therefore a 
trade-off here between total costs and risks, which needs to be assessed, taking 
the capacity situation in neighbouring countries into account before deciding 
whether foreign providers can bid to provide flexible capacity. One possibility is 
to place a limit on the share of foreign flexible capacity. 
Relationship with the spot market
One key consequence of the expansion of the role of reserves to account for 
known demand peaks is that the adequacy reserve becomes a substitute for the 
spot market. As a consequence, the reserve will necessarily put a cap on the spot 
price. It may also decrease volumes in the spot market, which can hurt liquidity. 
In our view, the proposed pricing of the reserve when activated by demand-
side participants (full-costing) minimises these potential adverse effects, but the 
interactions between the two must be assessed and monitored carefully.
It may be useful to organise the market for reserve takeoffs via Belpex, the 
Belgian electricity exchange, to ease comparisons between the spot price and the 
reserve takeoff price and to foster transparency.
Support for renewables
The proposed mechanism is entirely compatible with the existence of another 
capacity support mechanism for renewables. In fact, it is designed to adapt to 
developments in the installed capacity of intermittent sources of electricity. 
The fact that intermittent sources of energy will be charged according to their 
impact on reserve requirements contributes to transparency by distinguishing 
their contributions to the two different objectives of promoting renewables and 
assuring security of supply. 
Absent changes to the existing system of green certificates, the proposed cost-
sharing rule will tilt the balance toward non-intermittent sources of electricity 
within renewables or foster solutions that will transform intermittent sources 
into non-intermittent sources (for example, through storage). In that sense, the 
proposed solution will move Belgium away from the current hands-off policy 
regarding the optimal mix of renewable production and toward the most cost-
effective mix. 
Link with demand-side management
The irregularity of the load profile (the difference between base load and peak 
load, but also the fact that peak loads occur only a few hours per day) drives 
not only the need for flexible capacity but also its economic profitability (that 
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is, how many hours it operates). Smoother load profiles contribute to lowering 
costs by decreasing the time during which capacities are idle. Demand-side 
management measures such as retail peak/off-peak tariffs have exactly this role. 
Any further development in the integration of demand-side contributions to 
the wholesale market will reduce the required size of the adequacy reserve and 
therefore reduce its costs. 
The demand- and supply-neutral design, as well as the cost-sharing rule of the 
proposed flexible capacity mechanism, fosters the integration of demand-side 
management into the mechanism:
•	 The design is made to optimise contributions to flexible capacity from 
the demand side. 
•	 The cost-sharing rule provides incentives to large consumers and local 
energy suppliers to smooth their load profiles. More generally, this cost-
sharing rule fosters the integration of demand-side contributions to the 
operations of wholesale markets.
EpiloguE
The report of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the resulting plan that the 
state secretary for energy proposed to the government in June 2012 (Wathelet 
Report, 2012) were game-changers. Whereas, before, the debate had been cast 
mainly in terms of Belgium’s opportunity to continue to rely on nuclear power, 
the talk in town became how to adapt Belgium’s electricity system to a world 
characterised by more electricity from renewable sources. Discussions shifted 
from electricity production to the electricity system, including transmission, 
interconnections, production, and demand. This was quite revolutionary in the 
Belgian context.
Much has happened since then. First, Elia, the TSO, has moved from a 
traditional N-1 method of computing reserve requirements to a method that 
accounts for both supply shocks (outages) and demand shocks (forecast errors).107 
This is important because intermittent sources of renewable electricity increase 
the likelihood and size of forecast errors. Second, industrial clients, which 
already had been contributing to the tertiary reserve, started to participate in the 
operations of the primary reserve in 2013, and there are calls by the regulator and 
the TSO for further participation of the demand side in the operation of reserves 
(CREG, 2012; Elia, 2013). Third, rules for load-shedding to avoid a blackout 
in the event of predicted insufficient capacity were clarified. Fourth, support 
for solar panels and offshore wind has been adapted to correct for the windfall 
profits that investment in these technologies offered in a context of falling costs.
107 N-1 methods refer to deterministic methods that evaluate the size of reserve requirements in terms of 
the size of the largest production unit. 
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Other measures are being discussed, including operational standards to 
maximize the flexibility of new production units. There are also discussions 
about the possible curtailment of renewables and cogeneration units in case 
of overcapacity (Elia, 2013). These measures all go in the right direction, by 
removing obstacles to demand participation in the management of reserves and 
to the operations of markets, and by removing earlier distortions. 
Measures under discussion to ensure electricity adequacy remain a sore spot, 
however. In the original Wathelet report, two measures were proposed to ensure 
adequacy:108 the creation of a ‘strategic reserve’ made up of flexible units that 
existing operators wished to close down, and a call for tenders for the construction 
of new combined heat power gas turbines. Neither of these proposed measures 
satisfied any of the four principles that we have outlined in this chapter.109 By 
focusing on generation, they did not treat supply and demand in a neutral way. 
By focusing on gas, they were not technology neutral. Cost audits (which are 
notoriously subject to manipulation), instead of competition, would determine 
the financial remuneration of these units. The proposed cost-sharing schemes 
did not encourage accountability, as the cost would be charged to consumers on 
the basis of their consumption, in the case of the strategic reserve, and would be 
financed by a charge on nuclear production, in the case of the call for tenders. 
These measures were heavily criticised, even by partners in the coalition. 
In July 2013, the government approved a modification of the ‘strategic 
reserve’, whereby demand-side contributions by industrial clients and demand 
aggregators could compete with closing production units to offer capacity. This 
is an improvement that moves in the direction of the adequacy reserve proposed 
in this chapter (although details of the tender mechanism were not known at 
the time of writing this chapter). The government also confirmed, on the same 
occasion, its intention to tender 800 MW of new gas capacity. In our view, 
this additional mechanism would not be needed if the new ‘strategic reserve/
adequacy reserve’ were properly designed and sized. 
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edited by Antonio Estache
“In energy policy, big ideas may be needed, but the devil is often in the 
details.  This book combines assessments of broad policy decisions with 
a closer look at some of the issues raised as those major policies come 
into effect.  It starts with the EU’s main targets for energy – the 20% 
reductions in carbon emissions and energy intensity, and the 20% share 
of renewable energy – and its flagship Emissions Trading System.  Later 
chapters consider the current (in)efficiency of European energy use, the 
potential of the smart grid, how regulation can affect productivity in 
electricity distribution and how to pay for the flexible generators that 
will be needed alongside less flexible low-carbon plants.  The book will be 
useful for policymakers, those working in the electricity industry and those 
studying it.”
Richard Green, Alan and Sabine Howard Professor of Sustainable Energy 
Business, Imperial College London
“This is a much-needed book for policymakers, scholars and any 
serious student of energy policy in today’s complex environment. The 
contributions unravel the current European energy framework and point 
out shortcomings, incoherences, gaps and mismanaged uncertainties 
that lead to suboptimal outcomes. They also show the way forward for 
an effective European energy policy including the always complicated 
mix of national and supranational jurisdictions. The mixture of normative 
and empirical analysis offered by the book will prove useful to those 
implementing policy reform in European energy.”
Jose Luis Guasch, Professor Emeritus, University of California San Diego; 
Former Senior Adviser on Regulation and Competitiveness, and Head of 
the World Bank Global Expert Team on PPPs
“Energy economics is dead … long live energy economics. This book 
provides the most up-to-date analysis of current challenges to energy 
economics and energy policy in Europe, covering environmental, planning, 
distributional issues as well as traditional issues such as generation 
adequacy. A must-read for those interested in ‘the next generation’ of 
energy economics.”
Christian von Hirschhausen, Professor of Economic and Infrastructure 
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